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 Preface 
The Asia Foundation is pleased to present Afghanistan in 2013: A Survey of the Afghan People.
This annual nationwide opinion survey, currently in it its ninth year, is unique in Afghanistan due to 
its long duration and broad scope. It provides insights into Afghans’ views on the most critical issues 
facing the country, including security, national reconciliation, the economy, development and essen-
tial services, the quality of governance and political participation, corruption, justice, gender equality, 
and access to information. Over the years the Foundation has maintained a core set of questions for 
longitudinal comparison, while including select new questions each year to solicit public opinion on 
additional topics of interest. 
Expert survey teams were deployed in July 2013 to gather the opinions and perspectives of a na-
tionally representative sample of 9,260 Afghan men and women. 962 male and female enumerators 
conducted face-to-face interviews across all 34 provinces of the country, often under challenging 
conditions. To meet more aggressive margins of error, this year’s sample size represents nearly a 47% 
increase from previous years. ACSOR-Surveys, a respected Afghan market and opinion research firm, 
is the Foundation’s longstanding in-country survey partner. This year, for the first time the Foun-
dation contracted with the Kabul-based Sayara Media Group to conduct independent, third party 
monitoring for survey quality control.
In the spirit of continual improvement, the Foundation has made some important changes to the sur-
vey presentation this year. We have increased the analysis available in the survey book, highlighting 
in particular those findings that are the most interesting, surprising, and useful for policy, program-
ming, and further research in Afghanistan. We also conducted extensive in-house statistical analysis 
to draw out significant differences in opinion based on respondents’ region, ethnicity, income, gen-
der, and other characteristics. The Foundation and its survey partners are committed to ensuring 
the survey’s data validity, reliability, timeliness, precision, and integrity; we have included a more 
comprehensive technical Appendix this year that describes the survey methodology in detail. As we 
did in 2012, we will make public the full 2013 survey dataset on the Foundation’s interactive data 
visualization site, Visualizing Afghanistan.
This year’s Survey of the Afghan People reflects some unease in the country as Afghans approach the 
2014 election and transition, in which the Afghan government will assume full responsibility for 
security and development in the country as NATO-led forces draw down. Afghans continue to be 
worried about insecurity, corruption, and unemployment. Over the past year, there has been a sharp 
increase in fears about personal safety, and over half of the country expressed fear about voting in a 
national election. Public confidence in a wide range of public officials and institutions is at an eight-
year low, and public satisfaction with the performance of all levels of subnational government has 
declined. Despite these significant concerns, the survey also reveals considerable public optimism in 
some areas. A majority of Afghans continue to report that the country is going in the right direction, 
and a sizeable and growing number give national government performance a positive assessment. 
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Afghans express high levels of satisfaction with several basic services in their community, including 
education and drinking water. There is widespread awareness of the government’s reconciliation ef-
forts, and most Afghans surveyed say these efforts can stabilize the country. A majority of Afghans 
report that they believe that elections in their country are generally free and fair, and that the upcom-
ing election has potential to improve their lives. 
Across the Asia-Pacific region, The Asia Foundation supports empirical research and surveys to help 
to inform public policy and development programs. The findings presented in A Survey of the Afghan 
People may have particularly high relevance in Afghanistan in 2014, as political parties and candidates 
shape their election platforms and voters consider their choices. Since our Kabul office re-opened 
in 2002, The Asia Foundation has assisted Afghan efforts to rebuild the country and accelerate de-
velopment. We hope that the comprehensive findings will continue to help illuminate the complex 
environment in Afghanistan, and increase understanding and collaboration between the Afghan gov-
ernment, development partners, and local communities as they work together in the years ahead. 
David D. Arnold 
President, The Asia Foundation 
November 2013
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1  Executive Summary
Afghanistan in 2013: A Survey of the Afghan People is The Asia Foundation’s ninth annual public opin-
ion survey in Afghanistan. Not only does this survey document Afghans’ assessment of the current 
situation in their country in critical areas of governance and development, it has also established a 
statistically valid, longitudinal barometer of how people perceive changes in their country over time.
Expert survey teams were deployed from July 17 and July 25, 2013 to gather the opinions and per-
spectives of a nationally representative sample of 9,260 Afghan men and women. 962 male and female 
enumerators conducted face-to-face interviews across all 34 provinces of the country, often under 
challenging conditions. Respondents were all 18 years of age or older, including 14% from urban 
households and 86% from rural households. The average interview length was 38 minutes, with a 
range of 20 to 80 minutes. To meet more aggressive margins of error, this year’s sample size represents 
nearly a 47% increase from previous years.
Important advances were made in ensuring both the quality and accuracy of the data in 2013. The 
sampling error is a quality indicator that measures overall statistical confidence in the statements that 
can be made about the survey findings. For 2013 the sampling error for five key questions is +/- 
1.10% at 95% confidence level. The design effect also is a quality indicator measuring the difference 
between the actual sampling error and the intended or theoretical sampling error if random sampling 
had been achieved. In 2013 the design effect for five key questions is less than 2.33 (+/- 0.04). 
1.1  National mood
•	 Direction of the country. A majority of Afghans (57%) say their country is moving in the 
right direction. While this percentage has fluctuated since 2006, it has been increasing in recent 
years: from 46% in 2011 to 52% in 2012. Overall optimism this year is highest in the Central/
Hazarajat, South West, and South East regions. 
•	 Reasons for optimism. When asked why the country might be moving in the right direction, 
Afghans point to reconstruction (32%), good security (24%), an improved education system 
(13%), the opening of schools for girls (13%), and the active presence of the Afghan National 
Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) (13%). Since 2006, good security and recon-
struction have been consistently identified as the main reasons for optimism.
•	 Reasons for pessimism. The main reasons for pessimism about the direction of the country 
include insecurity (24%), corruption (23%), unemployment (20%), suicide attacks (11%), and 
the presence of the Taliban (9%). Although the proportion of Afghans who attribute their pes-
simism about the direction of the country to the issue of insecurity declined in 2012 and 2013, it 
has been the leading reason for pessimism every year since 2007. The proportion of Afghans cit-
ing corruption as a reason for pessimism rose significantly in 2013. The proportion of Afghans 
citing unemployment is at its highest point since 2006. 
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•	 Afghanistan’s biggest problems: national level. Afghans identify insecurity (30%), corruption 
(26%), unemployment (25%), and the economy (10%) as the top four problems currently facing 
Afghanistan as a whole. While this list of issues has remained fairly constant over the years, the 
most notable rise this year is in the number of those interviewed citing suicide attacks as the 
biggest problem (9% in 2013 compared to 4-5% for 2009-2012 period). 
•	 Afghanistan’s biggest problems: local level. At the local level, people are concerned about 
the problems of unemployment (27%) and insecurity (14%) (both of which were among the top 
national-level problems), but also about critical service delivery issues, including the electricity 
supply (24%), roads (19%), the availability of drinking water (19%), healthcare (13%), and educa-
tion (11%). While this list and ranking has not changed significantly over the last eight years, the 
most notable increase in 2013 is the problem of insecurity, which was 10% in 2012 and 14% in 
2013. The longer trendline, however, does not reveal a major shift since 2007.
•	 Biggest problems facing women. When asked about the most pressing problems facing wom-
en today, Afghans consistently identify education and illiteracy (27%), a lack of job opportuni-
ties for women (12%), women’s rights (10%), forced marriages and dowry payments (9%), and 
domestic violence (8%). While men and women reported many of these issues with equal fre-
quency, women cited job opportunities with significantly higher frequency than men. Women’s 
rights issues were cited as a concern with significantly higher frequency in rural areas than in 
urban areas. Pashtuns were significantly more likely to identify human rights as a concern than 
Afghans from other ethnic groups.
1.2  Security
•	 In 2013 a majority of Afghans (59%) report always, often, or sometimes fearing for their own 
safety or security or that of their family. While there was a significant drop in overall fear for 
safety in 2012 (to 48% from 56% in 2011) there was a sharp increase in fear for safety this year 
to 59%. People in the West region report feeling the most fear, and people in the Central/Haz-
arajat region the least fear.
•	 Around three quarters of Afghans say they would be afraid when encountering international 
forces (77%) and traveling from one part to another part of Afghanistan (75%). A clear majority 
would be afraid to participate in a peaceful demonstration (68%) and vote in a national election 
(59%).
•	 Nineteen percent of those surveyed say they or a family member experienced violence or a 
criminal act in 2013. Among those, around half experienced crime and half experienced vio-
lence. Looking at incidents of crime and violence since 2007, the reported level of violence 
experienced is increasing, while the reported level of crime experienced is decreasing. By far, the 
most frequently experienced type of crime or violence in 2013 was a physical attack or beating 
(21%). Having some or a lot of fear for safety is significantly correlated with having experienced 
crime or violence. 
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•	 Only half (51%) of Afghans have some level of confidence that perpetrators of violence or crime 
will be punished; confidence has declined across all regions of the country. On a positive note, 
people’s willingness to report incidents of crime or violence has increased significantly over the 
past year, from 52% in 2012 to 64% in 2013. Afghans who are confident that the guilty party 
would be punished are significantly more likely to have reported their incident of crime or 
violence. The institutions to which people most frequently reported crime or violence were the 
ANP and their local shura/jirga (informal justice system). Although overall only 2% of respon-
dents reported incidents to the Taliban, in Zabul province 51% reported incidents of violence 
or crime to the Taliban. 
•	 Over the last seven years, the level of confidence in both the ANA and the ANP has been rela-
tively stable and high. In 2013, 88% of respondents say they are confident in the ANA, while 
72% of respondents say they are confident in the ANP. Urban Afghans have higher levels of 
confidence in these institutions than rural Afghans, and Pashtuns have lower levels of confi-
dence than other ethnic groups.
•	 Lower levels of confidence in the ANP (25-65%) are concentrated in the South West, South 
East, and Central/Kabul regions. The South West, North East, and North West regions contain 
several provinces that have the highest level of confidence in the ANA (90-98%). 
•	 Since 2009, there has been decreasing support for armed opposition groups (AOGs). In 2013, 
only a third (35%) of respondents say they have a little or a lot of sympathy for the armed op-
position. Pashtuns are significantly more likely to have some sympathy for AOGs than other 
ethnic groups; urban Afghans are significantly more likely to have no sympathy than rural 
Afghans, and women are significantly more likely to have no sympathy for AOGs than men. 
The provinces with the lowest percentage of Afghans reporting a lot of sympathy for AOGs are 
Badakshan and Panjshir (less than 1%), and the provinces with the highest percentage include 
Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan, Daikundi, Paktika, Logar, Wardak, and Laghman (20-44%). When 
asked why Afghans might disagree with the goals of the AOGs, the main reason cited reason is 
that they kill innocent civilians.
•	 There is a high level of public awareness (74%) of the government’s attempts at reconcilia-
tion with AOGs, and a majority of Afghans (63%) say that these efforts can help stabilize the 
country. People more likely to agree that reconciliation efforts can lead to stability are largely 
concentrated in the provinces bordering Pakistan (70-88% in most of those provinces). 
1.3  Economic growth and employment
•	 Most Afghans (76%) report that their household economic situation is better now than in the 
Taliban period. 
•	 The most common employment sectors are agriculture (45%), skilled workers and artisans 
(10%), and informal sales and business (9%). On average, only 5% of women are employed, 
compared to 79% of men. The West region has the highest male employment rate, and the Cen-
tral/Kabul region has the lowest. Only 17% of Afghans surveyed report having female members 
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of the household contributing to household income, with women from rural households sig-
nificantly more likely to contribute to household income than women from urban households.
1.4  Development and service delivery
•	 When asked to assess a range of local services, most Afghans say they are satisfied with the avail-
ability of drinking water (74%) and education for children (72%). Around half are satisfied with 
the availability of irrigation water (53%), clinics and hospitals (52%), and medicine (50%). Less 
than half are satisfied with the condition of roads (43%) and the supply of electricity (41%). Sat-
isfaction with the supply of water for irrigation has risen over the last two years, and satisfaction 
with the electricity supply has been gradually rising since 2009.
•	 The three most recognized types of development projects involve reconstruction or opening of 
new schools, building of roads and bridges, and improving the drinking water supply. 
•	 The top five most frequently mentioned donors are the United States (46%), Japan (24%), Ger-
many (16%), India (16%), and China (7%). The United States has consistently been the most 
recognized donor since 2009. 
•	 The two main fuel sources Afghans use for heating are firewood (26%) and animal dung (20%). 
The two main fuel sources for cooking are firewood (48%) and bottled gas (21%). The use of 
firewood for heating has declined since 2009, and the use of grass and other biomass for heating 
has increased during the same period. 
•	 Nationally, the most common form of household water supply is a well, with 58% of urban 
respondents reporting that they use a well compared to 66% of rural respondents. More urban 
residents (38%) have piped water than rural residents (11%). Thirteen percent of Afghans say 
they have not had enough water over the past five years. More than 30% of people in 47 districts 
of 17 provinces say they have not had enough water.
•	 Among those Afghans who report using water for irrigation, 80% say that availability is good 
or very good. The main reason given for poor availability is decreased availability from natural 
springs.
•	 Sixty percent of respondents say they have had no education (76% of women and 44% of men). 
Lack of education is more common among rural respondents than urban respondents. Uzbek 
women were significantly less likely to have had formal education than other ethnic groups, 
closely followed by Pashtun women. Hazara women were significantly more likely to have had 
formal education at any level than women from any other ethnic group. Younger women are 
significantly more likely to be educated than older women.
•	 Among those with formal education, 25% had completed primary school, 20% completed sec-
ondary school, 36% completed high school, 12% completed grade 13 or 14, and 6% completed 
university or higher. Afghans with some level of education were significantly less likely to say 
that the country is moving in the right direction than Afghans with no education.
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1.5  Governance
•	 Three quarters (75%) of respondents give national government performance a positive assess-
ment. After a high of 80% of Afghans satisfied with national government performance in 2007 
dropped to a low of 67% in 2008, Afghans’ satisfaction with national government performance 
has been gradually rising over the past five years. 
•	 Satisfaction with all levels of subnational government performance declined this year, with 
the most notable decrease in the level of satisfaction with provincial government performance 
(from 80% in 2011-2012 to a seven-year low of 68% in 2013). In 2013, 59% of urban Afghans say 
municipal authorities are doing a good job and 66% of rural Afghans say district authorities are 
doing a good job. Respondents from the North West region are consistently the most likely to 
report that their provincial and district-level governments are doing a good job.
•	 Afghans give a particularly negative assessment of their member of parliament’s performance in 
two key areas: listening to their constituents and representing their needs, and delivering jobs 
and development. 
•	 Around one quarter (27%) of Afghans have received help from their provincial governor in 
resolving a problem or issue affecting them in the past two years, with rural residents more 
likely to have obtained such help than urban residents. Similarly, around one quarter (24%) of 
Afghans have had contact with a provincial council member over the past two years regarding 
a personal or local problem; contact with provincial council members has been on an upward 
trend since 2006.
•	 Over half of respondents (58%) say they are aware of a community development council (CDC) 
in their area, and awareness has been rising since 2006. Awareness of CDCs is noticeably higher 
among men than women. Among those who are aware of their local CDC, 63% are satisfied 
with their performance; citizens from the Central/Hazarajat region report the highest level of 
satisfaction.
•	 When asked about the level of confidence they have in various public institutions, organiza-
tions, and officials, in virtually all cases Afghans’ stated level of confidence in these various enti-
ties reached an eight-year low in 2013. The entities with the highest levels of public confidence 
are the Afghan Land Authority, electronic media, religious leaders, and community shuras/
jirgas. Public confidence in parliament showed the sharpest decline in respondents’ level of con-
fidence: a 15% drop from 2012 to 2013.  
•	 Afghans see corruption as a major problem in all facets of life and at all levels of government. 
Around half say corruption is a major problem in their neighborhood (49%), daily life (56%), 
and local authorities (58%). Around two thirds (68%) say it is a major problem in their provin-
cial government, and around three quarters (77%) say corruption is a major problem in Afghani-
stan as a whole. The perception that corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan as a whole is 
at its highest point in 2013 since 2006. Nonetheless, around half (47%) of Afghans still say that 
district and provincial government is applying about the right level of effort to fight corruption.
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•	 Afghans routinely experience corruption in a wide range of situations, including when in the 
district or municipality office, encountering the ANA and ANP, interacting with the judiciary/
courts, dealing with the state electricity authority, seeking public healthcare services, when ap-
plying for jobs, when applying for school, and when receiving official documents.
•	 When asked about the availability of dispute resolution mechanisms and services in their area, 
71% of Afghans say they are generally satisfied. In the past two years, 19% have taken a dispute 
to the Huquq (formal justice system dispute resolution service) or village jirga/shura (local 
informal justice system) and a high proportion report some level of satisfaction with the out-
come. The main types of disputes involve land, family matters, commercial matters, and other 
property disputes. 
•	 Overall, Afghans consider the local informal justice system (shuras/jirgas) to be more fair, trust-
worthy, effective, efficient, and in line with local norms and values than the formal state courts. 
For example, 67% say jirgas/shuras resolve cases in a timely and prompt fashion, while only 
46% say the same of the state courts. 
1.6  Political participation
•	 Around a quarter (23%) of Afghans report that it is safer today for people in their communities 
to express their opinions than it was a year ago, 17% say it is less safe, and 56% say that it is no 
different than a year ago. 
•	 Those who say people in their area feel safer this year to express their opinions tend to attribute 
it to things like improvements in local security conditions and guaranteed free speech. Respon-
dents who say it is less safe to express opinions this year cite things like poor security and the 
presence of the Taliban. A person who is afraid of foreign forces is significantly more likely to 
report having fear to express opinions. Afghans who fear for their personal safety or that of 
their family are significantly more likely to feel less safe to express their opinions.
•	 A high proportion of Afghans (68%) would be afraid to participate in a peaceful demonstration. 
Women are significantly more likely to be afraid to participate in a demonstration than men; 
wealthier Afghans are more likely to be afraid to participate in peaceful demonstrations than 
those who earn less; and Pashtuns are more likely to report having a lot of fear than Hazaras, 
Tajiks, and Uzbeks. The main reasons why respondents are likely to be afraid of participating in 
a peaceful demonstration are fear of foreign forces, fear of travel, and fear of the ANP and ANA.
•	 About three quarters of Afghans (76%) agree that it is acceptable to criticize the government in 
public. Agreement is highest in the Central/Kabul region and lowest in the West region, and 
higher in urban areas than rural areas.
•	 Around half (48%) of Afghans say they can have some level of influence over local government 
decisions. Pashtuns are significantly more likely than all other ethnic groups to say they have influ-
ence, Tajiks significantly less likely than Pashtuns, and men significantly more likely than women.
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•	 There is majority support (58%) for the idea that religion and politics should mix, while just 
over a third (38%) say that politics and religion should not mix. The proportion of people who 
agree that politics and religion should be mixed has declined considerably since 2011 and 2012 
(69-70%).
•	 When asked about elections in Afghanistan, a majority (61%) of Afghans surveyed say that in 
general they are free and fair. People are nonetheless concerned about things like corruption in 
counting the votes, vote buying, and security. 
•	 Nearly three quarters (58%) of Afghans would have some level of fear to run for public office. 
Citizens from the North East and Central/Kabul (49%) regions would have significantly less 
fear compared to other regions. Women are more afraid of running for public office than men, 
but compared to 2012, both men and women would be significantly more afraid of running for 
public office in 2013. In fact, the level of fear to run for public office was significantly higher in 
2013 than in all previous years. 
•	 Around half (59%) of Afghans say they would experience some level of fear when voting in a 
national or provincial election. The trend for this question peaked in 2010 after the national 
elections, but overall it appears to be on an upward trajectory. Pashtuns are significantly more 
afraid of voting in a national or provincial election than other ethnic groups in 2013. Afghans 
in the Central/Kabul and West regions express significantly more fear of voting this year com-
pared to 2012. 
•	 Most Afghans (81%) agree that each person should vote for himself/herself, regardless of what 
the community thinks, but only half (53%) say women should decide who to vote for on their 
own. Forty-six percent say men should be involved in women’s voting decision in some way. 
Women and urban residents are significantly more likely to say that women should decide on 
their own.
•	 For obtaining election information, Afghans by far and most frequently rely on relatives and 
family members as their main source, but also on (in descending order) weekly community 
shuras, mosques, and twice-weekly village markets and bazaars.
•	 Most Afghans (81%) say that election day security conditions are a factor in their decision to 
travel to polling stations to vote. Around half (56%) say that the outcome of the 2014 election 
will make a positive difference in their lives. One quarter (24%) say it will make no difference, 
and only a small number (15%) anticipate that it will make their lives worse. 
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1.7  Access to information
•	 Most Afghans (80%) use radio to obtain information. Around half use mobile phones (57%) and 
television (54%). Very few use the internet (3%), a computer (2%), and a fixed line phone (less 
than 1%).
•	 Rural Afghans are significantly more likely to use radio, and urban Afghans significantly more 
likely to use television and mobile phones. More women than men report using a television for 
obtaining information. Four times as many men as women use a computer and the internet.
•	 In terms of social sources of information, the most common means of obtaining information 
is by far through family and friends, then mosques, community shuras/jirgas, and bazaars. 
Women are significantly more likely than men to rely on friends and family, and significantly 
less likely than men to obtain information at the mosque.
1.8  Women in society
•	 Nearly all Afghans (90%) agree with the idea that everyone should have equal rights under the 
law, regardless of their gender. Women and urban residents express stronger support than men 
and rural Afghans.
•	 A majority (62%) of Afghans disagree with the traditional practices of baad (a traditional prac-
tice of giving a daughter to another party as a penalty or payment for some offense) and badal 
(an exchange of daughters between families for marriage). When asked whether a girl’s guardian 
should wait until she is of adult age and should always consult her first before arranging her mar-
riage, three quarters (74%) of Afghans agree. There were only slight differences between men’s 
views and women’s views on these issues. 
•	 A majority of respondents agree that a widow should be entitled to a portion of mahr (mahr is a 
provision of Shariah law that obligates a husband at the time of marriage to give a gift of money, 
possessions, or land to his wife, the aim being to provide her some financial security; the wife 
may take the gift at the time of marriage or defer, receiving all or part of the gift at a later date). 
Twenty-six percent of respondents disagree, with men disagreeing at a higher rate than women.
•	 Less than a quarter (21%) of women say that they know where women can take their problems 
to be resolved. The Directorate of Women’s Affairs, the Human Rights Council, and the dis-
trict government office are the most commonly-cited institutions.
•	 Around half of Afghans (54%) say state courts treat women and men equally. Sixty-eight per-
cent say there should be special local jirgas and shuras for women only. 
•	 Afghans’ support for equal representation of men and women in elected government positions 
is at 44% in 2013. Over time there has been a slight but noticeable decline in support for equality 
in leadership positions, down from a high of 50-51% in the 2006-2008 period. 
•	 The vast majority of respondents (83%) agree that men and women should have equal oppor-
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tunities in education. Although there has been a steady decrease in the level of strong support 
for gender equality in education between 2006 (58%) and 2013 (43%), the overall level of sup-
port (i.e., including those who either strongly or somewhat agree with equal opportunities) has 
stayed high and constant. Women were significantly more likely to support equal opportunities 
in education than men, as were urban respondents.
•	 A majority (63%) of Afghans agree that women should be allowed to work outside the home; 
this has been the case since 2006. Women and urban Afghans are significantly more likely to 
agree. Regionally, the highest level of support for women working outside of the home was in 
Central/Hazarajat and the lowest was in the South West. Nearly all Afghans who support the 
idea of women working outside the home support equal opportunities in education for men 
and women.
1.9  Enhancements in methodology 
•	 Over the last nine years, the Survey of the Afghan People has assessed the perceptions of Afghan 
citizens across all 34 provinces. As in previous years, survey fieldwork was conducted by 
ACSOR-Surveys for The Asia Foundation in Afghanistan. This year, the Foundation conducted 
additional in-house quality control and for the first time, independent, third-party monitoring 
conducted by Sayara Media Group.
•	 In the spirit of continual improvement, The Asia Foundation has made some important changes 
to the survey presentation this year. As in previous years, technical improvements have been 
made to the sample size, sampling plan, sampling method, and survey questionnaire. Please see 
Appendix 2: Methodology for further detail. 
•	 In 2013 the sample size was increased to 9,260 respondents (from 6,290 in 2012). This increase in 
sample size by 47% from previous years meets more aggressive margins of error. Respondents 
were selected using stratified finite sampling techniques, with a minimum target set of 192 re-
spondents per province (last year, the minimum set was 100 respondents per province). 
•	 A number of changes were made to the survey questionnaire based on a statistical analysis of the 
results for 2012. As a result of this analysis, the wording of select questions was changed to en-
sure that they measure the intended concept more clearly. A total of 32 questions were deleted 
from the 2012 questionnaire, while 38 questions were added. For example, four new questions 
were added to improve the information available on voting behavior and decisions, and new 
questions were added on water (five new questions) and land issues (four new questions), as these 
topics are at the root of many local conflicts in Afghanistan.
•	 Additional advances were made in quality control, and will continue to improve in the 2014 
survey. The 2013 survey includes three new substantive checks for quality control: (a) nonre-
sponse analysis (Don’t Know and Refused responses) over time by province, district, enumera-
tor, gender, ethnicity, and number of observers present for the interview; (b) logic tests to check 
for bias, as well as question reliability and validity; and (c) scales for increased reliability and 
validity, including cross-analysis against key trend questions.
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•	 As in 2012, deteriorating security was a challenge for accessing sampling points in 2013. While 
sampling points are randomly identified, opinions on key trends may differ significantly be-
tween safe and unsafe districts. In an effort this year to reduce the negative impact of sampling 
replacements on representativeness, this year’s survey included 840 “intercept” interviews, a 
technique where respondents from insecure districts are intercepted while shopping or traveling 
in more secure ones, in addition to 2,079 respondents from “man-only” districts, where female 
enumerators cannot travel due to security concerns. 
•	 As a result of efforts to survey insecure areas, this year reflects an oversampling of men (64%) 
compared to women (34%), as well as an oversampling of rural areas compared to urban areas. 
However, due to the increase in sample size, the total number of women surveyed this year is 
more than most previous years. 
•	 Eleven provinces were over-sampled, with the minimum sample size set to 402 respondents to 
reduce sampling error and allow for a statistically reliable provincial-level comparative analysis. 
To avoid the problem of having to replace sampling points due to inaccessibility as a result of 
insecurity or other reasons, a larger number of sampling points than necessary (about 30%) were 
selected; this way, any substitutions made would have already been randomly chosen, and so 
sampling point substitution had no impact on the randomness of the overall sample.
•	 The main findings are presented in the report using geographical and demographic criteria to 
examine and then describe any statistically significant differences in perceptions of survey re-
spondents. The main statistical tests used to describe any differences reported were Chi-Square 
tests, correlations, and regression analyses.
•	 The goal when presenting the findings has been to provide sufficient context and detail for 
readers to draw their own conclusions. As in previous years, however, interpretation of the 
results has been kept to a minimum.
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2 National Mood
Afghanistan faces a number of pressing and interconnected problems at the national level. Three 
fundamental challenges facing the country are insecurity, the state of the economy, and the lack of 
good governance.
Afghan civilian casualties have increased sharply this year as armed opposition groups have stepped 
up their attacks. With the peace talks yet to produce any significant results and international forces 
scheduled to end their combat mission in Afghanistan next year, insecurity is likely to be one of the 
biggest national concerns in 2014.
One of the biggest but still poorly understood and planned changes in 2013 has been the security and 
economic impact of the withdrawal of many Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Up to this 
point in time, the PRTs have played an important role at the provincial and district level by enabling 
service delivery, circulating cash into the local economy, creating jobs, developing infrastructure, and 
maintaining some level of security. Government capacity to fill the gap is weak, leaving a funding and 
security vacuum. In July 2012, a meeting between the government of Afghanistan and its donors in 
Tokyo gave assurances for continued aid for a “decade of transformation,” but the resulting Tokyo 
Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) placed strict conditions on further support.
Corruption, from petty bribery to grand corruption, is another pressing problem at the national 
level. Afghanistan ranks third from last in a recent comparative analysis of citizen perceptions of cor-
ruption in 176 countries,1 with the annual cost of corruption estimated at around USD $3.9 billion. 
In the past year the local media has made efforts to expose the extent and nature of corruption in the 
country.  To date, the government’s efforts in fighting the problem have not produced the desired 
positive results. Corruption at all levels of society continues to affect most Afghan citizens. 
In general, apart from the slow lead up to the presidential and provincial council elections that are 
scheduled to take place in April 2014, the context for most of the significant events in 2013 has been 
characterized by uncertainty. This is largely due to the current social, political, and security transi-
tion, as well as the gradual transition from “off budget” development assistance to channeling of do-
nor funds directly through the government budget. In this environment, the reaction of officials and 
institutions at both the central and local levels has been one of hedging against uncertainties related 
to the upcoming elections and the post-2014 context. 
2.1  Direction of the country
Key Questions:
1 Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index 2012. www.transparency.org.
Q-3: Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going 
in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?
Q-1a/b: Generally speaking, based on your own experience, what are two reasons to think that 
Afghanistan is going in the right direction?
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Overall, 57% of respondents surveyed in 2013 say that the country is moving in the right direction, 
and 38% say that it is moving in the wrong direction. As shown in Fig. 2.1 below, the percentage of 
respondents who say that the country is going in the right direction has fluctuated since 2006, but has 
remained fairly high.
Fig. 2.1: Q-3. Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going 
in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?  || 2006-2013 
The key changes in the direction of this trend that occurred in 2008, 2010, and 2011 are likely linked 
to key events in those years. The downturn in optimism in 2008 may have been due to the surge in 
violence that year, and also to the nature of that violence. In 2008, the Taliban shifted its tactics from 
assaults and combat to more suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which created 
more civilian casualties and raised anxieties about safety among the population. In 2010, the rise in op-
timism may be linked to the shift in U.S. and NATO strategy. The number of International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) troops peaked that year at 150,000. ISAF/NATO shifted its strategy from 
counter-terrorism to counter-insurgency, which emphasizes protecting the civilian population and 
reducing public support for insurgents through more development assistance. In 2011, the downward 
shift in mood could be connected to declining prospects for reconciliation talks with the Taliban. 
The head of the High Peace Council and former president of Afghanistan, Burhannudin Rabbani, 
was assassinated in September 2011, and President Karzai’s relationship with the U.S. government 
came under increasing strain, especially as talks on the Bilateral Strategic Agreement stalled. It is also 
interesting to note that 2008 and 2011 were the worst drought years in the last decade, which may 
have been a contributing factor to a decreased sense of optimism in the country.  
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It is important to note that in 2013 this question did not allow respondents the option of saying 
“some in right direction, and some in wrong direction,” as was the case in previous years. For 2013, 
the option was to list “don’t know.” This may have affected the percentages for both “right direction” 
and “wrong direction” somewhat this year.
According to the provincial data (see Fig. 2.2 below), Nooristan, Panjshir, and Zabul provinces have 
the lowest percentages of respondents who say the country is headed in the right direction. In those 
provinces, only 28% to 40% of those interviewed gave positive responses. In the provinces of Herat, 
Badghis, Faryab, Kapisa, Parwan, Wardak, and Logar,  40% to 50% of the respondents say Afghanistan 
is going in the right direction. More than 60% of the respondents say that Afghanistan is going in the 
right direction in Badakhsan, Takhar, Balkh, Samangan, and Jawzjan. National mood is similarly high 
in Daikundi, Nimroz, Uruzgan, Helmand, Kandahar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Kunar, and Laghnam. 
Overall optimism this year is highest in the Central/Hazarajat, South West, and South East regions. 
Fig. 2.2: Q-3. Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going 
in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?  || Provincial breakdown
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When looking at the different responses to the question on why the country might be moving in the 
right direction, the top five issues were (see Fig. 2.3 below): 
•	 Reconstruction (32%);
•	 Good security (24%);
•	 Improved education system (13%);
•	 Opening of schools for girls (13%); and
•	 Presence of the Afghan National Army (ANA)/Afghan National Police (ANP) (13%).
Fig 2.3: Q-1a/b. Generally speaking, based on your own experience, what are two reasons to think that 
Afghanistan is going in the right direction? (a and b responses combined)
 
It is interesting to note that urban respondents (37%) rank reconstruction higher than rural respon-
dents (30%), which is consistent with previous years. Similarly, rural respondents are more likely 
than urban respondents to cite the existence of a functional ANA/ANP as a reason for thinking that 
the country is moving in the right direction.
Since 2006, good security and reconstruction/rebuilding have been consistently identified as the main 
reasons why Afghans say that their country is moving in the right direction (see Fig. 2.4 below). 
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Fig. 2.4: Q-1a/b. Generally speaking, based on your own experience, what are two reasons to think that 
Afghanistan is going in the right direction? (a and b responses combined) || 2006-2013 
REASONS: RIGHT DIRECTION 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Good security 31 34 39 44 38 39 41 24
Reconstruction/rebuilding 21 39 32 36 35 40 35 32
Schools for girls have opened 16 19 19 21 15 10 14 13
Improvement in education system - - - - 10 16 13 13
Economic revival 7 9 5 6 10 8 8 6
Having active ANA and ANP - 7 7 7 6 11 13 13
Peace/end of the war 29 16 21 9 12 7 7 7
Good government 9 9 9 12 10 9 5 5
Democracy/elections 10 9 7 1 7 3 4 6
There is considerable regional variation in the reasons given for why the country is moving in the 
right direction. For example, reconstruction/rebuilding as a reason for optimism accounts for 33% 
in the Central/Kabul region, 26% in the East, 27% in the South East, 26% in the South West, 34% in 
the West, 27% in Central/Hazarajat, and 37% in the North West. Improved security as a reason for 
optimism was most commonly mentioned in the North East (33%) region, followed by the Central/
Hazarajat (32%) region. Respondents in the South East mentioned improved security at a lower rate 
(15%) than respondents in other provinces. 
When looking at the different reasons given for why the country might be moving in the wrong 
direction, the top five issues were (see Fig. 2.5 below): 
•	 Insecurity (24%);
•	 Corruption (23%);
•	 Unemployment (20%);
•	 Suicide attacks (11%); and
•	 The presence of the Taliban (9%).
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Fig 2.5: Q-2a/b. Generally speaking, based on your own experience, what are two reasons to think 
that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction? (a and b responses combined) 
Of those respondents who said that the country is going in the wrong direction, insecurity is still 
the top reason given (Fig. 2.5). However, citing insecurity as a reason for the country moving in the 
wrong direction has declined by half since 2007. 
Although the proportion of Afghans who attribute their pessimism about the direction of the coun-
try to the issue of insecurity declined in 2013, it has been the leading reason for pessimism every year 
since 2007. It dropped to 39% in 2012 (down from 45% in 2011) and dropped further down to 24% 
in 2013 (see Fig. 2.6 below).
Fig 2.6: Q-2a/b. Generally speaking, based on your own experience, what are two reasons to think 
that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction? (a and b responses combined) || Insecurity
Looking at longitudinal trends (see Fig. 2.7 below) beyond the issue of insecurity, the proportion 
of respondents citing unemployment as a reason for pessimism increased from 13% in 2011 to 20% 
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in 2013. Unemployment as a reason is at its highest point in 2013 (20%) since 2006. The proportion 
of respondents citing general corruption has risen significantly in 2013, up to 23% from 14% in the 
previous year. 
Fig. 2.7: Q-2a/b. Generally speaking, based on your own experience, what are two reasons to think that 
Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction? (a and b responses combined)  || 2006-2013
REASONS: WRONG DIRECTION
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Insecurity 6 48 50 42 44 45 39 24
Unemployment 21 15 15 15 16 13 18 20
Corruption  - 13 19 17 27 16 14 23
Suicide attacks  -  -  -  6  8  11 11 11
Presence of Taliban  -  9  8  7  6  7 6 9
Bad government 22 15 12 25 18 15 11 6
Bad economy 27 12 17 11 8 10 10 8
Administrative corruption 2 15 9 10 - 4 10 6
No reconstruction 22 8 7 6 4 4 6 4
 
There are significant differences between provinces in respondents’ perceptions on why the country 
is moving in the right direction or wrong direction. In Helmand, for example, 84% of respondents say 
that the country is moving in the right direction, compared to just 32% in Nooristan. In Helmand, 
the data shows that the high percentage of respondents who think the country is moving in the right 
direction reflects their level of satisfaction with reconstruction projects and the existence of a func-
tioning ANA/ANP. By contrast, in Nooristan, respondents reported two main reasons for why the 
country may be moving in the wrong direction: insecurity (17%) and corruption (14%). 
A statistical analysis of factors that may explain why respondents might say that Afghanistan is mov-
ing in the right direction2 shows that the following factors each have a significant effect. 
•	 An increase in the level of confidence in government institutions significantly increases the 
likelihood of a “right direction” response.
•	 As a respondent’s level of support for women’s rights increases,3 the likelihood that the respon-
dent will say that the country is moving in the right direction also increases.
2   A stepwise regression analysis was carried out to test the relative importance of gender (d1), age (d2), education (d5), ethnicity 
(d14), income (d18a), province (m7), and perceived personal safety (q18) as factors that explain whether or not respondents say 
Afghanistan is moving in the right direction.
3 A scale was created for women’s rights using three variables: Everybody should have equal rights (q66a_R): chi2(1)=26.09, p<.001; 
Women should be allowed to work outside the home (q82): chi2(1)=59.25, p<.001; Women should decide for themselves on who 
to vote for (q84_R): chi2(1)=46.70, p<.001.
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•	 The more literate the respondent, the more likely they are to say that the country is moving in 
the right direction.4
•	 Being single rather than married significantly decreases the likelihood of a “right direction” 
response.
•	 An increase in the extent of a respondent’s use of different forms of communication technology 
(e.g., radio, TV, mobile phone) increases the likelihood of a right direction response.
The number of people witnessing the interview was not statistically correlated with the likelihood of 
a “right direction” response. 
2.2 Afghanistan’s biggest problems: national level
Key Question:
When respondents were asked what the biggest problems facing the country are at the national level, 
the top four issues were (see Fig. 2.8 below):
•	 Insecurity (30%);
•	 Corruption (26%);
•	 Unemployment (25%); and 
•	 Poor economy (10%).
Fig 2.8: Q-4a/b. In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole? (a and b re-
sponses combined)
Looking at longitudinal trends (see Fig. 2.9 below) the percentage of respondents citing insecurity 
(30%) shows a slight increase in 2013 compared to the 2012 figure of 28%. Perceptions of unemploy-
ment as a major problem facing Afghanistan declined slightly from 27% in 2012 to 25% in 2013. The 
most notable rise is in the number of those interviewed citing suicide attacks as the biggest problem 
(9% in 2013 compared to 4%-5% for 2009-2012 period). 
4 Literacy: Chi2(2)=14.68, p=.001. Note that differences in the level of education were also significant [Pearson chi2(2)=12.86, 
p=.002.].
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Fig 2.9: Q-4a/b. In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole? (a and b re-
sponses combined) || 2006-2013
BIGGEST PROBLEM: NATIONAL
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Insecurity 27 46 36 36 37 38 28 30
Unemployment 32 27 31 35 28 23 27 25
Corruption 19 16 14 17 27 21 25 26
Poor economy 24 19 17 20 11 10 11 10
Education 10 11 9 11 11 10 10 9
Poverty 13 5 8 11 10 12 9 9
Suicide attacks - - - 4 5 4 5 9
Presence of Taliban 6 13 13 8 8 4 8 7
Regionally, between 37%-38% of respondents in the Central/Kabul, the South East, and the Central/
Hazarajat regions cited insecurity as the biggest problem facing Afghanistan today. Thirty-seven per-
cent of Central/Kabul region respondents identified unemployment as the biggest national problem. 
This is significantly higher than anywhere else in the country. The North West region recorded the 
next highest percentage (29%).
2.3  Afghanistan’s biggest problems: local level
Key Question:
When respondents were asked what the biggest problems facing the country are at the local level, the 
top seven issues were (see Fig. 2.10 below):
•	 Unemployment (27%);
•	 Electricity supply (24%);
•	 Roads (19%);
•	 Availability of drinking water (19%);
•	 Insecurity (14%); 
•	 Healthcare (13%); and
•	 Education (11%).
Q-5: What are the biggest problems in your local area? 
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Fig. 2.10: Q-5a/b. What is the biggest problem in your local area? (a and b responses combined)
At the local level, the list and hierarchy of problems cited has not changed significantly over the last 
eight years (see Fig. 2.11 below). The mention of unemployment as a pressing local problem decreased 
slightly from 29% in 2012 and 27% in 2013. The most notable increase compared to the previous 
year is the problem of insecurity, which was 10% in 2012 and 14% in 2013. The longer trendline on 
insecurity, however, does not reveal a major shift since 2007.
Fig. 2.11: Q-5a/b. What is the biggest problem in your local area? (a and b responses combined) || 2006-2013
BIGGEST PROBLEM: LOCAL
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Unemployment 34 26 28 26 26 28 29 27
Electricity 25 27 30 26 28 23 25 24
Roads 14 19 18 24 24 15 20 19
Drinking water 18 21 22 22 22 20 18 19
Education/schools/literacy 14 21 14 15 16 14 15 11
Healthcare/clinics/hospitals 15 17 15 20 17 12 12 13
Insecurity 8 15 14 13 13 14 10 14
The biggest local problems identified by respondents vary by region. Lack of employment opportuni-
ties was cited most frequently in the East (33%) region, while lack of electricity was most frequently 
cited as the most important local problem in the North East and North West (35%).  Drinking water 
is most often cited in the North West (34%) region as the biggest local problem.  
 
27
24
19 19
14 13 11
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30% BIGGEST PROBLEM: LOCAL LEVEL
National Mood 25
While overall, 19% of respondents cite roads as the biggest local problem, around one quarter of 
respondents in the Central/Kabul (26%), North East (26%), and North West (23%) regions identify 
roads; in fact, roads rank as the most frequently cited local problem in the Central/Kabul region. 
2.4  Biggest problems facing women
Key Question: 
When asked about the biggest problems facing women in Afghanistan, respondents referenced the 
following top five issues (see Fig. 2.12 below): 
•	 Education/illiteracy (27%);
•	 Lack of job opportunities for women (12%); 
•	 Lack of women’s rights (10%);
•	 Forced marriages/dowry payments (9%); and
•	 Domestic violence (8%).
Fig. 2.12: Q-78ab. What are the biggest problems facing women in this area today? 
Across the country, illiteracy and the lack of education is identified as the biggest problem facing 
women in all regions, with the highest proportions recorded in the Central/Hazarajat (30%), North 
West (27%), and Central/Kabul and East regions (both 24%). Issues of illiteracy and education were 
mentioned least frequently in the South West (17%) region.
 
27
12
10
9
8
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Education/illiteracy Lack of jobs  for 
women
Lack of women’s 
rights
Forced 
marriages/dowry 
payments 
Domestic violence
BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING WOMEN
Q-78. What are the biggest problems facing women in this area today?
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The lack of job opportunities for women was particularly prominent in the North West (23%) and 
North East (21%), followed by the Central/Kabul (15%), Central/Hazarajat (14%), and West (11%) 
regions. 
Lack of rights for women is a main concern of South West (15%), East, and West region respondents 
(both 13%), but in the Central/Kabul region only 5% of respondents say that lack of rights is a prob-
lem facing women. Domestic violence was most commonly identified by respondents in the South 
West (14%), South East (12%), and West (10%) regions. Interestingly, in Central/Hazarajat very few 
respondents (3%) mentioned domestic violence.  
Female and male respondents agree that education/illiteracy and lack of rights are among the most 
significant problems facing women. However, a lack of job opportunities for women was more like-
ly5 to be cited by women (18%) than men (13%), and domestic violence was a more important issue 
for female respondents (11%) than male respondents (8%).  Interestingly, forced marriages/dowries 
were cited by both men (10%) and women (8%) as a pressing problem. 
There are significant regional and ethnic differences in the extent to which respondents say forced 
marriages and the payment of dowries are a problem. The region that was most likely to report that 
forced marriages and dowries are a problem was the South East (18%),6 and the two regions that were 
least likely to report these issues as problems were the North West (3%) and Central/Hazarajat (3%) 
regions. Similarly, in comparison with the three other largest ethnic groups in Afghanistan (Tajik, 
Hazara, Uzbek), Pashtun respondents were more than twice as likely to cite forced marriages and 
dowry payments as problems than respondents from other ethnic groups (see Fig. 2.13 below).
Fig. 2.13: Q-78a/b. What are the biggest problems facing women in this area today? || Forced mar-
riages/dowry responses by ethnic group
5  Chi2 (1, 8840) = 58.19 Pr < 0.001
6  Chi2 (1, 8840) = 91.71 Pr < 0.001
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Women’s human rights issues were mentioned as a concern with significantly7 higher frequency in 
rural areas (32%) than in urban areas (22%). Pashtuns ranked women’s human rights issues (32%) as a 
concern at a significantly8 higher frequency than all other ethnic groups.
Viewed longitudinally (see Fig. 2.14 below), there is not a noticeable change in the percentages and 
rankings of these issues, suggesting that the numerous initiatives to improve the rights and roles of 
women have not yet made major headway. 
Fig. 2.14: Q-78ab. What are the biggest problems facing women in this area today? 
BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING WOMEN
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Education/illiteracy 24 29 28 30 31 25 29 27
Lack of rights/women’s 
rights
18 13 13 11 7 15 10 10
Lack of job opportunities 
for women
0 9 11 13 15 2 14 12
Domestic violence 5 7 6 5 7 9 8 8
Forced marriages/
dowry
7 7 5 4 5 8 6 9
General healthcare 9 5 5 6 3 8 5 4
Poverty 2 5 6 5 2 8 4 3
Can’t leave home 9 5 5 4 3 6 2 1
Under control of men/
men have power
9 3 1 1 2 6 2 2
Pregnancy-related 
healthcare
10 4 2 5 5 5 2 3
Don’t know 1 3 11 2 13 1 3 4
7  Chi2 (1) 54.19 p <0.001
8  Chi2 (1) 342.26, p<0.001
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3 Security
With the transition formally slated for 2014, responsibility for security and counter-terrorism has 
now passed to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF),9 even in the country’s most insecure 
provinces. Following the creation of the Special Forces within the Afghan National Police (ANP) 
and their nationwide deployment to handle insurgent activities, the media coverage of some of their 
operations appears to have positively influenced public perceptions of the ANSF. In addition to 
the increasing presence and professionalism of the ANSF, in rural areas that are contested by illegal 
armed groups there is a growing reliance on semi-formal law enforcement and security structures 
such as the Afghan Local Police (ALP), and in some places, arbakai (tribal militias). 
Despite these significant developments, the rate of crime in the country remains high, possibly fu-
eled by insufficient numbers of criminal investigative police.10  In the large urban centers such as 
Kabul, many trained security staff were left without work due to the dismantling of private security 
firms. This has inhibited government efforts to control crime. Armed robbery and kidnappings have 
received increasing national media coverage, which has led to large-scale protests against such kidnap-
pings of traders and businessmen. In some areas, the establishment of the ALP and arbakai may be 
undermining local government and may have even led to an increase in criminal activities.
In addition to the general increase in crime across the country, the incidence of violence has also 
increased. The number of civilian casualties in the first six months of this year has increased by 23%11 
compared to the same period in 2012, as armed opposition groups have stepped up their attacks. The 
Afghan National Army (ANA) is generally acknowledged to be doing a good job, even though they, 
too, are currently suffering a significant number of casualties.12 
After 2015, responsibility for the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan, which is currently 
being led by the High Peace Council, will be transferred to line ministries. While clear progress has 
been made, several factors suggest that advancements will be slow during the transition, including the 
timeframe required for long-term shifts in thinking among the main actors, the likely influence of the 
planned elections in 2014, and the need to develop a clear strategy for the post-2015 peace process. 
The main challenges ahead are likely to be the inclusiveness and legitimacy of the process. Perhaps 
the weakest part of the process to date has been the lack of mechanisms for linking local communities 
with the political process. Local conflict resolution mechanisms will be a necessary component of the 
post-2015 strategy to ensure that the peace and reconciliation process is effective.  
9 ANSF is a blanket term that includes the Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police 
(ANP), and the National Directorate of Security.
10 Ministry of Interior of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Annual Report 1392: (ratio of one criminal investigative policeman to 
5,267 citizens).
11 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (2013). Mid-year Report: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. p1. Kabul, 
Afghanistan: July 2013.
12 Informal estimate provided by Wall Street Journal staff based on information gathered during field missions: The Afghan Army 
and Police are sustaining about 400 casualties a week since taking over the lead for security operations from ISAF this year. 
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3.1  Crime and violence
Key Questions:
Overall, 59% of respondents in 2013 report always, often, or sometimes fearing for their own safety 
or security, or for that of their families. The trend line on fear for safety (see Fig. 3.1 below) shows 
that there was a significant drop in 2012. From 2011 to 2012, there was a decrease in the number of 
attacks by militant/insurgent groups and the foreign forces reported by respondents. The trend then 
increases from 2012 to 2013. This cannot be explained directly by the survey data, but it is interest-
ing when considered in the context of the above-mentioned recent increase in civilian injuries and 
casualties in the first half of 2013, owing mainly to the increased use of improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) by insurgents.13
13 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (2013). Mid-year Report: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. p1. Kabul, 
Afghanistan: July 2013.
Q-18: How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family 
these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your 
family’s safety?
Q-19: Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or of some criminal act in 
the past year? 
Q-20: What kind of violence or crime did you or someone in your family experience in the past 
year?  
Q-21: Still thinking about any violent or criminal act you or your family may have experienced in 
the past year, was it reported to anybody outside your family or not? 
Q-22: Who did you report the crime to?
Q-23: If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have 
that the guilty party would be punished? 
Q-24: In your view, what is the biggest cause of crime in Afghanistan?
Q-30: Would you participate in the following activities with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear?: 
a) When participating in resolving problems in your community; b) Voting in a national/provin-
cial election; c) Participating in a peaceful demonstration, d) To run for public office; e) When 
encountering ANP; f) When encountering ANA; g) When traveling from one part of Afghanistan 
to another part of the country; h) When encountering international forces. 
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Fig. 3.1: Q-18. How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family 
these days? || 2006-2013 
Overall, respondents from the West region (81%) report feeling the most fear in general, and respon-
dents from the Central/Hazarajat report feeling the least fear (35%). Pashtuns (66%) report experienc-
ing significantly14 more fear compared to all other ethnic groups. 
Looking at the main responses to the questions about level of fear to participate in various specific 
activities (see Fig. 3.2 below), nationally, 77% of respondents report experiencing fear when encoun-
tering international forces, 68% report they would feel fear participating in a demonstration, 75% of 
respondents report they would feel fear when traveling from one part to another part of Afghanistan, 
and 59% of respondents say they would feel fear when voting in a national election. 
Fig. 3.2: Q-30a/h. Would you participate in the following activities with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? 
LEVEL OF FEAR: PARTICIPATION IN ACTIVITIES  
 No fear Some fear A lot of fear Don’t know
 (%) (%) (%) (%)
When participating in resolving problems 
in your community
57 34 8 1
Voting in a national/provincial election 41 40 19 1
Participating in a peaceful demonstration 28 40 28 3
To run for public office 37 39 19 4
When encountering ANP 46 37 15 2
When encountering ANA 49 34 15 2
When traveling from one part of Afghan-
istan to another part of the country
24 46 29 1
When encountering international forces 20 43 34 2
14 Pearsons Chi2 (1, n=9,233) = 65.2619, p < 0.000
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In general, the trend on fear when voting in a national election has been increasing since 2006. The 
current high level of fear respondents say they would feel when voting in a national election is likely 
to be of concern to those planning the 2014 elections. It is also important to note that Pashtuns say 
they would experience significantly15 more fear (67%) when voting compared to other ethnic groups. 
Looking at respondents’ experience with crime or violence, overall, 19% of Afghans surveyed say 
they have suffered from either violence or a criminal act in 2013, compared to 16% in 2012. Ten 
percent of urban respondents have experienced crime or violence, and 22% of rural respondents. 
Sixteen percent of women report having experienced crime or violence, and 21% of men; men were 
significantly more likely than women16 to report that they or a member of their family had suffered 
from violence or crime.  Among different ethnic groups, 26% of Pashtuns, 15% of Tajiks, and 12% 
of Hazaras surveyed report having experienced violence or crime. Pashtuns were significantly17 more 
likely than any other ethnic group to say they had experienced violence or crime.
After combining the different categories of responses given into two broader categories (crime; 
violence),18 the data show that among those who experienced violence or crime, 51% of respondents 
report having experienced crime and 49% report having experienced violence in 2013 (see Fig. 3.3 
below). The analysis also shows that having some or a lot of fear for safety is significantly correlated19 
with respondents or their families having also experienced violence or crime.20 
Fig. 3.3: Q-19. Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or of some criminal act in 
the past year? || 2007-2013
15 Pearsons Chi2 (1, n= 9,177) = 325.78,  p <0.000 
16 Pearsons Chi2 (1, n=9,249) = 45.26, p < 0.000
17 Pearsons Chi2 (1, n= 241.7806, p < 0.000
18 In total, 15 different categories of responses were given to Q-22: for the purposes of analysis, these were placed into two broad 
categories: 8 response categories were place under Crime, and 7 response categories were placed under Violence.
19 r = -0.12 p <0.000
20 75% of those respondents who had experienced some violence or crime, also reported some or a lot of fear for their safety or the 
safety of their families. 
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Looking at incidents of crime and violence since 2007, the overall the level of violence reported being ex-
perienced has been increasing, while the level of crime reported being experienced has been decreasing. 
Examining just the above trendline on violence (which is based on seven different types of violence, 
including physical attack or beating, suicide attacks, sexual violence, and actions by militants/insur-
gents, the police, the army, or foreign forces), the type of violence experienced by respondents has 
varied from year to year. The main type of violence reported in 2013 was physical attack or beating 
(21%). There had been a significant21 increase from 2010 to 2011 in the number respondents who 
reported physical attacks, while from 2011 to 2012, there had been a significant decrease in reports 
of physical attacks.22 From 2012 to 2013, there was a significant increase in the percentage of respon-
dents reporting actions by militant/insurgents23 and foreign forces.24 At the same time there was a 
significant decrease in the percentage of respondents reporting physical attacks25 and suicide attacks.26
Figure 3.4 below shows the different types of crime or violence respondents experienced in 2013. 
By far, the most frequently experienced type of crime or violence was physical attack or beating 
(21%). This was followed by racketeering or extortion (12%), theft of livestock (10%), and burglary 
or looting (10%). 
Fig. 3.4: Q-20. What kind of violence or crime did you or someone in your family experience in the past 
year?  
21 Pearsons Chi2 (1, n=2,416) = 24.34, p < 0.000
22 Pearsons Chi2 (1, n=2,311) = 17.78, p < 0.000 
23 Pearsons Chi2 (1, n=2,930) =  11.0597, p < 0.001
24 Pearsons Chi2 (1, n=2,930) =   7.5722, p < 0.006
25 Pearsons Chi2 (1, n=2,930) =  23.3406, p < 0.000
26 Pearsons Chi2 (1, n=2,930) =   5.9360, p < 0.015
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When asked about their level of confidence that perpetrators of violence or crime would be punished, 
51% of respondents said that they would have some or a great deal of confidence. Respondents who 
say they are confident that the guilty party would be punished were significantly more likely to have 
reported the incident. However, the rate of reporting varies with the type of violence or crime. For 
example, those who had experienced a physical attack or beating were more likely27 to report the 
incident than those who had experienced violence as a result of the actions of the foreign forces.28
Across all regions there has been a decrease in the level of confidence that authorities would punish 
perpetrators of violence or criminal acts (see Fig. 3.5 below). The steepest declines in confidence from 
2012 to 2013 have been in the West (a decrease of 13%) and the North East (a decrease of 11%). Among 
the regions, people in the Central/Hazarajat region had the highest overall level of confidence (66%).
Fig. 3.5: Q-23. If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have 
that the guilty party would be punished? || Some or a great deal of confidence, 2010-2013 by region 
LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE: 2010-2013 BY REGION
2010 2011 2012 2013
Central/Kabul 56 49 51 44
East 58 66 61 56
South East 50 49 54 48
South West 49 61 63 62
West 55 58 58 45
North East 62 69 70 59
Central/
Hazarajat
53 63 67 66
North West 68 61 59 51
Respondents’ willingness to report incidents of crime or violence has increased significantly over the 
past year, from 52% in 2012 to 64% in 2013. 
While respondents in rural areas were more than twice as likely to say they had  experienced violence 
or crime than respondents from urban areas, rural respondents were significantly less likely to report 
these incidents.29 Respondents from the South East and South West regions were the most likely to 
say they had experienced violence or crime, but respondents in the North East (75%) and North 
West (80%) were the most likely to report such incidents. Respondents from the Central/Hazarajat 
region are the least likely to say they have experienced violence or crime, and are also the least likely 
to report such incidents (34%).
27 Pearsons Chi2 (1, n=1,994) 38.09, p < 0.000
28 Pearsons Chi2 (1, n=545) = 10.07, p < 0.002 
29 Pearsons Chi2 (1, n=1,907) = 6.27, p < 0.01
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Among those respondents who reported violence or criminal acts, 26% took their problems to the 
ANP and 18% took their problems to the local shura or jirga (see Fig. 3.6 below). Interestingly, in 
2013, 2% of respondents who reported these incidents reported them to the Taliban. Respondents in 
only nine provinces out of 34 reported such incidents to the Taliban, and most of these were from 
Zabul province, where 51% of respondents reported incidents of violence or crime to the Taliban. 
Fig. 3.6: Q-22. Who did you report the crime to? 
3.2  Perceptions of the Afghan National Security Forces
Key Questions:
Over the last seven years, the level of confidence in both the ANA and the ANP has been relatively 
stable and high. The level of confidence in the ANA and ANP reported here is based on the average 
number of respondents who either somewhat or strongly agreed with all of the statements listed in 
Fig. 3.7 below. 
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Q-42: Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: a) ANA is 
honest and fair with the Afghan people; b) ANA helps improve security. Would you say strongly 
or somewhat? 
Q-44: Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: a) ANP is 
honest and fair with the Afghan people; b) ANP helps improve the security; c) ANP is efficient at 
arresting those who have committed crimes. Would you say strongly or somewhat?
Q-46. Now, please tell me if you think that the following [ANA and ANP] need foreign support 
to do their job properly at the moment?
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Fig. 3.7: Q-42a/b & Q-44a/b/c. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each of the following state-
ments.
CONFIDENCE IN ANA AND ANP
Q-42: Afghan National Army Q-44: Afghan National Police
a) ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan
    people
a)   ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan
      people
b) ANA helps improve the security b)  ANP helps improve the security  
c)  ANP is efficient at arresting those who
     have committed crimes
In 2013, 88% of respondents say they are confident in the ANA, while 72% of respondents say they 
are confident in the ANP. Although overall, agreement was consistently high across all provinces, ur-
ban respondents (79%) are significantly30 more likely to say they are confident in both the ANA and 
ANP (i.e., likely to somewhat or strongly agree with all five of the statements in Fig. 3.7 above) than 
rural respondents (65%). Among ethnic groups, Pashtuns are significantly31 more likely to disagree 
with these statements than other ethnic groups, and regionally, respondents living in the South East 
region are the most likely32 to disagree.
In 2013, confidence in the ANA is consistently higher across the country than it is for the ANP, 
except for in three provinces where the respondents have equal confidence in both institutions (Dai-
kundi, Laghman, and Wardak). For those respondents who reported police actions, there is a signifi-
cant33 increase in confidence in the ANA compared to the ANP. These differences are most extreme 
for respondents in the following five provinces: Khost, Nooristan, Paktia, Panjshir, and Parwan.
Afghans’ views on the ANP have not changed significantly since 2008 (see Fig. 3.8 below). The level 
of agreement with the statements about the ANP’s role in improving security and the ANP’s effi-
ciency in arresting perpetrators of crime rose about 5% from 2012 to 2013. 
30  Pearsons Chi2(1, 9,260) = 99.55, p < 0.000
31  Pearsons Chi2(1, 9,257) = 16.4011, p < 0.000
32  Pearsons Chi2(1, 9,260) = 88.7585, p < 0.000
33  Those who reported police action: [Mean = 0.56, SD = 0.93] compared to those who did not, t (n=1914) = 3.17 , p < 0.000, one tail
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Fig 3.8: Q-44a/b/c. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. ANP is 
honest and fair with the Afghan people; ANP helps improve the security; ANP is efficient at arresting those 
who have committed crimes. Would you say strongly or somewhat? || 2008-2013
Looking at provincial-level data for these questions about the ANP (see Fig. 3.9 below), compared to 
other provinces, respondents in Kunduz and Jawzjan have the highest level of confidence in the ANP 
(90-94%). Respondents with lower levels of confidence in the ANP (25-65%) tend to be concentrated 
in the South West, South East, and Central/Kabul regions.  
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Fig 3.9: Q-44a/b/c. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. ANP 
is honest and fair with the Afghan people; ANP helps improve the security; ANP is efficient at ar-
resting those who have committed crimes. Would you say strongly or somewhat? || Provincial 
breakdown
Longitudinal data on perceptions of the ANA (see Fig. 3.10 below) shows that the percentage of those 
who regard the ANA as helping to improve security rose from 87% in 2012 to 91% in 2013. Overall, 
views on the ANA have not changed much since 2007.
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Fig 3.10: Q-42a/b. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. ANA is 
honest and fair with the Afghan people; ANA helps improve the security. Would you say strongly or some-
what? || 2007-2013
At the provincial level, there is a wide variation among the respondents who have confidence in the 
ANA (see Fig. 3.11 below). Those interviewed in the provinces of Ghor, Wardak, and Zabul are the 
least confident in the ANA (38% to 65%). The South West, North East, and North West regions 
contain several provinces that have the highest level of confidence (90% to 98%).
Fig 3.11: Q-42 a/b. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. ANA is 
honest and fair with the Afghan people; ANA helps improve the security. Would you say strongly or 
somewhat? || Provincial breakdown 
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To understand why the confidence levels for both the ANA and ANP have been consistently high 
since 2007, some consideration must be given to the responses provided by respondents to the fol-
lowing questions:
Thirteen percent of respondents give the existence of a functional ANA and ANP as a main reason 
for why the country is moving in the right direction. Overall, 26% of all respondents who reported 
incidents of violence or crime reported them to the ANP. Of those respondents who are confident 
in the ANP, 28% reported incidents of violence or crime to the ANP compared to 23% of those who 
are not confident in the ANP (i.e. those who did not agree with any of the statements in Fig. 2.7)
Those respondents who report being exposed to violence or crime were significantly34 less likely to 
have confidence in the ANP. However, if they reported this incident to the ANP, they are 11% more 
likely to have confidence in the ANP than if they had reported the incident to another institution. 
The level of confidence that the ANP would arrest the guilty party has increased from 75% in 2012 to 
80% in 2013. In total, there has been an increase of 10% since 2010 (see Fig. 3.12 below). 
Fig 3.12: Q-44c.  ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes. Would you say strongly 
or somewhat? || 2008-2013 
34 An OLS regression was conducted to determine the effect of exposure to violence and exposure to theft on the perceived effec-
tiveness of the ANP, controlling for ethnicity and region. Violence significantly decreased perceptions of the effectiveness of the 
ANP (Beta=0-0.024, Pr=004), as did exposure to theft with less magnitude (Beta=-0.021, p=.007).  Effectiveness of the ANP was 
measured using a reliable 3-item scale. Overall, the model was significant, R2 =.0.004, F(4, 53730)=59.98, p < 0.0001)
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Q-1: Reasons for country moving in the right direction. 
Q-22: Who did you report the crime to?
Q-23: If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have 
that the guilty party would be punished? 
Q-26: How often in the past year have you had to give money, a gift, or perform a favor for these 
organizations?
Q-30: Fear when encountering the ANA/ANP.
Q-46: Do you think that the ANA/ANP need foreign support to do their job properly at the 
moment?
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Nationally, 37% of respondents say they experienced corruption in their dealings with the ANP. Of 
those who had confidence in the ANP, 49% say they had experienced corruption. Interestingly, a 
reported experience of corruption decreased confidence in the ANP by only 12%. 
Lastly, despite the high level of confidence in the ANP nationally, 76% of all respondents say that the 
ANP still needed foreign support to do its job. This is a significant increase from 2012, when 67% of 
respondents said that the ANP needed continued foreign support. Although most respondents in all 
provinces say that the ANP needs help from foreigners, in Panjshir and in Baghlan only 30% and 45% 
of respondents respectively say that ANP needs help from foreigners. 
The consistently high level of confidence in both the ANA and ANP since 2007, despite the high 
percentages of respondents that have reported fear when encountering the ANA or ANP during this 
time,35,36 is likely to be based on very practical considerations that reflect the realities for ordinary 
citizens in Afghanistan. Both the ANA and the ANP are both relatively new institutions. Compared 
to the period prior to their formation, their presence has brought at least some sense of law and order 
to the country. 
Overall, the reasons for the high level of confidence in the ANA and ANP are complex and vary 
between provinces, but appear to reflect three main factors: 
•	 Existence: the fact that the ANA and ANP are present, and thus help to bring order and a sense 
of security;
•	 Confidence: the level of confidence that if incidents of violence or crime are reported to the 
ANA and ANP, the guilty party would be arrested; and
•	 Corruption: whether or not the respondents had experienced corruption in their dealings with 
the ANP.
3.3  Peace and reconciliation
Key Questions:
35 2013 data: fear when encountering ANA (39%) and ANP (52%)
36 There was significant variation at the provincial level in the reported fear when encountering ANA/ANP, ranging from just 2% 
of respondents in Jawzjan, to 43% of respondents in Zabul. 
Q-60. Are you aware of any efforts being taken by the Afghan government to reconcile with 
armed opposition groups? 
Q-61. Do you think reconciliation efforts between the Afghan government and armed opposition 
groups can help to stabilize the country, or not?
Q-62. In your opinion, what is the reason that the armed opposition groups are fighting against 
the Afghan government?
Q-63. What is one reason that an Afghan citizen might support the goals of armed opposition 
groups? 
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Since 2009, there has been decreasing support for armed opposition groups (AOGs). In 2013, only 
35% of respondents say they have a little or a lot of sympathy for the armed opposition (see Fig. 3.13 
below). 
Fig. 3.13: Q-65. Thinking about the reasons you have given for why armed opposition groups have been 
fighting during the past year, in general, would   you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy 
or no sympathy at all for these groups?  || 2009-2013
Pashtuns are significantly more likely to have some sympathy for the armed opposition (42%) com-
pared to other ethnic groups. Urban respondents (71%) are significantly37 more likely to have no 
sympathy at all compared to rural respondents (61%), and women (70%) are more likely38 to have no 
sympathy for AOGs than men. 
There are interesting differences among provinces in the level of support for the armed opposition 
(see Fig. 3.14 below). The provinces with the lowest percentage of respondents who say they have 
a lot of sympathy for AOGs are Badakshan and Panjshir (less than 1%). Provinces with the highest 
percentage of respondents with a lot of sympathy include Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan, Daikundi, 
Paktika, Logar, Wardak, and Laghman (20-44%). 
37  Pearsons Chi2(1, n= ) =  66.8538, p < 0.000
38  Pearsons Chi2(1, n= ) = 111.6667, p < 0.000
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SYMPATHY FOR ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS
Q-64. What is one reason that an Afghan citizen might disagree with the goals of armed opposition 
groups? 
Q-65: Thinking about the reasons you have given for why armed opposition groups have been 
fighting during the past year, in general, would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little 
sympathy, or no sympathy at all for these groups?
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Fig. 3.14: Q-65. Thinking about the reasons you have given for why armed opposition groups have been 
fighting during the past year, in general, would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy or 
no sympathy at all for these groups? || Provincial breakdown
When asked why Afghans might disagree with the goals of the AOGs, the most commonly cited rea-
son is that they kill innocent civilians 24%. This is true both among those with no sympathy (30%) 
and among those reporting some or a lot of sympathy (26%). The second most commonly cited rea-
son for disagreeing is a desire to finish the war (14%). Regionally (see Fig. 3.15 below), the desire to 
finish the war as a reason for disagreeing with the goals of AOGs is highest in the Central/Hazarajat 
region (30%) and lowest in the South East region (9%). The third most common reason for disagree-
ing with AOGs is the perception that they work for Pakistan (8%). This differs along regional lines, 
where regions bordering Pakistan (East, South East, Central/Kabul, and South West) are more likely 
to report AOG allegiances to Pakistan compared to regions farther from the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
border.
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Fig. 3.15: Q-64. What is one reason that an Afghan citizen might disagree with the goals of armed opposi-
tion groups? || Provincial breakdown
REASONS: NO SYMPATHY FOR ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS
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suicide
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freedom
2 4 3 3 2 5 0 2 3
Don’t know (vol.) 10 6 4 11 11 13 21 19 11
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Nationally, 74% of respondents are aware of the government’s attempts at reconciliation with the 
armed opposition groups. The level of awareness is higher in urban areas (77%) than in rural areas of 
the country (74%).  
Overall, 63% of respondents agree with the statement that the reconciliation efforts between the gov-
ernment and armed opposition groups can stabilize the country (64% of rural respondents, and 57% 
of urban respondents). Looking at ethnic differences, more Pashtuns (70%) and Uzbeks (69%) agree 
that reconciliation can stabilize the country than Tajiks (55%), and Hazaras (50%).
There are provincial differences in the response to this question about reconciliation (see Fig. 3.16 
below). Those respondents more likely to agree that reconciliation efforts between the government 
and AOGs can help stabilize the country are largely concentrated in the provinces bordering Pakistan 
(70-88% in most of those provinces). The Central provinces of Panjshir and Parwan and the West 
provinces of Ghor and Herat have the lowest percentage of the respondents agreeing with the state-
ment (17-50%).
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Fig. 3.16: Q-61. Do you think reconciliation efforts between the Afghan government and armed opposition 
groups can help to stabilize the country, or not? || Provincial breakdown
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4 Economic Growth and Employment
With a per capita GDP (based on Purchasing Power Parity) of only USD $1072 in 2013, Afghanistan 
is the tenth poorest country in the world.39 Agriculture plays a critical role in the country’s economy, 
and many Afghans rely on farm-related activities as their main source of income. Afghanistan’s ag-
ricultural output is still 50% below its pre-war (1979) level, and investment in the sector has been 
very low.40 However, an exceptional harvest in 2012, along with the launch of Afghanistan’s first 
large-scale mining activities, increased real GDP growth from around 7% to nearly 12%41 last year. 
Untapped mineral deposits of oil, gold, copper, lithium, and iron ore in Afghanistan are estimated at 
USD $1 trillion.42 Improvements in the legal and regulatory environment for mining could help se-
cure planned investment, and assuming a good harvest in 2014, peaceful elections, and the continued 
growth of the telecommunications sector, growth could increase in 2014.43 The Ministry of Com-
merce and Industries (MoCI), in accordance with the London Compact and at the direction of both 
the President’s Office and parliament, is taking the lead on drafting and revising 45 new commercial 
laws and regulations, several of which are now before parliament.
The planned withdrawal of most international military troops by the end of 2014 may adversely 
affect private sector confidence, and is likely to be accompanied by a decline in international develop-
ment assistance. The Afghan national budget has depended heavily on external aid since 2001, with 
donor funds providing up to 65% of the core budget in 2012. There is widespread concern that the 
pre-election period may be accompanied by increased insurgency activities that will undermine hard-
won economic and social development gains. Afghanistan must make a rather rapid transition from 
a war-oriented, aid-dependent economy to one that is more sustainable and commercially oriented. 
Afghanistan’s annual population growth rate is around 3%. In 2010, 49% of the population in Af-
ghanistan were the age of 14 years or younger.44 A large number of young adults are entering the labor 
force, thus the unemployment rate is likely to rise. The proportion of the labor force that is under-
employed or in vulnerable employment is also set to rise. Local job creation is therefore likely to be 
the greatest challenge during the transition period, especially since investors are increasingly reluctant 
to invest while the economic climate and security situation are uncertain, and since the manufactur-
ing base has suffered so badly from cheap imports. The balance of trade and the depreciation of the 
Afghan currency are also important considerations for the country’s growth and development. 
4.1  Economy
Key Question:
39 International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013.
40 World Bank (April 2013). Afghanistan Economic Update. Poverty Reduction & Economic Management: South Asia Region. 24pp.
41 World Bank (April 2013). Afghanistan Economic Update. Poverty Reduction & Economic Management: South Asia Region. 24pp.
42 Joint Geological Survey conducted in 2010 by the U.S. Pentagon and the U.S. Geological Survey.
43 World Bank (April 2013). Afghanistan Economic Update. Poverty Reduction & Economic Management: South Asia Region. 24pp.
44 Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population 
Prospects: The 2010 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm.
Q-6: Overall, for you and your family, which of these periods was the best economically? [Recent 
period after the Taliban, or the Taliban period]
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In 2013 most Afghans (76%) report that economic conditions improved after the Taliban period, but 
the figures vary according to geography, gender, and household income. For example, urban residents 
(92%) are more likely than rural residents (85%) to report that economic conditions have improved 
after the Taliban period. 
Respondents from the North West region of Afghanistan are the most likely to report an improve-
ment in the post-Taliban period (96%), while respondents from the West region are the least likely 
(76%). Women are significantly more likely than men to report that they and their families are better 
off in the post-Taliban period.45 
Regionally (see Fig. 4.1 below), far more respondents in the North West, North East, and Central/
Kabul regions (73-94% in most of those provinces) say that their economic situation is currently bet-
ter in comparison to the Taliban period. In Zabul, Paktika, and Nooristan, a much lower percentage 
(33-53%) of respondents say that their current economic situation is better now than before. It is 
worth noting that these three provinces have had limited development relative to other provinces, 
and are among the most insecure.
Fig. 4.1: Q-6. Overall, for you and your family, which of these periods was the best economically? || Most 
recent period after the Taliban: Provincial breakdown 
45 Probit regression, R2=0.05, LR Pearsons Chi2 (9) = 474.78, p < 0.0001 [(Model controlled for Age, Marital Status, Income, Access 
to Information, Support for Women’s Rights, Gender, Education, Province, and Urban/Rural] 
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Respondents from poorer households are significantly more likely to report being economically bet-
ter off during the post-Taliban era, and wealthier respondents are significantly more likely to report 
having been better off during the Taliban era (see Fig. 4.2 below). 
Fig. 4.2: Q-6. Overall, for you and your family, which of these periods was the best economically? || By 
income level
As the level of support for women’s rights and confidence in the government increases, access to 
information increases, and the level of education increases, respondents are significantly more likely 
to say that the post-Taliban period is better economically for them and their families. By contrast, 
perceptions that the economy was better under the Taliban are significantly correlated with sympa-
thy for armed opposition groups.46
4.2  Employment
Key Questions:
In 2013, 51%47 of the respondents surveyed say that they are employed. Fig. 4.3 below shows the 
distribution of employment categories among those respondents. Forty-five percent48 of those who 
are employed work in agriculture, either as farmers (36%) or farm laborers (9%). The next largest 
employment categories are skilled workers/artisans (10%) and informal sales/business (9%). 
46  r=0.18, p < 0.0001
47  n=5,154
48  n=2,583
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D-3: Are you now working, a housewife (ask only women), retired, a student, or looking for work?
D-4: What is your main occupation?
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Fig. 4.3: D-4. What is your main occupation? 
Eighty-seven percent of those under the age of 35 are employed, and 91% of those between the ages 
of 35-54 are employed. Only 76% of those aged 55 or over are employed. These figures represent only 
those people who are available for employment, not those who are housewives, students, or retirees. 
The definition of “employed” used in the survey is “being paid for work.” Eighty six percent of the 
women surveyed say they are housewives. Housewives may still earn some money for their families, 
but are generally not available for employment.49 For all respondents, on average 5% of all women 
and 79% of all men surveyed are employed, with men in rural areas being statistically more likely 
to be employed than men in urban areas.50 The overall national employment rate51 for men is 89%. 
However, there is a significant52 difference in the male employment rate among the regions. The West 
region has the highest rate of employment for men (91%), while the Central/Kabul region has the 
lowest rate of employment for men (84%).  
The overall rate of unemployment for men varies at the regional level, from 7% in the South East 
region to 19% in the Central/Kabul region. Among those working, the Central/Kabul region has the 
highest percentage of self-employed (14%), while the Western region has the lowest (3%). The Cen-
tral/Kabul region has the largest proportion of students (13%), compared to a low of 2% in the South 
West region. The Central/Hazarajat region has the lowest percentage of skilled workers and artisans 
(3%) and the highest percentage of farmers (55%).
49 Women living in rural areas are more likely to be housewives than women living in urban areas [Pearson Chi2(1) =  30.6063   p < 0.000].
50 Pearson Chi2 (1) = 27.1313   p = 0.000
51 The male employment rate is the number of males employed/number of males employed or available for work (which in this 
case includes two categories: unemployed and other). “Employed” means receiving a wage. Housewives, students, and retirees are 
excluded from this calculation. 
52 F (7,5726) = 12.61, p<.0001, R2 = 0.015
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4.3 Household income
Key Questions:
The average household size in the sample was nine people per household,53 with 48% of households 
consisting of seven to 10 people. Household size (which varies in the survey from one to 48 people 
per household) is significantly correlated with the reported household income.54 While 6% of respon-
dents report a household income of less than 2,000 Afghani per month, and 5% report an income of 
more than 20,000 Afghani, over half (54%) of respondents report a household income of 3,001-10,000 
Afghani per month (see Fig 4.4 below). 
Fig. 4.4: D-18a. For statistical purposes only, we need to know your average monthly household income. 
Will you please tell me which of the following categories best represents your average total family monthly 
income?
53  SE=.04, 95% CI 9.00-9.16
54  r= 0.29, p < 0.0001
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D-18a: For statistical purposes only, we need to know your average monthly household income. 
Will you please tell me which of the following categories best represents your average total family 
monthly income?
D-18b: Do female members of the family contribute to this household income, or not?
D-18c: How much of your household’s total income comes from female members of the house-
hold?
D-19: Please rate the living standard of your household.
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Overall, as the education level of the respondent increases, there is a significant increase in reported 
household income. It is worth noting that on average, women report significantly lower monthly 
household incomes than men. The reasons for this are not clear, but it may be more difficult for wom-
en to assess the overall monthly household income since 86% of the women surveyed are housewives, 
and not working outside the home, and therefore do not have an income. Only 17% of respondents 
report having female members of the household contributing to household income. Women from 
households in rural areas (20%) are more likely55 to contribute to household income than women in 
urban areas (13%). 
There are significant differences between ethnic groups in the rate of women’s contribution to house-
hold income. For example, both Pashtun and Hazara women are significantly56 more likely to con-
tribute to household income than Tajik women. The reasons for this may be cultural; the difference 
cannot be explained by household size, nor by the level of education of the respondent. There are 
also statistically significant differences between regions. For example, respondents in the South East 
region are significantly57 more likely to report that women are contributing to their household in-
come than other regions.
Looking at the issue of self-reported standard of living, 85% of respondents say that their household 
has enough money for food every day, and 66% say that their household has enough money for fuel. 
Fifty-three percent say that their household has enough money for daily food, fuel, and children’s 
education combined. Only 26% say that their household has enough money for daily food, fuel, chil-
dren’s education, and occasional luxury items.
55  Pearsons Chi2 (3) =  30.8231, p < 0.000
56  Pashtun vs Tajik: Pearsons Chi2 (1) =  23.6359, p < 0.000; Hazara vs Tajik: Pearsons Chi2(1) = 12.2505, p < 0.000
57  Pearsons Chi2(1) = 35.0686, p < 0.000
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5  Development and Service Delivery
The 2013 UN Human Development Index (HDI)58 for Afghanistan places the country in the low 
human development category (175th out of the 187 countries assessed). Afghanistan scores low in 
several key areas, including: health; education; gender; and trade, economy, and income. Afghanistan 
is currently dependent on donors to address its pressing development needs. The international com-
munity has reaffirmed its commitment to make up to USD $16 billion in development aid available 
for Afghanistan under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF), which was agreed at 
the Tokyo Conference in July 2012. However, this funding, which will increasingly be channeled 
directly through the Afghan government’s budget, is linked to the introduction and successful imple-
mentation of a range of government reforms. 
Slow progress has been made on developing the necessary legal and policy framework and offering 
the necessary incentives for encouraging the private sector to provide services on behalf of the govern-
ment in areas where it has insufficient capacity to do this directly. In addition, insecurity is undermin-
ing budget execution rates and violence is preventing basic government operations. Overall, there 
is a lack of reliable data on the number of service-delivery related projects in the country, and the 
assessment of impacts tends to be short-term and rather narrow. Higher priority needs to be placed 
on assessing the sustainability of projects and their lasting long-term benefits. 
5.1  Satisfaction with services available in local area
Key Questions:
The survey asked Afghans about their current level of satisfaction with five categories of services: 
•	 Water: Seventy-four percent of respondents report that the availability of clean drinking water 
is good or very good in their area, and 53% report that the availability of water for irrigation is 
good or very good.
58  http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/AFG.html
Q-9: I would like to ask you about today’s conditions in the village/neighborhood where you 
live. Would you rate [each item on a list of services: a. availability of clean drinking water, b. 
availability of water for irrigation, c. supply of electricity, d. availability of clinics and hospitals, 
e. availability of medicine, f. availability of education for children, g. condition of roads in your 
areas] as very good, quite good, quite bad, or very bad in your area?
Q-10: In the last 12 months, do you know of, or have you heard of any project or program in this 
area/district covering any of the following?
Q-11: Which countries do you think have provided the most funding for these types of projects 
in your area/district?  
Q-38c: Provincial council members have various responsibilities. How would you rate their 
performance on each of the following duties? [c. improving the delivery of basic services]
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•	 Electricity: Forty-one percent report that the supply of electricity is good or very good.  
•	 Healthcare: Fifty-two percent of respondents say that the availability of clinics and hospitals is 
good or very good, and 50% report that the availability of medicine is good or very good.  
•	 Education: Seventy-two percent report that the availability of education for children is good or 
very good.  
•	 Roads: Forty-three percent say that the condition of roads in their area is good or very good. 
Nationally, respondents were most satisfied with the drinking water supply and education. They 
were least satisfied with the electricity supply and the condition of the roads. Although overall sat-
isfaction with the condition of roads was low considering that approximately 76% of Afghanistan’s 
main roads have been rehabilitated, the low level of satisfaction may be due to the relatively poor 
condition of secondary local access roads. 
Looking at regional data on levels of satisfaction with basic services, respondents from the Central/
Kabul region are most satisfied with education for children (80%), the availability of hospitals and 
clinics (63%), medicine (63%), and the condition of roads (50%). Respondents from the East (20%) and 
South East (18%) regions report the lowest level of satisfaction with the electricity supply. Respon-
dents in the East region are the most satisfied with the condition of roads (53%).
Comparing 2013 to previous years (see Fig. 5.1 below), respondents’ satisfaction with electricity sup-
ply and water for irrigation has risen over the last two years. Respondents’ satisfaction with availabil-
ity of children’s education, drinking water, clinics and hospitals, and medicine experienced a slight 
decline from 2012 to 2013.
Fig 5.1: Q-9a/f. How would you rate today’s conditions in the village/neighborhood where you live? || 
Combination of quite good and very good responses: 2007- 2013 
SATISFACTION WITH BASIC SERVICES
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Availability of education for children 72 70 67 68 73 77 72
Availability of clean drinking water 63 62 63 63 70 76 74
Availability of clinics and hospitals 56 51 49 46 57 58 52
Availability of medicine - 49 44 43 53 53 50
Availability of water for irrigation 59 47 53 49 45 52 53
Supply of electricity 31 25 34 34 34 36 41
Afghans’ satisfaction with the electricity supply has been gradually increasing since 2009 (see Fig. 5.2 
below), even though most households still only use electricity for lighting rather than for heating or 
cooking. The sharp drop in satisfaction with the electricity supply in 2008 coincides with a serious 
drought that year, which would have made electricity generation more difficult than usual. In 2011, 
there was another serious drought, but this does not seem to have affected the trend line, perhaps due 
to the completion of new power lines to supply electricity from Tajikistan.
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Fig 5.2: Q-9c. How would you rate today’s conditions [c. supply of electricity] in the village/neighborhood 
where you live? || Combination of quite good and very good responses: 2007- 2013 
When asked how well provincial councils are doing in improving the delivery of basic services, na-
tionally, 31% of respondents report that they are doing a bad job. There were differences between re-
gions in the assessment of the performance of provincial councils on service delivery. The least likely 
to be satisfied were respondents from the Central/Kabul region, where nearly half of the respondents 
(47%) report that provincial councils are doing a bad job. In contrast, only 18% of respondents in the 
North West region say that the provincial councils are doing a bad job.
5.2  Awareness of development programs and donors
Key Questions: 
An analysis of the 2012 survey dataset shows that the level of awareness of development projects and 
the countries that fund them is influenced by eight main factors: 
•	 The extent to which the projects generate local employment and mobilize the community;
•	 The direct impact of projects on household income;
•	 The type of project (“soft” projects that focus on capacity development have lower recognition, 
but not necessarily less impact, when compared to “hard” projects such as the construction of 
roads or irrigation ditches); 
•	 The duration of the project (projects that are implemented over a longer timeframe are likely to 
have better recognition than projects implemented over a shorter timeframe);
•	 Whether or not the projects improve service delivery;
•	 The number of people directly affected by the project;
•	 The effectiveness of the communication strategy for the project; and
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SATISFACTION WITH ELECTRICITY SUPPLY
Q-10: In the last 12 months, do you know of, or have you heard of any project or program in this 
area/district covering any of the following? (see Appendix 3 for full list)
Q-11: Which countries do you think have provided the most funding for these types of projects 
in your area/district?  
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•	 Gender (men and women are equally likely to be aware of projects that focus on household 
energy sources, but men are likely to be more aware of irrigation projects).
These factors are reflected in Afghan citizens’ level of recognition of service delivery and reconstruc-
tion projects. Nationally, in 2013, the three most recognized categories of development projects were 
those involving reconstruction or opening of new schools (37% of respondents), building of roads 
and bridges (36%), and improving the drinking water supply (31%). These are all “hard” project types 
that have long-term benefits and employ or directly benefit large numbers of people. It is interesting 
that school projects received a higher level of recognition than did drinking water supply projects. 
Regionally, there was significant variation in respondents’ level of recognition of the three project 
categories mentioned above, even for the types of projects that were most recognized overall. For ex-
ample, looking at the awareness of reconstruction of roads and bridges, which were among the most 
visible projects overall, the level of awareness ranged from 54% of respondents in the South West 
region to just 16% of respondents in the Central/Hazarajat region. The South West region also had 
the highest level of awareness of drinking water projects (60%) compared to just 16% in the Central/
Hazarajat region. The level of awareness of education projects was more consistent across the regions, 
except in two adjacent regions. In the South West region 55% of respondents were aware of education 
projects, while in the West region, only 28% of respondents were aware of education projects. The 
eight influencing factors listed above are likely contributing to the variation in the awareness of such 
projects, but these results may also reflect an uneven distribution of donors across provinces.
In terms of donor recognition, (see Fig. 5.3 below) the top five most recognized donors were: the 
United States (46%), Japan (24%), Germany (16%), India (16%), and China (7%). The United States 
has consistently been the most recognized donor since 2009. The level of recognition for each of the 
top five donors varies between regions, reflecting the distribution of their projects. In each region, the 
United States was recognized as a donor with the following frequencies: Central/Kabul (37%), East 
(54%), South East (61%), South West (62%), West (46%) North East (42%), Central/Hazarajat (33%), 
and North West (31%). Japan was most recognized in the East (37%) region and least recognized in 
the North East region (11%). Germany was most recognized in the North East (44%) and the East 
regions (27%) and at much lower levels in other regions. India had a fairly even distribution of rec-
ognition between the regions, with the highest level of recognition in the South West (28%) and the 
East (25%) regions, and the lowest level of recognition in the Central/Hazarajat region (5%). China 
was recognized with fairly steady frequency across all regions, ranging from 3%-9%. 
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Fig. 5.3 Q-11a/b/c. Which countries do you think have provided the most funding for these types of proj-
ects in your area/district? (a, b, and c responses combined)
DONOR RECOGNITION
Country Name
Central/
Kabul
East
South 
East
South 
West
West
North 
East
Central/
Hazarajat
North 
West
Overall
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
USA 37 54 61 62 46 42 33 31 46
Japan 26 37 25 27 27 11 29 18 24
Germany 8 27 13 7 8 44 2 17 16
India 14 25 22 28 16 7 5 6 16
Afghan Gov’t 15 5 9 5 10 21 17 14 12
China 9 9 6 7 7 3 5 3 7
Turkey 10 2 4 4 4 3 5 10 6
UK (Britain) 1 7 4 21 2 4 1 1 6
Saudi Arabia 3 4 5 21 3 2 0 2 5
France 7 5 2 2 5 11 1 2 5
Iran 3 5 6 5 10 2 9 4 5
Canada 2 5 5 12 8 0 6 0 4
Pakistan 2 3 2 3 4 1 4 2 2
Nat’l Solidarity 
Program
3 3 3 0 1 2 1 3 2
Thailand 3 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1
Australia 1 0 2 3 0 1 0 0 1
5.3  Household fuel sources
Key Questions: 
The availability of energy for domestic use in Afghanistan is an important issue at the household level 
for both economic and both environmental reasons. Looking at household energy use for heating and 
cooking, a total of seven main fuel sources were reported (see Fig. 5.4 below). 
Q-17a: What is the main source of energy that you use for cooking at home?
Q-17b: What is the main source of energy that you use for heating your home?  
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Fig 5.4: Q-17a/b. What is the main source of energy that you use for cooking at/heating your home? 
The two main fuel sources used by respondents for heating are firewood (26%) and animal dung 
(20%). The two main fuel sources for cooking are firewood (48%) and bottled gas (21%).
Household firewood costs, which for the average household are at least $300 per year, represent a 
significant expense. However, there are also serious health and environmental consequences of using 
firewood as the main source of fuel for both cooking and heating in Afghanistan. The use of firewood 
for cooking causes respiratory problems due to the inhalation of smoke. Firewood for those who live 
in urban areas is sourced mostly from rapidly depleting supplies of wood from the two South East 
region provinces of Khost and Paktia.59 For most rural residents, firewood is obtained by harvesting 
woody species that grow in rangeland habitats, which puts pressure on the species that are being har-
vested. In parts of Bamyan, for example, due to widespread overharvesting of woody plants for fuel, 
people may now have to walk for up to four hours from their village to harvest sufficient firewood to 
meet their needs.60 While this is a direct consequence of overharvesting and thus a natural resources 
management issue, it is also becoming a conservation issue. For example, many slow-growing woody 
rangeland species often used for firewood may need special protection from over-harvesting, as the 
volumes being harvested are likely to be unsustainable.61 Also, many woody species of Ephedra that 
grow in the region, which are commonly harvested for firewood, are included in the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature’s threatened species list.62
59 Wingard, J.R. et al. (2008). East Forest Program, Timber Trade Survey (2006-2008). 68pp. Wildlife Conservation Society: Kabul, 
Afghanistan.
60 Shawe, K.G. Unpublished fieldwork conducted in Bamyan Province in 2009.
61 Slow-growing woody species are often the dominant species in rangeland habitats and do not regenerate easily.
62 http://www.iucnredlist.org [search Ephedra species Central/West Asia].
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In addition to firewood, the other main source of energy for heating is animal dung. The use of ani-
mal dung as a major source of fuel is unsustainable because it deprives the soil of necessary nutrients. 
Despite the effort required to harvest them, rangeland-harvested firewood and animal dung are both 
free, hence the dependency on these two main fuel sources. Bottled gas is relatively cheap, is easy 
to transport, and the amount used can be more precisely controlled than wood, hence its use as the 
second most important fuel for cooking. 
The reported use of firewood for heating has declined since 2009 (see Fig. 5.5 below). The reasons for 
this need further research, but it is interesting to note that the reported use of grass and other biomass 
as a source of energy for heating has increased during the same period. 
Fig 5.5: Q-17b.  What is the main source of energy that you use for heating your home? || 2009-2013
The Central/Hazarajat region has the highest reported use of grass and other plant biomass for heat-
ing (30%), and a higher use of animal dung (40%) than any other province. This region is one of the 
main rangeland areas in Afghanistan, and the communities in rangeland areas are mainly dependent 
on livestock. 
The Central/Kabul region has a higher reported use of firewood for heating purposes (46%) than any 
other region, even though the electricity supply in the Central/Kabul region is good relative to other 
regions. The reported use of electricity (3%) as a source of energy for heating is very low across all 
regions, similar to the use of kerosene (2%) and diesel (<1%). The reported use of charcoal for heat-
ing is higher in the South West region (18%) compared to all other regions, and the reported use of 
bottled gas for heating is higher in the East region (18%) than in any other region. 
The survey revealed different regional patterns of energy use for cooking and heating. For example, 
although the Central/Kabul region had the highest use of firewood for heating, it had the lowest 
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reported use of firewood for cooking (21%). However, almost half of respondents from the Central/
Kabul region report using bottled gas for cooking (49%), more than twice the level reported for any 
other region, and twice as many respondents in the Central/Kabul region report using electricity for 
cooking (8%) than in any other region. The differences in fuel use for cooking purposes probably 
reflect price and availability. The low use of firewood for cooking in the Central/Kabul region is 
probably due to the ready availability of bottled gas as a cheap and cleaner alternative. In the Central/
Hazarajat region the reported use of animal dung and grass or other plant biomass for cooking was 
higher than for any other region. Further information on the availability and price of bottled gas in 
the Central/Hazarajat region is needed, but the most likely explanation is that animal dung and grass 
or other plant biomass are readily available and free.
5.4  Household and agricultural water use
Key Questions:
Nationwide, the most common form of household water supply is a well, with 58% of urban respon-
dents reporting that they use a well compared to 66% of rural respondents. 
Unsurprisingly, 38% of urban respondents have piped water compared to only 11% of rural respon-
dents. The environmental and public health significance of the findings needs careful consideration. 
Over-reliance by urban dwellers on wells that draw water from aquifers is likely to be unsustainable, 
given the rapid urban population growth in cities such as Kabul. Where wells tap into water stored 
in fossil aquifers, it is likely to become a significant problem in the future because such aquifers are 
not naturally recharged.
When asked whether their household has generally had enough water over the past five years, 42% 
of respondents say they have had enough, while 45% say that they have only sometimes had enough. 
Thirteen percent of respondents say that in the past five years they have not had enough water. Re-
spondents in the Central and South West regions of Afghanistan were the most likely to report hav-
ing enough water. The provinces in which respondents most often report not having enough water 
are: Khost (20%), Takhar (21%), Balkh (25%), Jawzjan (25%), and Zabul (33%). More critically, more 
than 30% of the respondents in a total of 47 districts in 17 provinces report that they have not had an 
adequate water supply (see Fig. 5.6 below). These districts should be high priority targets for develop-
ment projects designed to improve the water supply.
Q-12: Where do you usually get drinking water for your family?
Q-13: Do you use water for irrigation? 
Q-14: How would you evaluate the amount of water available for irrigation in your area last year?
Q-15: Please list the main reasons why the amount of water for irrigation is bad or very bad.
Q-16: Over the last five years, has your household generally had enough water?
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Fig 5.6: Q-16: Over the last five years, has your household generally had enough water? 
DISTRICTS WITHOUT ADEQUATE WATER SUPPLY
Province District (% of respondents)
Kabul District 8 (39%), Bagrami (36%)
Wardak Daimir Dad (38%)
Ghazni Waghaz (42%), Deh Yak (33%)
Paktika Mata Khan (42%)
Khost Musa Kheil (50%)
Laghman Bad Pech (33%)
Kunar Sawaki (83%), Shigal wa Sheltan (42%), Sar Kani (33%)
Badakhshan Kash (50%), Darayim (58%)
Takhar Rustag (33%), Chahab (58%), Namak Ab (33%)
Baghlan Dushi (46%) 
Balkh Marmul (57%), Shortepa (50%), Char Bolak (58%), Sholgara (50%) 
Jawzjan Darzab (33%), Faizabad (58%), Mardyan (30%), Khwaja Dukoh (42%)
Faryab Andkhoy (31%), Qurghan (50%) 
Badghis Qalai-e-Now (33%)
Herat Rubat-e-Sangi (53%), Pashtun Zarghun (45%), Karrukh (42%) 
Farah Shibkoh (50%), Qala-e-kah (50%), Pur Chaman (50%)
Nimroz Asl-i-chakhansur (31%)
Kandahar Nesh (42%)
Zabul
Atghar (42%), Tarang Wa Jaldak (36%), Naw Bahar (67%), Shinkai (61%), Qalat 
(42%), Shemel Zayi (33%), Arghandab (Zabul) (50%)
Ghor Char Sada (42%), Saghar (58%)
Daikundi Sang-t-Takht (30%), Gizab (42%)
Nationally, 52%63 of those surveyed report that they use water for irrigation. There is a large differ-
ence between rural and urban areas, with rural respondents comprising 94% of those who report us-
ing water for irrigation. Analyzing urban and rural respondents separately, 64% of rural respondents 
surveyed report that they use water for irrigation, compared to only 14% of respondents living in 
urban areas (see Fig. 5.7 below).  
63  n=4436
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Fig 5.7: Q-13.  Do you use water for irrigation? || National, urban, rural breakdown 
Among those respondents64 who report using water for irrigation purposes, 80% say that the avail-
ability of water for irrigation is either good or very good (see Fig. 5.8 below). 
Fig 5.8: Q-14. How would you evaluate the amount of water available for irrigation in your area last 
year?
64  n=4,436
 
52
64
14
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
National Rural Urban
USE OF WATER FOR IRRIGATION
 
5
15
58
22
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Very bad Bad Good Very good
AVAILABILITY OF WATER FOR IRRIGATION
Development and Service Delivery 63
There is a statistically significant difference65 in urban and rural respondents’ assessment of the avail-
ability of water for irrigation, Sixty-one percent of rural respondents compared to 46% of urban 
respondents say that irrigation water availability is good or very good.
Interestingly, among those respondents who report using water for irrigation, the main reason given 
for bad or very bad availability is the lack of water available from natural springs (64% of respon-
dents). Assisting communities to plan for natural fluctuations in water availability and providing 
training in climate change adaptation will be particularly important in these areas.
There were statistically significant differences between regions, with respondents from the West re-
gion being the most likely to report that the availability of water for irrigation is bad or very bad 
(37% of West region66 respondents compared to 18% nationally). In contrast, only 11% of respon-
dents from the North East region report that availability is bad or very bad.67 This is interesting, 
because the Amur/Panj River Basin that feeds this part of Afghanistan has 20% of the country’s ir-
rigated land, but only 3% of its water resources.68
Those provinces in which the respondents surveyed are most likely to be dissatisfied with the avail-
ability of water for irrigation are listed below in Fig. 5.9 below. 
Fig. 5.9: Q-14: How would you evaluate the amount of water available for irrigation in your area last 
year? || Bad or very bad 
 PROVINCES WITHOUT ADEQUATE 
WATER SUPPLY FOR IRRIGATION
Province % of respondents 
Balkh 33%
Wardak 31%
Ghor 41%
Zabul 42%
Kabul 33%
Farah 38%
65 Urban vs Rural: Pearsons Chi2 (1) = 88.38, p < 0.001
66 West Region vs. Other regions: Pearsons Chi2 (1) = 93.99, p < 0.0001
67 Northeast vs. Other regions: Pearsons Chi2 (1) = 27.92, p < 0.001
68 United Nations Country Team in Afghanistan (2013): Natural Resources Management & Peace-building in Afghanistan. p. 20. Nai-
robi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme.
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5.5  Educational attainment and literacy
Key Questions:
Although 72% of respondents report that the availability of education is quite good or very good 
in their area, 60% of respondents reported that they have received no schooling whatsoever (i.e., no 
formal education, in-home schooling, literacy classes, or madrassa education). 
It is important to look at gender-disaggregated data for this question. The percentage of respondents 
reporting that they have no education rises to 76% for women, compared to only 44% for men. Lack 
of education is more common among rural respondents (63%) than urban (48%) respondents (see Fig. 
5.10 below).
Fig. 5.10: D-5. What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed?  || No education with 
national, rural, urban, and gender breakdown
As expected, education is significantly correlated with income.69 There are observable differences 
between the monthly incomes of those who have no education and those who have a university edu-
cation or higher (see Fig. 5.11 below).
69 r = 0.2641, p = < 0.000
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D-5: What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed?
D-6: Please tell me if you can: [a. write a letter to someone without any assistance, b. read a letter 
from somebody without any assistance, c. if a piece of nan cost 20 Afghani at a bakery, how much 
change will you get if you want to buy 4 pieces and you have 100 Afghani in your pocket?]
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Fig. 5.11: D-5. What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed?  || No education and uni-
versity or higher education by monthly income 
When looking at the highest level of formal educational attainment respondents have achieved, 
among those who had pursued formal education, 25% had achieved a primary school level education, 
20% secondary school level, 36% high school level, 12% grade 13 or 14, and 6% a university level 
education.70 
However, looking at each level of education separately, the completion rates vary. Of those who en-
tered primary school, only 40% completed this level of education. Of all those who went on to enter 
secondary school after primary school, 40% completed this level of education and 60% dropped out. 
Of all those who entered high school, 63% completed this level of education and 37% dropped out. 
Of all those who went on to study at grade 13 and grade 14 levels, 66% completed grade 14 and 34% 
had dropped out. Finally, of all those who entered university, 62% completed this level of education 
and 38% dropped out. This data shows that although completion rates are relatively poor for primary 
and secondary level education, they are much higher for high school, grade 14, and university.
Given the low completion rate at the primary school level (40%) and the small percentage of respon-
dents who completed grade 14 (comprising 12% of all respondents who said that they had received 
some level of formal education), arguably the most important immediate educational target would be to 
increase the completion rates for primary and grade 14 levels. These are the most critical levels of educa-
tion for improving the national literacy level and supplying qualified teachers for the next generation.
Interestingly, the survey data does not show significantly different overall rates of completion for 
women and men at each of the different levels of education. However, there were ethnic differences 
in the levels of female educational attainment. Uzbek (84%) women were significantly less likely to 
have had formal education at any level71 than other ethnic groups, closely followed by Pashtun (83%) 
70  130 respondents out of 9,260 surveyed. See the questionnaire in Appendix (1) for a fill listing of educational levels.
71  Pearson Chi2 (1, n=9,251) = 31.5141, p = < 0.000
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women. By contrast, Hazara women (28%) were significantly72 more likely to have had formal educa-
tion at any level than women from any other ethnic group. Hazara (14% of those surveyed) and Tajik 
(10% of those surveyed) women were most likely to have high school diplomas, and Uzbek (3%) and 
Pashtun (5%) women the least likely.
Younger female respondents were significantly more likely to be educated than older female respon-
dents.73 For example, younger women in the 18-30 age group are more likely to have had some formal 
education (29% of the women surveyed in this age group), than women in the 31-50 age group (12%), 
or the over 50 age group (6%). Although very few of the women included in the survey reported 
having a university level education (less than 1% of all women surveyed), of these women, 53% were 
in the 18-30 age group, 41% were in the 31-50 age group, and just 6% were in the over 50 age group.
Men in all three of the age groups are significantly74 more likely than their female peers to have had 
some formal education. Sixty-three percent of men aged 18-30, 42% of men aged 31-50, and 36% of 
men over 50 years of age have had some formal education. Just as for women, the generation gap in 
male education increases as the level of educational attainment increases. Of all men included in the 
survey that have some university level education (3%), 54% were in the age 18-30 category, 32% were 
in the age 31-50 category, and 14% were in the over age 50 category (note that this figure is more than 
twice the percentage of women over age 50 who have a university level education). 
Looking at all respondents in 2013, only 2% had some university education. A lack of gender parity 
is evident when this figure is disaggregated: 88% of those respondents with some university education 
are male, and only 12% are female.
There are some interesting correlations between the survey findings on education level and respon-
dents’ views on other questions in this survey. Those respondents with some level of education were 
significantly75 less likely to think that country is moving in the right direction than those with no 
education. Fifty-nine percent of the respondents with some level of education said that the country 
is moving in the right direction, compared to 62% of those with no education. While women’s ac-
cess to education is increasing in Afghanistan, a lack of education and illiteracy have consistently 
been identified as the biggest problems facing women in Afghanistan since 2006, and were reported 
by 27% of respondents in 2013. One of the most common reasons respondents provide for thinking 
that the country is moving in the right direction is the opening of schools for girls (reported by 6% 
of respondents this year).
This year, respondents were asked three questions about literacy, which resulted in a classification of 
the respondents into one of four main levels of literacy ranging from illiterate to literate.76 Using this 
72 Pearson Chi2 (1, n=3,134) = 17.2541, p = < 0.000
73 r =-- 0.2102, p < 0.000
74 18-30 Age Category: Pearson Chi2 (1, n=4,055) = 436.6224, p = < 0.000; 31-50 Age Category Pearson Chi2 (1, n=4,157) = 
408.5643, p = < 0.000; 51 and Over Age Category: Pearson Chi2 (1, n=1,408) = 75.2347, p = < 0.000
75 Pearsons Chi2 (2, n=8,770) = 12.8318, p < 0.001
76 No skills (Illiteracy): Literacy Level (0): not numerate, can’t read or write / 1 Skill: Literacy Level (1a): numerate only; Literacy 
Level (1b): read only; Literacy Level (1c): write only / 2 Skills: Literacy Level (2a): numerate + read; Literacy Level (2b): numerate 
+ write; Literacy Level (2c): both read + write / 3 Skills (Literacy): Literacy Level (3): numeracy + read + write. 
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classification, 8% of the respondents could neither read, write, or count and so are classified as illiter-
ate, but this is likely to be an under-estimate for the reasons given below. Fifty percent were classified 
as literate (able to read, write, and count). Surprisingly, 39% of respondents fell in the middle of this 
classification scheme under the category of those who could count, but could neither read nor write. 
Although inadequate as a surrogate, not having had any schooling at all is often equated to illiteracy. 
Of those respondents (60%) who reported having no education at all, based on the answers given, 22% 
were still classified as literate for practical purposes. It is likely that this represents a degree of social 
desirability bias in the responses given by this group of respondents, as some may not want to admit 
to not being able to read, write, or count. It is important to note that when assessing literacy, specific 
literacy tests should be conducted in order to determine the actual level of literacy of the respondent. 
The answers given to each of these questions were not backed up by checks on the reading, writing, 
and numeracy skills claimed, thus the levels of illiteracy reported here are probably underestimates.
Forty percent of respondents reported that they could write a letter without any assistance, and 41% 
reported that they could read a letter without assistance. Breaking this down by the level of educa-
tional attainment, the percentages of respondents that could write a letter without any assistance were 
as follows: those with some home schooling or who had attended literacy classes (52%), an Islamic 
school (70%), primary school (70%), secondary school (95%), high school (100%), grades 13 and 14 
(100%), and university (100%). It is interesting to note that respondents who say they have had either 
some home schooling or some Islamic schooling (90%) have a higher literacy rate than those how 
have had formal primary schooling (86%), but this is probably the result of the low completion rate 
at primary school level. 
Looking at numeracy, 80% of all respondents knew how much change they would get from 100 Afgs 
if they brought four pieces of nan bread at 20 Afgs each. For those with no education, 67% report that 
they know how much change they would get. For all those with some informal or formal education, 
95% report that they know how much change they would get.77 
There were regional variations in literacy rates. Regions in which respondents were most likely to be 
illiterate were the West (23%), North West (20%), and North East (19%) regions. The South East (5%), 
East (6%), and Central/Hazarajat (7%) regions had the lowest percentages of illiterate respondents. 
77 The detailed breakdown by level of educational attainment is as follows: for those with some home schooling or who had attended 
literacy classes (75%), Islamic schooling (89%), primary schooling (95%), secondary schooling (98%), high school (98%), grades 13 
and 14 (98%), and university (98%).
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6  Governance
In order to comply with the reforms required under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework 
(TMAF), President Karzai issued Presidential Decree Number 45 in July 2012.78 This 164-article decree 
emphasizes administrative reform, counter-corruption, and justice sector reform. The General Direc-
torate of Administrative Affairs and the Cabinet have been tasked with monitoring and reporting on 
progress. The Decree is ambitious in scope and timeframe, and has proved challenging to implement.
Decree Number 45 directs key line ministries, the National Assembly, special offices, directorates, 
and commissions to take concrete action to improve government transparency, accountability, ef-
ficiency, responsiveness to citizen needs, and delivery of essential services across the country. Specific 
priorities include drafting and passing key pieces of legislation; improving water, electricity, and 
transportation infrastructure; improving the quality of education and health care; and supporting 
the agricultural sector and small and medium enterprise development. As the Afghan government 
addresses these challenges, over time it may result in increased positive public perceptions of govern-
ment performance at various levels.
Although the decree has a strong focus on anti-nepotism and bringing corrupt officials to justice, 
progress has been challenging. Afghanistan remains at the bottom of a recent comparative ranking 
of public perceptions of corruption in numerous countries, at the same level as North Korea and 
Somalia.79 While high-level political corruption often receives the greatest attention, the impact of 
administrative or “petty” corruption on Afghan citizens is equally distinctive. Administrative corrup-
tion limits and distorts Afghans’ access to essential public services, hinders economic development, 
and erodes trust in government and the rule of law.80 In a positive trend, according to recent analysis 
the transparency of Afghanistan’s national budget improved from 21% in 2010 to 59% in 2012.81 
This exceeds the commitment of 40% made by Afghanistan at the Tokyo Conference in 2012. Fiscal 
transparency is one means of reducing corruption in the country, even if the capacity to implement 
budgetary reforms remains low.82 
In the area of justice sector reform, priorities in Decree Number 45 include such measures as clear-
ing case backlogs in the courts (with emphasis on corruption and land cases), activating and staffing 
all inactive courts in the country, and simplifying judicial procedures. These efforts, combined with 
the focus on reducing corruption in the justice sector and elsewhere, may increase Afghans’ trust in 
and use of the formal justice system for resolving disputes. The decree does not address the informal 
justice sector, the importance of which was formally recognized in the Bonn Agreement as having an 
78 The Office of the President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Decree on the execution of content of the historical speech of June 
21, 2012 in the special session of National Assembly. July 29, 2012. www.afghanistan-un.org.
79 Transparency International – Corruption Perceptions Index (http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results).
80 United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime (2012). Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent Patterns and Trends. 34pp. December 2012.
81 Survey on budget transparency, participation and oversight in 100 countries around the world conducted in 2012 by the Interna-
tional Budget Partnership, - Afghanistan is now ranked 25th globally (at the same level as Poland). http://internationalbudget.org/
wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-Report-English.pdf
82 An assessment by the U.S. Government Accountability Office and the United States Agency for International Development 
found that none of the 38 ministries assessed were rated as being able to implement program budgeting reform without external 
assistance.
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important complementary role to play in advancing citizens’ access to justice. Local informal justice 
sector institutions include jirgas and shuras, which are consultative councils or assemblies of tribal 
elders that gather to discuss and resolve conflicts and disputes and make collective decisions about 
important social issues.
6.1  Satisfaction with government performance
Key Questions:
The survey explored Afghans’ perceptions of how the national government is carrying out its re-
sponsibilities. Three quarters (75%) of respondents give national government a positive assessment, 
including 26% who say that the government is doing a very good job and 49% who say it is doing a 
somewhat good job. After a high point of 80% satisfaction in 2007 dropped to a low point of 67% in 
2008, Afghans’ satisfaction with national government performance has been gradually rising over the 
past five years (see Fig. 6.1 below). 
Q-37. Members of the parliament have various responsibilities. How would you rate their 
performance on each of the following duties? Would you say they are doing a bad job, an OK job, 
a good job or a great job: [a. listening to constituents and representing their needs, b. delivering 
jobs and development, c. making laws for the good of the country, d. monitoring the President 
and his staff].
Q-40: Community development councils have been established as part of the National Solidarity 
Program, and members of the council are representatives of various groups in your community. Tell 
me, do you know if there is a CDC in your community?
Q-47: Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall the 
[national government, provincial government, municipal authorities, district government] is doing 
a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job, or a very bad job?
Q-49. Has the Provincial Governor ever been involved in helping to resolve a problem or issue 
(masala/masael) that affects you in the last 2 years?
Q-50: Have you ever personally tried to contact a representative on the provincial council for help 
in solving any of your personal or community problems in the last 2 years?
Q-52: How satisfied are you with the job your community development council is doing? Are you 
very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied? 
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Fig. 6.1: Q-47. Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall 
the national government is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job, or a very bad 
job?  || 2007-2013 
While respondents’ level of satisfaction with national government remained constant from 2012 to 
2013, satisfaction levels with all other levels of government declined in 2013 (see Fig. 6.2 below). The 
most notable decrease was in the level of satisfaction with provincial government performance, which 
fell from 80% in 2011 and 2012 to a seven-year low of 68% in 2013. 
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Fig. 6.2: Q-47a/d: Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that over-
all the [national government, provincial government, municipal authorities, district government] is doing 
a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job, or a very bad job?  || 2008-2013
Looking at respondents’ level of satisfaction with municipal and local government, in 2013 59% of 
urban residents say that their municipal authorities are doing a somewhat good or very good job, and 
66% of rural respondents say that the district government is doing a somewhat good or very good job. 
However, there has been some regional variation in these views on sub-national government since 
2007. Respondents from the North West region are consistently the most likely to report that the 
provincial-level and district-level governments are doing a somewhat or very good job. 
The 2013 survey also asked respondents how they would rate the performance of individual mem-
bers of parliament in four specific areas of responsibility (see Fig. 6.3 below). Over one third of re-
spondents say that their members of parliament are doing a bad job in the areas of listening to their 
constituents and representing their needs, and in delivering jobs and development. The survey also 
asked respondents about the overall level of confidence they have in parliament (see Fig. 6.7). Those 
interviewed rated individual parliamentary members slightly higher than the parliament itself (49% 
for members versus 47% for the legislative institution). However, respondents also expressed quite a 
low level of confidence in both, relative to other institutions. 
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Fig. 6.3: Q-37. Members of the parliament have various responsibilities. How would you rate their per-
formance on each of the following duties? Would you say they are doing a bad job, an okay job, a good job, 
or a great job?
 
In an attempt to gauge how Afghan respondents may interact with individual political and public 
figures, this year the survey asked those interviewed if they had received help from a provincial gov-
ernor in resolving a problem or issue affecting them (see Fig. 6.4 below). A little over one-quarter of 
all respondents (27%) said they had received such help. In urban areas, however, less than 20% indi-
cated they had received any such aid, while one out of every three rural respondents stated they had 
obtained such help from a governor.
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Fig. 6.4: Q-49. Has the provincial governor ever been involved in helping to resolve a problem or issue 
(masala/masael) that affects you in the last 2 years?
The survey also asked respondents if they have had any contact with a representative of the provincial 
council over the past two years for help in solving a personal or local problem. Twenty-four percent 
of respondents say they contacted a provincial council representative, which is slightly higher than 
2012 (22%) but equal to the 2011 percentage (see Fig. 6.5 below). Since 2006, however, the trend line 
for this question has generally been going upward.   
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Fig. 6.5: Q-50. Have you ever personally tried to contact a representative on the provincial council for 
help in solving any of your personal or community problems in the last 2 years?  || 2006-2013 
Community development councils (CDCs) were established as part of the National Solidarity Pro-
gram to function as elected governance bodies in rural areas, responsible for formulating and supervis-
ing development projects and serving as a liaison between communities, the Afghan government, and 
nongovernmental organizations. Current government policy indicates that CDCs are likely to play 
the role of village councils provided for in the Afghan Constitution until appropriate legislation is 
passed and elections are held to formally constitute such bodies.
Respondents received a brief explanation about CDCs, and were then asked whether they were aware 
of such institutions in their neighborhood. Over half of respondents (58%) say they are aware of a 
CDC in their area. Awareness of CDCs is noticeably higher among men (62%) than women (54%). 
Because CDCs operate exclusively in rural areas, it does not come as a surprise that awareness of 
them is more than twice as high among rural respondents (64%) than urban dwellers (37%). Since 
2006 there has been a fairly steady increase in the number of respondents who said they were aware 
of CDCs (see Fig. 6.6 below).
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Fig. 6.6: Q-40. Community development councils (CDC) have been established as part of the National 
Solidarity Program and members of the council are representatives of various groups in your community. 
Tell me, do you know if there is a CDC in your community? || 2006-2013 
Respondents who said they are aware of the CDC in their community were asked about their level 
of satisfaction with the CDC’s overall performance. Sixty-three percent say they are satisfied with the 
performance of their local CDC, including 16% who are very satisfied. 
The level of satisfaction with CDCs’ job performance differs across regions. Respondents in the 
Central/Hazarajat region report the highest level of satisfaction (77% say they are very satisfied or 
somewhat satisfied with CDC performance). The region with the lowest satisfaction level is Central/
Kabul (51% of respondents say they are very or somewhat satisfied with CDC performance). 
6.2  Confidence in public institutions
Key Question:
In addition to their level of satisfaction with different levels of government, respondents also were 
asked about their level of confidence in a variety of officials, institutions, and organizations.  Those 
who said they have a lot of confidence (phrased as “a great deal of confidence” in previous surveys) or 
are somewhat confident (phrased as “a fair amount of confidence” in previous surveys) were classified 
as having confidence in that particular entity. Those respondents who said they had not much or no 
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Q-41. I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out 
each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, 
some, not much, or no confidence at all?
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confidence at all in that official, institution, or organization were classified as not having confidence. 
Fig. 6.7 below provides a longitudinal comparison of Afghans’ level of confidence in various entities. 
Fig. 6.7: Q-41a/p. I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read 
out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, 
not much, or no confidence at all? 
CONFIDENCE IN OFFICIALS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS
 Confidence (%)
(A lot + some)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Afghanistan Land Authority  - - - - - - - 71
Electronic media such as radio, 
TV
84 74 76 70 71 72 75 68
Religious leaders - - - - - 74 73 66
Community shuras/jirgas - 71 69 67 66 70 68 65
Community development 
councils
- 64 65 64 61 68 66 62
Provincial councils - 69 65 62 62 67 66 57
Provincial government - - - - - 67 65 59
Parliament as a whole - - - - 59 62 62 47
Your member of parliament - - - - - - - 49
Government ministers - 58 51 53 54 56 55 45
National NGOs 57 59 62 61 55 54 54 51
International NGOs 57 65 64 66 54 56 53 51
Local militias 31 33 36 37 34 36 39 32
District government - - - - - - - 61
People who take bribes - - - - - - - 18
The court system - - - - - - - 43
In general respondents expressed lower levels of confidence in 2013 than they did in 2012 for every 
public institution, organization, and official listed. Public confidence in parliament experienced the 
sharpest decline in respondents’ level of confidence: a 15% drop from 2012 to 2013.  In virtually all 
cases in 2013, respondents’ stated level of confidence in these various institutions reached an eight-
year low.
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6.3  Corruption
Key Questions: 
As described in Chapter 2, this year corruption was the second most frequently mentioned major 
problem facing Afghanistan as a whole, right after insecurity. Survey results reveal that Afghans see 
corruption as a major problem in all facets of life and at all levels of government (see Fig. 6.8 below). 
Forty-nine percent of respondents say corruption is a major problem in their neighborhood.  Around 
equal percentages of respondents say corruption is a major problem in their daily life (56%) and in 
their local authorities (58%). More than two thirds say that corruption is a major problem in their 
provincial government (68%), and over three quarters say that corruption is a major problem in Af-
ghanistan as a whole (77%). 
Fig. 6.8: Q-25a/e. Please tell me whether you think that corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, 
or no problem at all in the following areas. 
Q-25: Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no 
problem at all in the following areas: [a. in your daily life, b. in your neighborhood, c. in your local 
authorities, d. in your provincial government, e. in Afghanistan as a whole].
Q-26: Please tell me how often in the past year have you had to give money, a gift, or perform a fa-
vor for these organizations or in these situations? [a. officials in the municipality/district office, b. 
customs office, c. Afghan National Police, d., Afghan National Army, e. judiciary/courts, f. state 
electricity supply, g. public healthcare service, h. when applying for a job, i. admission to schools/
university, j. to receive official documents.]
Q-27: Do you think that your local district or provincial government is doing too much, about 
right, or not enough to fight corruption?
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Nationally, when asked about corruption, respondents reported that it is a major or minor problem 
in the following categories: in Afghanistan as a whole (95%), in provincial government (93%), and in 
local authorities (90%). These figures have been consistently high since the first survey in 2006, with 
small changes from year to year. 
For example, the percentage of respondents reporting that corruption is a major problem in their 
neighborhood fell slightly (by 2%) from 2012 to 2013. The perception that corruption is a major 
problem in Afghanistan as a whole is at its highest point in 2013 since the first survey was conducted 
in 2006. The lack of improvement in the assessment of corruption as a problem at these three levels 
of government is of interest when considering the commitment made by the government in the 2012 
Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework to address corruption.
The biggest recent change in Afghans’ perception of corruption has been in the area of daily life. The 
percentage of respondents who say that corruption is a major or minor problem in daily life increased 
by 14% from 2006 to 2011, but fell by 4% from 2011 to 2013 (see Fig. 6.9 below). 
Fig. 6.9: Q-25a. Please tell me whether you think that corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or 
no problem at all in the following area. || 2006-2013 
With corruption registering as one of the biggest problems facing Afghanistan, the survey sought to 
measure people’s actual personal experience with corruption in various facets of life by asking how 
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often in the past year they had to give cash or a gift to, or perform a favor for, a government official 
in various institutions and situations (see Fig. 6.10 below). 
The situation in which respondents most frequently encountered corruption in the form of an obliga-
tion to pay a bribe is when seeking public healthcare services (38%). Around a third of respondents 
also report encountering corruption when applying for jobs (31%), interacting with the judiciary/
courts (33%), receiving official documents (28%) and in dealing with the Afghan National Police 
(31%). The lowest experience of bribery is recorded for contact with the Afghan National Army 
(21%).
Fig. 6.10: Q-26a/j. Please tell me how often in the past year have you had to give money, a gift, or perform 
a favor for these organizations or in these situations?  
CORRUPTION: VARIOUS SITUATIONS
Institution
No  
cases
In some 
cases
Most 
cases
In all 
cases
Had no 
contact Refused
Don’t 
know Overall
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Officials in the municipality/
district office
23 12 11 6 47 0 1 100
Customs office 21 12 9 4 54 0 1 100
Afghan National Police 28 17 10 4 40 0 1 100
Afghan National Army 32 11 7 3 46 0 1 100
Judiciary/courts 21 15 12 6 45 0 1 100
State electricity supply 26 14 10 3 46 0 1 100
Public healthcare service 33 21 13 4 29 0 1 100
When applying for a job 25 15 11 5 43 0 1 100
Admissions to schools/
university
31 13 10 3 43 0 1 100
To receive official documents 25 14 10 4 45 0 1 100
Overall, when asked to provide their assessment of provincial and district government efforts to 
fight corruption, 47% of Afghans say that government’s level of effort is about right, and 37% say 
government is not doing enough. Respondents’ views vary across the regions (see Fig. 6.11 below). 
The largest proportion of respondents in the Central/Kabul (43%) and North East (38%) regions say 
the government is not doing enough to fight corruption. This is likely influenced by the fact that the 
Central/Kabul region has among the highest proportion of respondents who say that corruption is a 
major problem across most levels of government. Most respondents in the South East and South West 
regions say the government’s level of effort in fighting corruption is about right.
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Fig. 6.11: Q-27. Do you think that your local district or provincial government is doing too much, about 
right, or not enough to fight corruption? 
6.4  Dispute resolution and justice systems
Key Questions: 
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Q-68:  In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn’t settle with 
the other party and had to go to the Huquq Department or village/neighborhood-based shura/
jirga to resolve it, or not?
Q-69: What kind of a case or dispute was it?
Q-71: Where have you taken this case or dispute?
Q-73: Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the 
following statements about the Huquq Department [a. are fair and trusted]?
Q-74: Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the 
following statements about the State Courts [a. are fair and trusted, b. follow the local norms and 
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Overall, 71% of Afghans say they are somewhat or very satisfied with the available dispute resolution 
mechanisms/services in their area. Nineteen percent say that in the past two years they have taken a 
dispute to the Huquq83 (formal justice system) or village jirga/shura (local informal justice system). Of 
these respondents, 77% were either somewhat or fully satisfied with the outcome. 
Looking at regional variations, respondents from the South East region (29%) were significantly more 
likely84 and respondents from the Central/Hazarajat region (9%) were significantly less likely85 than 
respondents from other regions to take a dispute that they could not settle to the Huquq or local 
village jirga/shura.
The four main categories of disputes taken to the Huquq or village jirga/shura, were related to land 
(41%), family matters (18%), commercial matters (12%), and other property disputes (12%) (see Fig. 
6.12 below). 
83 The Ministry of Justice Department of Huquq is tasked with settling citizen disputes related to debt, property, and family matters.
84  Pearson Chi2(1) = 1.3e+03, p < 0.000
85 Pearson Chi2(1) = 424.7658, p , 0.000
values of our people, c. are effective at delivering justice, d. resolve cases timely and promptly].
Q-75: Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the 
following statements about the village/neighborhood-based shuras/jirgas [a. are fair and trusted, 
b. follow the local norms and values of our people, c. are effective at delivering justice, d. resolve 
cases timely and promptly fair and trusted]
Q-77: How satisfied are you with the available dispute resolution mechanisms/services in your 
area? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, very dissatisfied?
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Fig. 6.12: Q-68 and Q-69. In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn’t 
settle with the other party and had to go to the Huquq Department or village/neighborhood based shura/
jirga to resolve it, or not? If yes, what kind of a case or dispute was it? 
Since 2009,86 the percentage of respondents reporting that they have taken land disputes to the Huquq 
or to the village shura/jirga, has declined by 10% (See Fig. 6.13 below). The number of respondents 
reporting commercial disputes to the Huquq or the village shura/jirga has risen by 5% in recent years 
(8% in 2009 to 13% in 2013).
Fig. 6.13: Q-69. What kind of a case of dispute was it? || Land 2009-2013
86 The disputes over land option was not included in the 2010 questionnaire, and so there is no data for that year.
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Of those respondents who reported a land dispute, there was regional variation, with respondents 
from the South East region (16%) being the most likely87 and respondents from the Central/Hazarajat 
region (2%) being the least likely88 to have taken this type of dispute to the Huquq or local shura/
jirga. However, the percentage of respondents in the Central/Hazarajat region who report having 
taken land disputes to the Huquq or village shura/jirga (67%)89 was the highest of any region. 
Looking at which dispute resolution institutions respondents turned to for assistance, 36% of respon-
dents took their disputes to local shuras/jirgas and 36% took their disputes to the Huquq, but 24% 
took their disputes to both institutions (see Fig. 6.14 below). This suggests that in these disputes, a 
satisfactory outcome may not have been achieved with the shura/jirga so the dispute was taken to the 
formal justice system. Whether they took a dispute to the local shura/jirga or to the Huquq depends 
on the type of dispute. Respondents were more likely to take disputes to the Huquq if the disputes 
involved divorce (52%) or traffic accidents (47%), but they were more likely to take disputes to the 
local shura/jirga if the disputes were about family problems (44%).
Fig. 6.14: Q-69. What kind of a case or dispute was it? Where have you taken this case or dispute? || Q-61 
by Q-71
DISPUTE RESOLUTION BY INSTITUTIONS
 
Huquq 
department 
state court
Village, 
neighborhood-based 
shura/jirga
Both Other Don’t know Total
 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Dispute over land 36 37 25 0 2 100
Other property dispute 36 31 31 0 1 100
Commercial dispute 38 38 24 0 0 100
Divorce 52 28 19 0 2 100
Family problems 30 44 22 0 3 100
Traffic accident 47 29 23 0 1 100
Drug smuggling 0 0 100 0 0 100
Reconstruction problem 100 0 0 0 0 100
Robbery 39 16 44 0 0 100
Dispute over 
inheritance
40 0 60 0 0 100
Refused 40 60 0 0 0 100
Don’t know 4 24 4 0 68 100
Overall 36 36 24 0 3 100
87 Pearson Chi2(1) = 16.9327, Pr = 0.000
88 Pearson Chi2(1) = 15.0492, Pr = 0.000
89 n=40
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Fig 6.15 below shows that the proportion of respondents who reported taking disputes for resolution 
to state courts or Huquq department decreased from 46% in 2012 to 36% in 2013. The same reduction 
appears in the informal justice system, where the proportion of respondents saying they use their vil-
lage or neighborhood-based shura/jirga for dispute resolution decreased from 43% to 36%. However, 
the number of respondents who say they took their disputes both to the state court and shura/jirga 
shows a sharp increase, from 6% in 2012 to 24% in 2013. 
Fig. 6.15: Q-71. Where have you taken this case or dispute? || 2008-2013
Given the high percentage of respondents who are satisfied with the available dispute resolution 
mechanisms/services in their area, it is not surprising that many respondents also somewhat agree 
or strongly agree with the statement that the Huquq department (72%), state courts (62%), and local 
shura/jirgas (81%) are fair and trusted. Fig 6.16 below compares Afghans’ perceptions about state 
courts and shuras/jirgas on a range of issues. 
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Fig. 6.16: Q-74. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree 
with the following statements about state courts? Q-75. Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, 
somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the village/neighborhood-
based jirgas/shuras?
The most noteworthy finding in the responses to this question is that the local informal justice system 
is considered by respondents to be more fair, trustworthy, effective, efficient, and in line with local 
norms and values than the formal state courts. The widest gap in respondents’ perceptions is in their 
level of agreement with the statement about these institutions’ ability to resolve cases in a timely and 
prompt manner. Sixty-seven percent say jirgas/shuras resolve cases in a timely and prompt fashion, 
while only 46% say the same of the state courts. 
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7  Political Participation
Afghanistan’s next presidential and provincial council elections are scheduled for April 5, 2014. The 
perceived legitimacy of the electoral process is critical to the stability of the country’s political sys-
tem in the post-transition period. The 2009 presidential and provincial council elections and 2010 
parliamentary elections were marred by violence and intimidation aimed at candidates and voters, 
and allegations and formal complaints of fraudulent practices like ballot stuffing and vote buying. It 
is against this backdrop that Afghans are formulating their views on the upcoming election in 2014. 
In July 2013, a new Electoral Law and a Law on the Structure and Authorities of the Election Com-
mission were approved. Despite this positive step, given past experience in Afghanistan the challenges 
to a free and fair election are considerable. The Afghan government and its development partners 
must place priority on developing and improving election dispute resolution mechanisms, the selec-
tion process for members of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and Independent Electoral 
Complaints Commission (IECC), the role of political parties, and the vote counting process. They 
must also ensure that all eligible Afghans are able to register and vote in the election. At the end of the 
first phase of voter registration in July 2013, only 23% of registered voters were women. 
With respect to the exercise of broader political freedoms beyond the right to vote, the story is mixed. 
The Afghan constitution protects the rights to assembly and expression, but these rights are errati-
cally upheld across the country. Demonstrators and protestors are occasionally met with excessive 
force. Media plays a critical role in conveying information about elections and other political issues 
to the general public and helping shape public opinion, as evidenced by a rapid recent increase in the 
number of political talk shows on television and radio. Selective government crackdowns on media 
encourage self-censorship, although the Afghan parliament’s recent modification to the Media Law, 
which creates a commission for media-related complaints and violations, is another positive develop-
ment. In the run-up to the 2014 election it is essential that Afghan citizens are able to freely access 
information and express their views on the political development of their country.
7.1  Exercising basic political freedoms
Key Questions: 
Q-30: Please, tell me, whether you would participate in the following activities [a. participating in 
a peaceful demonstration] with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? 
Q-31a: In some countries, people do not feel able to publicly criticize their government while in 
other countries they feel quite free to do so in public. How strongly do you agree or disagree that 
in Afghanistan it is generally acceptable to criticize the government in public?
Q-31b: In comparison to one year ago, do people in your community feel more safe, as safe as 
before, or less safe to express their opinions?
Q-32: What changes compared with the past do you think have made most people to feel more safe 
to express their opinions in the area where you live?
Q-33: Why don’t people in your area have the freedom to express their opinions?
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In the area of freedom of expression, 23% of respondents in 2013 report that it is more safe for people 
in their communities to express their opinions than it was in 2012. Seventeen percent say it is less 
safe, and 56% say that it is no different than a year ago. Relative to other regions, the highest propor-
tion of respondents from the South West (24%) and East region (23%) say it is less safe for people to 
express their opinions, and the highest proportion of respondents from the North East and Central/
Kabul regions (both 29%) say it is more safe. While there were no major gender differences in the 
response to this question, there is a notable urban-rural difference, with 27% of urban respondents 
saying people in their area feel more safe to express their opinions, but only 22% of rural respondents 
saying people feel more safe. 
It is particularly important to understand regional variations in respondents’ perceptions of their 
freedom of expression during the lead up to the 2014 elections. In 2013 the data from this question 
were compared with the previous three years (2010-2012). The analysis shows that respondents felt 
that it was significantly90 safer for communities to express their opinions in the Central/Kabul and 
the South East regions during 2013 compared to the national average figures for the previous three 
years. However, respondents in the West, North East, Central Hazarajat, and North West regions 
felt that it was significantly91 less safe for communities to express their opinions in 2013 compared to 
the average for the previous three years.  
Those who say people in their area feel more safe this year to express their opinions tend to attribute 
it to things like improvements in security conditions in their area (48%) and guaranteed free speech 
(26%). Respondents who say it is less safe to express opinions this year cite things like bad security 
conditions (35%) and the presence of the Taliban (18%). 
However, analysis of responses to this question over time shows that there is a complex interplay 
of factors influencing whether respondents feel safe to express their opinions, including: insecurity, 
perceived freedom of speech, gender, literacy level, income level, the level of support for women’s 
rights, fear for personal safety, fear of the ANA or ANP, and fear of foreign forces. Age does not have 
a significant impact, and income is only marginally significant.
There are some interesting correlations between respondents’ views on this question about freedom 
of expression and their views on other questions in the survey. On average, a person who is afraid of 
foreign forces is 40% more likely92 to report having fear to express opinions. Similarly, respondents 
who fear for their personal safety or that of their family are more likely93 to feel less safe to express 
their opinions. These other influencing factors may also help to explain apparent inconsistencies 
in the survey responses. For example, of the 68% of respondents who either somewhat or strongly 
90 Central/Kabul Region - Pearson Chi2 (2, n=5,888) = 48.6744, p < 0.000; South East Region - Pearson Chi2 (2, n=2,766) = 
14.6571, p < 0.001
91 West Region - Pearson Chi2 (2, n=3,137 ) = 20.3828, p < 0.000; North East Region - Pearson Chi2 (2, n=3525) = 12.8603, p 
< 0.002; North West Region - Pearson Chi2 (2, n=3,663) = 14.9499, p < 0.001;  Central/Hazarajat Region - Pearson Chi2 (2, 
n=1225) = 49.5707, p < 0.000
92 Probit regression of q31b, perceived safety to express opinions, on q30h, fear when encountering foreign forces. Beta= 0.40, 
p<.001, Pseudo R2 = 0.04, LR Chi2 (1, n=3,580) =196.37, p < 0.0000  
93 r = +0.12, p < 0.0001
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agreed that it is generally acceptable to criticize the government in public, 16% also felt that it was less 
safe for people in their community to express their opinions.94
Regarding freedom of assembly, 68% of respondents expressed fear about participating in a peaceful 
demonstration. On average, women are 27% more likely to be afraid to participate in a demonstration 
than men, even after accounting for regional differences. Interestingly, respondents who earn more 
money are more likely to be afraid to participate in peaceful demonstrations than those who earn less, 
and Pashtuns are more likely to report a lot of fear compared to Hazaras, Tajiks, and Uzbeks. Fewer 
respondents in the South West region say they would fear participating in a peaceful demonstration 
this year (72%), compared to last year (81%). However, there were no significant differences between 
2012 and 2013 on this question for any other regions. 
The main reasons why respondents are likely to express fear of participating in a peaceful demon-
stration are: fear of foreign forces, fear of travel, fear of the ANP, and lastly fear of the ANA. For 
example, on average, a respondent who is afraid of foreign forces is 73%95 more likely to be afraid of 
participating in a demonstration than someone who isn’t afraid of foreign forces. This is independent 
of the effect of age, gender, and geographic region.
Respondents were then asked about the degree to which they think it is generally acceptable to criti-
cize the government in public. About three quarters of respondents (76%) strongly agree or some-
what agree that it is acceptable. Seventy-three percent of respondents in rural areas agree, while 83% 
of urban respondents are in agreement, revealing a fairly sizeable rural-urban difference. There are 
also some regional differences in views on this question (see Fig. 7.1 below). The highest level of agree-
ment with the statement that it is generally acceptable to criticize the government is in the Central/
Kabul region (83%). Relative to the other regions, fewer people in the West region (61%) agree that it 
is acceptable to criticize the government in public.
94 83% of those respondents who somewhat or strongly agreed that it generally acceptable to criticize the government in public also 
felt that it is either more safe or as safe as it was in 2012 to express their opinions.
95 Stepwise probit regression of q30c (fear of participating in a peaceful demonstration) on fear of foreign forces, gender, urban-rural 
and region. Beta= 0.7257, p = < 0.000, Pseudo R2 = 0.0583, LR Chi2 (1, n=8,865) =644.49, p < 0.0000  
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Fig. 7.1: Q-31a. How strongly do you agree or disagree that in Afghanistan it is generally acceptable to 
criticize the government in public? || By region
7.2  Ability to influence government decisions
Key Question: 
Overall, 48% of respondents say they can have some or a lot of influence over local government 
decisions. This figure varies regionally, with 63% of respondents in the East region and 39% in the 
Central/Kabul region saying they can have some or a lot of influence. There are also variations by 
ethnicity and gender. Pashtuns are significantly more likely96 than all other ethnic groups, Tajiks 
significantly less likely97 than Pashtuns, and men significantly more likely98 than women to think that 
they can have some influence over local government decisions. 
It is somewhat difficult to report on a longitudinal trend for this question, because the word “local” 
was added to this question in 2013 in order to capture a more meaningful answer. This changed the 
question from referring to influence over government in general, to referring to influence over two 
specific institutions of subnational government (i.e., provincial and district). However, looking at the 
trendline from 2008 to 2012, there has been a steady decline in the percentage of respondents who 
feel that they have some or a lot of influence over government decisions, from a high of 66% in 2008 
down to 52% in 2012, and then to 48% (referring only to local government decisions) in 2013. 
96  Pearson Chi2 (1, n=9,151) =  58.3807, p = < 0.000
97  Pearson Chi2 (1, n=6,738) =  69.6076, p < 0.000
98  Pearson Chi2 (1, n=9,151) =  48.8091, p = < 0.000
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7.3 Politics and religion
Key Question:
The survey examined public opinion about the involvement of religious leaders in government de-
cision-making. Respondents were asked whether they agree more with the idea that politics and 
religion should be mixed (i.e., that local religious leaders should be regularly consulted on problems 
facing an area), or that politics and religion should not mix. More than half (58%) of respondents say 
that religion and politics should mix, while just over a third (38%) say that politics and religion should 
not mix. Interestingly, there is a sizeable urban-rural difference in the responses to this question; 68% 
of urban respondents, but only 55% of rural respondents, agree that politics and religion should mix. 
There were no significant gender differences in the responses to this question. 
Looking at regional differences (see Fig. 7.2 below), people in the Central/Kabul (71%) and South West 
(62%) regions were the most likely to agree that politics and religion should be mixed, while respon-
dents from the North West (47%) and Central/Hazarajat (49%) regions were the least likely to agree.
Fig. 7.2: Q-28. Some people say that politics and religion should be mixed (i.e. local religious leaders should 
be regularly consulted on the problems facing an area), while others think that politics and religion should 
not mix. Which is closer to your view? || By region
In addition, there are noticeable variations among ethnic groups’ views on this issue. Tajik respon-
dents were most likely to say that politics and religion should mix (63%), followed by Hazaras (59%) 
and Uzbeks (57%). Pashtun respondents (54%) were the least in agreement with the statement that 
politics and religion should be mixed. 
Q-28. Some people say that politics and religion should be mixed (i.e. local religious leaders should 
be regularly consulted on the problems facing an area), while others think that politics and religion 
should not mix. Which is closer to your view?
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The proportion of respondents who say politics and religion should be mixed (58%) has decreased 
considerably from 2011 and 2012, when 69%-70% of respondents agreed that politics and religion 
should be mixed (see Fig. 7.3 below). 
Fig. 7.3: Q-28. Some people say that politics and religion should be mixed (i.e. local religious leaders should 
be regularly consulted on the problems facing an area), while others think that politics and religion should 
not mix. Which is closer to your view? || 2006-2013
7.4  Elections and voting decisions
Key Questions: 
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Q-30: Please, tell me, whether you would participate in the following activities [b. voting in a 
national or provincial election, d. running for public office] with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? 
Q-54: Thinking about what is meant by “free” and “fair”: In general, do you think elections in 
Afghanistan are free and fair, or not? 
Q-55: Tell me the reasons why you think they were not free and fair starting with the most 
important reason and then the next most important reason and so on.
Q-56: Please tell me which statement you agree with more: (a) each person should vote for oneself 
regardless of what his/her community thinks, or (b) each person should vote the way his or her 
community votes?
Q-57: From the following four sources -- mosque, community shuras, friends/family, and bazaars 
-- which one do you use most often for obtaining information about elections and who to vote for?
Q-58. Does security, by this we mean participating and traveling to polling stations, play a part in 
deciding whether you will vote in an election?
Q-59. In 2014, there is going to be an election for a new president in Afghanistan. Do you think 
the result of the presidential election in 2014 is likely to make your life better, make your life 
worse, or have no impact on your life? 
Q-84: If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves or 
should men decide for women who they should vote for?
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It was explained to respondents that “free” generally means that all people have the chance to vote as 
they wish, and that “fair” generally means that all candidates/parties follow the rules, are given equal 
access to the public, and the votes were counted correctly and not manipulated.
When asked about elections in Afghanistan, in 2013 61% of respondents say that in general they are 
free and fair. It is difficult to compare the 2013 responses to the question on free and fair elections 
with the question that was asked in the previous two years. In the 2013 survey the meaning of the 
term “elections” was purposefully made more general (i.e., it refers to the three main types of elec-
tions, presidential, parliamentary, and provincial council) rather than just referring to the 2010 par-
liamentary elections (as was the case for the question in the previous two years). Although Afghans’ 
responses on these two questions are not directly comparable, it is interesting to note that in 2011, 
49% of respondents said that the 2010 parliamentary elections were free and fair.
The reasons that respondents provide in 2013 for why they think elections in Afghanistan are not free 
and fair mostly concern corruption: for example, corruption in counting the votes (23%), corruption 
in the election process in general (16%), and vote buying (14%). Eleven percent mentioned lack of se-
curity. Although the results are not directly comparable, it is still interesting to note that the reasons 
given in recent years for why the parliamentary elections were not free and fair mirror the results of 
2013, but with different emphasis. In 2011, the two main reasons volunteered by respondents for why 
the elections were not free and fair were vote buying (42%) and fraudulent vote counting (35%), and 
in 2012 the main reasons given were general elections fraud (76%) and bribery (10%).
When asked about the level of fear they would have to run for public office, 58% of respondents said 
they would have some or a lot of fear. Regarding regional variations in the response to this question, 
respondents from the South East (77%), South West (76%), and West (76%) regions are the most 
afraid of running for political office, while respondents from the North East (48%) and Central/
Kabul (49%) regions would have significantly99 less fear compared to all other regions. It is also im-
portant to note that the level of fear when running for public office significantly100 increased in 2013 
compared to all previous years of the survey.
Women (67%) would be more afraid of running for public office than men (56%). This finding is 
interesting when paired with information from the IEC that in nine provinces, no women have 
registered as candidates for the provincial council positions. Regionally, women would be the most 
afraid of running for public office in the South West (88%), West (84%), and South East (79%) regions, 
and least afraid in the Central/Kabul (54%), Central/Hazarajat (56%), and North East (59%) regions. 
Compared to 2012, both men and women would be significantly101,102 more afraid of running for 
public office in 2013.
99 Pearson Chi2 (2, n=8,885) = 158.0376   p = < 0.000
100 Pearson Chi2 (7, n=53,753) = 477.0139, p < 0.000
101 Men: Pearson Chi2 (2, n=9508) = 9.4678, p = < 0.009
102 Women: Pearson Chi2 (2, n=5416) = 20.6305, p = < 0.000
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Fifty-nine percent of respondents report that they would experience some or a lot of fear when voting 
in a national or provincial election (see Fig. 7.4 below). The trend for this question peaked in 2010 
after the national elections and has risen by 3% since 2012, but overall it appears to be on an upward 
trajectory. This should be a matter of concern for those planning the 2014 elections.
Fig.7.4: Q-30. Please, tell me, whether you would participate in the following activities [voting in a na-
tional or provincial election] with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? || 2006-2013
There were regional and ethnic variations in the level of fear of voting in a national or provincial 
election. Respondents in the South West (74%), South East (72%), and West (71%) regions have the 
most fear, and respondents in the North West (48%), Central/Hazarajat (44%), and North East (43%) 
regions have the least fear. Respondents from the Central/Kabul (51%) and the West regions (71%) 
have significantly103 more fear in 2013 than they did in 2012. Lastly, Pashtuns are significantly104 more 
afraid of voting in a national or provincial election than other ethnic groups in 2013.  
In response to a question about whether a person should make his or her own decision when voting 
or vote according to the views of the community, 81% of respondents agree that each person should 
vote for himself/herself, regardless of what the community thinks. 
Regionally, respondents in the Central/Kabul region (86%) were most likely to agree that a person 
should make his or her own voting decision, and respondents in the South East region (73%) were the 
least likely to agree. Regarding ethnic differences, Pashtuns are significantly105 more likely than any 
other ethnic group to say that people should decide for themselves. However, this may be because the 
Pashtun vote is traditionally split between multiple candidates, unlike the Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek 
ethnic groups, which tend to only have one or very few candidates at the national level. 
103 Central/Kabul Region: Pearson Chi2 (1, n=3,239) = 23.2507, p = < 0.000; West Region: Pearson Chi2(1, n=1,755) = 22.5057, p 
< 0.000
104  Pearson Chi2 (1, n=9177) = 325.7802, p = < 0.000)
105  Pearson Chi2 (1, n=9,203) = 66.3136, p = < 0.000
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Nationally, 53% of respondents think women should decide for themselves who they should vote 
for (see Fig. 7.5 below). Twenty-five percent say that men should decide for women, and 21% say 
that women should decide with the advice of men. However, the figures vary significantly between 
provinces and by gender. Respondents in Zabul (17%), Paktika (19%), and Nooristan (20%) are sig-
nificantly106 less likely to say that women should decide for themselves than other provinces, and 
respondents in Panjshir (79%) and Bamyan (78%) are significantly107 more likely to say that women 
should decide for themselves. 
Sixty-two percent of women say that women should decide on their own how to vote, compared 
to only 45% of men who said that women should decide on their own (see Fig. 7.5 below). Female 
respondents are significantly108 more likely to say that women should decide for themselves. Urban 
respondents are significantly more likely109 to say that women should decide who to vote for by 
themselves (66%) compared to rural respondents (49%) (see Fig. 7.5). Looking at ethnic differences, 
65% of Hazaras, 58% of Tajiks, 53% of Uzbeks, and 45% of Pashtuns say that women should decide 
their vote for themselves.
Fig. 7.5: Q-84. If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves or 
should men decide for women who they should vote for? || Overall and by gender and settlement
This year the survey asked a new question concerning respondents’ main source of information about 
elections. Respondents by far and most frequently identified relatives and family members as their 
main source (48%) (see Fig. 7.6 below). This is a particularly important source of information for 
women in rural areas, who are more confined to their homes and have low literacy levels; male house-
106  Pearson Chi2 (2, n=9,141) = 233.0293, p < 0.000
107  Pearson Chi2 (2, n=9,141) = 221.7624, p < 0.000
108  Pearson Chi2(2, n= 9,141) = 284.0800, p < 0.000
109 An OLS regression was conducted to determine the effect of living in urban areas, ethnicity, occupation, income and region on 
q84, whether or not women should decide for themselves who to vote for. Living in urban areas significantly increased perceptions 
of whether or not women should decide for themselves (Beta=0.2503, t=11.73, p <0.000, F [6, n=9,113] p <0.000, R2 = 0.05), 
after controlling for ethnicity, occupation, income and region. 
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hold members relay information obtained from outside the home to the female household members. 
Eighteen percent of respondents say the weekly community shura is their main source of election in-
formation, and 13% say the mosque, specifically the mullahs’ Friday sermons. The twice-weekly village 
markets and bazaars were identified by 5% of respondents as their main election information source.
Fig. 7.6: Q-57. From the following four sources — mosque, community shuras, friends/family, and ba-
zaars  — which one do you use most often for obtaining information about elections and who to vote for?
In recent elections in Afghanistan, one of the biggest problems on election day has been security. To 
explore this issue, in 2013 the survey incorporated a new question that solicited respondents’ opinions 
about the degree to which security conditions on election day (i.e., the conditions they would face 
when participating in the election and traveling to the polls) influence their decision whether or not 
to vote. A very high proportion of respondents (81%) say that election day security conditions are a 
factor in their decision. Urban respondents (84%) were slightly more likely to say that security is a 
factor in their decision to vote than rural respondents (80%).   
With the next presidential election slated for the spring of 2014, this year’s survey asked respondents 
if they think the outcome of that election will make a difference in their lives. Encouragingly, more 
than half of those interviewed (56%) say that the result of the presidential election in 2014 is likely to 
make their lives better (see Fig. 7.7 below). Twenty-four percent of Afghans say that the election will 
make no difference in their lives, and only 15% anticipate that it will make their lives worse. 
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Fig. 7.7: Q-59. In 2014, there is going to be an election for a new president in Afghanistan. Do you think 
the result of the presidential election in 2014 is likely to make your life better, make your life worse, or have 
no impact on your life? 
 
56
15
24
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Better Worse No Difference
IMPACT OF 2014 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
ON AFGHANS' LIVES

Access to Information 99
8  Access to Information
The physical communications infrastructure in Afghanistan is rapidly expanding. As a measure of 
the progress that has been made in the last decade, it is remarkable that 85%110 of the country is now 
covered by mobile phone networks. The number of radio and television stations has increased sig-
nificantly over the last few years, and the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology 
(MCIT) has started to issue more licenses to private internet service providers (ISPs) with the goal of 
increasing internet access across Afghanistan. At the same time, the cost of internet access is decreas-
ing rapidly due to a major expansion of the fiber-optic network supported by Afghanistan’s develop-
ment partners. As more Afghans have access to mobile and internet technology, Afghanistan’s rap-
idly growing and evolving social media sector will have an increasingly important impact on public 
opinion and the level of public engagement on critical social and political issues.
The impact of the expansion of the physical communication infrastructure and the availability of 
different forms of information sharing has mostly been felt in urban areas, where access to informa-
tion is easier and electricity supplies more stable. In rural areas, the role of jirgas and shuras as both 
governing bodies and one of the main channels of information has been reinforced by decades of war, 
the destruction of the media infrastructure, and widespread illiteracy.111 Casual word of mouth, the 
mosque, and radio also continue to be major sources of information for rural Afghans. However, 
in rural areas in particular, the expansion of the mobile phone network is likely to have significant 
impacts beyond simply improving communication. Mobile phones transcend social, economic, and 
geographic boundaries, and are quickly becoming tools for the delivery of services in Afghanistan, 
including the provision of agricultural information and mobile banking. 
One of the impacts of the 2014 transition process on access to information is likely to be a decline 
in funding for Afghan media organizations from international donors, especially those organizations 
that produce programs for broadcast on local radio. In addition, the draft media law that is currently 
being discussed could allow the government to restrict media activities, especially those of news 
channels. The draft law would also restrict the ability of media to debate or report on topics such as 
national security and religion. 
8.1  Physical sources of information
Key Question: 
Overall, 80% of respondents use a radio, 54% use a television, and 57% use a mobile phone, but only 
2% use a computer and 3% use the internet for obtaining information. The use of a fixed phone line 
110 Yacoobi, Sakena. “Literacy and Education for Afghan Women through Texting.” June 4, 2013. The Huffington Post. http://
www.huffingtonpost.org
111 Rawan, S. M. (2002). Modern Mass Media and Traditional Communication in Afghanistan, Political Communication Vol.19 (2), 
pp.155-170.
Q-7. Do you or do you not use any of the following for obtaining information? [a. radio, b. TV 
set, c. mobile phone, d. computer, e. fixed phone line, f. the internet]
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was less than 1%. In 2012, respondents were asked whether they owned a radio, television, mobile 
phone, or computer. In 2013, the question was modified to ask whether respondents use a radio, 
television, mobile phone, or computer for obtaining information. This change was made in order to 
provide more useful data. 
Previous survey data shows that between 2007 and 2012, radio ownership in rural areas was about 
half that of radio ownership in urban areas. However, radio ownership and radio use for obtaining in-
formation are not the same thing. While in 2013 84% of rural respondents say that they use radio for 
obtaining information, in 2012 only 40% said that they owned a radio, suggesting that rural respon-
dents are regularly accessing radios that are owned by others. It is quite common in rural Afghanistan 
for villagers to gather around a radio in or just outside the home of the families that own radios. In 
2013, respondents in rural areas (84%) were more likely to use a radio for obtaining information than 
urban residents (65%), probably because urban residents have easier access to other means of obtain-
ing information (see Fig. 8.1 below). 
Fig 8.1 Q-7. Do you or do you not use any of the following for obtaining information? || Rural and 
urban 
Looking at provincial radio use in more detail, in 16 of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan more than 
90% of respondents report using a radio for obtaining information. The provinces with the highest 
overall use of radio as a means of obtaining information were Kandahar (99%), Parwan (99%), Logar 
(99%), and Khost (99%). Radio use was significantly112 lower in Sar-i-Pul (36%), Nimroz (59%), Ba-
myan (54%), and Daikundi (51%) than in other provinces, and radio use in Sar-i-Pul was significantly113 
lower than in any other province. In these four provinces, the percentage of women using radio 
to obtain information was also significantly114 lower than for any other province (Sar-i-Pul (12%), 
112  Pearson Chi2 (1, n=9,260) = 839.0022, p < 0.000
113  Pearson Chi2 (1, n=9260) = 317.2942, p < 0.000
114  Pearson Chi2 (1, n=3,136) = 346.8250, p < 0.000
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Nimroz (40%), Bamyan (49%), and Daikundi (33%), compared to the 72% radio use by women at the 
national level). 
Looking at the use of television for obtaining information (see Fig. 8.1 above), 54% of respondents re-
port that they use a television set, but in contrast to the data on radio use, more women (61%) report 
using a television for obtaining information than men (49%). Ninety-three percent of respondents 
living in urban areas use a television for obtaining information, compared to 41% of those living in 
rural areas. This is probably partly due to the poor electricity supply in rural areas.
There was a sharp increase in ownership of mobile phones from 2007 to 2012 (see Fig. 8.2 below), 
but compared to 2013 data on mobile phone use, a relatively low percentage of respondents (57%) 
reported using a mobile phone for obtaining information. There was no significant difference be-
tween men and women in the use of mobile phones, but there is a significant115 difference in the use 
of mobile phones as a means of accessing information between urban respondents (83%) and rural 
respondents (50%) (see Fig. 8.1 above).  
Fig. 8.2: Mobile phone ownership. || 2007-2012
As noted above, the reported use of computers is still very low (2% of respondents). However, even 
though the number of respondents reporting that they use a computer was small, four times as many 
men (4%) as women (1%) use a computer. Internet use mirrors this pattern, with 3% of respondents 
reporting that they use the internet to obtain information, and four times as many men (4%) as 
women (1%) using the internet for this purpose, and urban respondents (11%) using the internet to 
obtain information at a much higher rate than rural respondents (1%).  
115  Pearson Chi2 (1, n=9,260) = 462.6391, p < 0.000
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In summary, there is a significant difference between rural and urban areas in their use of communica-
tion technology, with respondents in rural areas relying most on radio116 and respondents in urban 
areas relying most on television117 and mobile phones for obtaining information.
8.2  Social sources of information
Key question:
In terms of social sources of information, the most common means of obtaining information reported 
by respondents is from family and friends (46%). The next most common sources among the choices 
offered in the survey are mosques (16%), community shuras/jirgas (12%), and bazaars (5%). Twenty 
percent of Afghans say that they use other sources as their primary source of information. 
The wording of this question has changed several times over the years in which the survey has been im-
plemented, making longitudinal comparisons difficult. However, looking at the averages for 2006-2010, 
the top three categories were family and neighbors (52%), community elders (14%), and mullahs (10%). 
In 2013 there are important differences between urban and rural respondents’ responses, with the 
overall reported use of these different social sources of information being significantly118 lower in 
urban areas than in rural areas (see Fig. 8.3 below). 
Fig. 8.3: Q-8. Which one of the following sources do you use most often for obtaining information? || 
Rural and urban
 
116  Pearson Chi2 (1, n=9,260) =  95.9146, p < 0.000
117  Pearson Chi2 (1, n=9,259) = 1.2e+03, p < 0.000
118  Pearson Chi2 (4, n=9,230) = 494.1944, p < 0.000
Q-8. Which one of the following sources do you use most often for obtaining information? 
[mosque, community shuras, friends and family, bazaars, other sources]
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For example, the reliance on family and friends as a key source of information is lower in urban ar-
eas (40%) than in rural areas (48%). Nine percent of urban respondents most often use a mosque for 
obtaining information, compared to 18% of rural respondents. Perhaps less surprising is that rural 
respondents (15%) rely much more heavily on local shuras/jirgas for obtaining information than do 
urban respondents (4%). Access to other forms of information is more limited in rural areas, and 
shuras/jirgas are a well-established and trusted traditional source of information. However, the high 
percentage of urban respondents (43%) who say they use “other sources” for information suggests 
that urban respondents may have been confused about the difference between social sources and 
physical sources of information when considering this question. Lastly, there are some interesting 
gender differences in the reliance of different sources of social information. Women (61%) are sig-
nificantly119 more likely to use family and friends as a main source of information compared to men 
(32%), but women (7%) are significantly120 less likely to use a mosque as a main source of information 
than men (25%).
119  Pearson Chi2 (1, n=9,260) = 799.3620, p = < 0.000
120  Pearson Chi2 (1, n=) = 420.3291, p = < 0.000
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9  Women in Society
In the midst of the ongoing security and economic transitions in Afghanistan, and looking towards 
the political transition and transformational period to come, Afghan women face significant chal-
lenges. The past decade has seen tremendous gains for women, particularly in the realms of health and 
education, with maternal mortality reducing by 80% and girls’ enrollment in schools increasing to 3.2 
million. This past year, however, there have been some major setbacks for both women’s rights and 
the gains that have been made. 
The withdrawal of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and international security forces has 
resulted in girls’ schools temporarily closing or shutting down entirely in some areas until some 
level of stability can be achieved by government security forces. With the loss of PRT funding and 
security, women have lost jobs, access to services, and mobility. Lack of economic opportunities and 
unemployment will continue to be major obstacles facing Afghan women, as new government poli-
cies make it increasingly difficult for women to register their own companies and apply for business 
loans. The Elimination of Violence against Women (EVAW) law, enacted by a presidential decree in 
2009, was celebrated as a major step forward for women’s rights in Afghanistan, but it has yet to be 
ratified by parliament.
In the past decade, women’s participation in politics has increased and has consistently been held 
up as a major achievement for women’s rights since the fall of the Taliban. There are currently 68 
women members in parliament’s lower house, 28 women senators in the upper house, a total of 117 
women in all 34 provincial councils, three women ministers, and one female governor. This year, 
however, women’s quota provisions in the new elections law were systematically taken out. While a 
20% quota for women in provincial council seats was negotiated back into the law in July 2013, the 
5% reduction (down from a previous quota of 25%) eliminated 21 women’s seats in the provincial 
councils. A low number of female candidates may contribute towards further curbing women’s quo-
tas and female voter turnout. There is currently a strong push to register women to vote in the 2014 
elections, after the effort got off to a slow start. 
This year has been a year of transitions: security transition with the final tranche of PRTs closing, 
the beginning of the political transition with voters and candidates registering for the next presiden-
tial election, and economic transition as the reduced number of international personnel and projects 
starts to affect local economies and as unemployment rises with the youth bulge. It will be important 
for the Afghan government and its international development partners to ensure that the rights and 
role of women in Afghan society continue to be a priority in the post-2014 period.
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9.1  Rights and justice
Key Questions:
An overwhelming majority of Afghans (90%) agree with the idea that everyone should have equal 
rights under the law, regardless of their gender, including 59% who strongly agree. However, a higher 
proportion of women (66%) than men (53%) express strong support for equal rights under the law. 
There is also a notable urban-rural split on this question: while 71% of urban respondents strongly 
agree, only 56% of rural respondents strongly agree that women and men should have equal rights 
under the law. 
Looking at regional differences in the response to this question (see Fig. 9.1 below), only 6% of re-
spondents in the Central/Kabul region strongly disagree or somewhat disagree with the view that 
women should have equal rights under the law. In contrast, 17% of respondents in the West region 
disagreed with that statement: a percentage close to double than that of most other regions.
Q-66a. I’m going to read some statements. Please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat 
agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with each statement. [a. Everyone should 
have equal rights under the law regardless of their gender]
Q-74e. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly 
disagree with the following statements about state courts? [e. State courts treat men and 
women equally]
Q-75e. Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly 
disagree with the following statements about the village/neighborhood-based jirgas/shuras? 
[e. There should be local women’s jirgas and shuras]
Q-76a/c. Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree 
with the following statements? [a. the practices of baad, and baadal in Afghanistan, b. The guardian 
of a female should wait until she is of adult age and should always consult her first before arranging 
her marriage, c. if a husband dies without children, his wife is entitled to part of mahr]
Q-78. What are the biggest problems facing women in this area today? 
Q-79. In your area is there an organization, institution, or authority where women can go to have 
their problem(s) resolved?
Q-80. What organization, institution, or authority is that?
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Fig.9.1 Q-66a. I’m going to read some statements. Please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, 
somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with each statement. [a. Everyone should have equal rights under 
the law regardless of their gender] || By region
Despite this overall strong support for equal rights under law for Afghan women, women’s rights 
were high on respondents’ minds this year when asked about the biggest problems facing women. 
Chapter 2 (National Mood) provides an overview of the results for this question; the top three re-
sponses for problems facing women were education/illiteracy (27%), lack of job opportunities for 
women (12%); and women’s rights issues in general (10%). However, many of the other less frequent-
ly mentioned responses to this open-ended question are actually core rights issues, including domestic 
violence, forced marriages/dowry, women not being able to leave home, and women being under the 
control of men (i.e., men having power over women). Combined, these women’s rights issues com-
prise 30% of all responses to the question about the biggest problems facing Afghan women, making 
women’s rights issues the most frequently mentioned problem, just ahead of education/illiteracy. 
Please see Chapter 2 for detailed analysis of some of the statistically significant differences in responses 
to this question based on respondents’ gender, ethnicity, and other factors. As noted in Chapter 2, the 
list and ranking of the biggest problems facing women in Afghanistan has not changed much over the 
past eight years, which suggests that the public may not be seeing much direct impact of the numer-
ous initiatives to improve the rights and roles of women. 
This year the survey included three new questions about specific aspects of women’s rights. First, 
respondents were asked about their level of agreement with the practices of baad and badal in Af-
ghanistan. Baad is a traditional practice of giving a daughter to another party as penalty or payment 
for some offense. Badal marriage involves the exchange of daughters between families for marriage. 
Nationally, 62% of respondents disagreed (either strongly or somewhat) with these practices (65% of 
women, and 60% of men).
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When asked whether they agree with the statement that a girl’s guardian should wait until she is of 
adult age and should always consult her first before arranging her marriage, the majority of respon-
dents (74%) either strongly or somewhat agreed. Respondents with university education (75%) were 
more likely to agree than respondents with only primary education (70%). Looking at regional dif-
ferences, respondents from the North East (79%) and North West (80%) were more likely to agree as 
well. Men and women disagreed with the statement in near equal proportions (23% of female respon-
dents and 26% of male respondents). As noted above, forced marriage/dowry is one of the leading 
women’s rights problems facing Afghan women today, mentioned by 9% of respondents (and nearly 
equal percentages of men and women).
The third new survey question involves the issue of inheritance. Respondents were asked whether 
they agree with the statement that if a husband dies without children, his wife is entitled to a portion 
of mahr. Mahr (or mehr) is a provision of Shariah law that obligates a husband at the time of mar-
riage to give a gift of money, possessions or land to the wife, the aim being to provide some financial 
security for the wife. The wife may take the gift at the time of marriage or defer receiving all or part 
of the gift until a later date.  Overall, while a majority of respondents agree that a widow should be 
entitled to a portion of mahr, 26% of respondents strongly or somewhat disagree, with men (30%) 
more likely to disagree than women (18%). Looking at differences by ethnicity (see Fig. 9.2 below), 
Pashtuns (31%) are most likely to disagree with the statement and Hazaras (20%) show the lowest 
rate of disagreement. 
Fig. 9.2: Q-76a. Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree 
with the following statement? [a. If a husband dies without children, his wife is entitled to part of mahr] || 
By ethnicity
Less than a quarter (21%) of all women surveyed say that they know of a place where women can 
take their problems to be resolved. When asked which institution or organization they are thinking 
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of, 46% said the Directorate of Women’s Affairs, 13% said the Human Rights Council, and 9% said 
the district government office. While the Directorate of Women’s Affairs was equally recognized in 
both urban and rural areas, urban women referred to the Human Rights Council (20%) and women’s 
shuras (9%) more frequently than rural women, and rural women referred to district government of-
fices (12%) more frequently than urban women. 
The survey looked at the issue of women’s access to justice in both the formal and informal sectors. 
When asked if the state courts treat women and men equally, around half (54%) of respondents 
strongly or somewhat agreed. There is not a significant difference between men and women in the 
level of agreement with the statement. Regionally, respondents from the Central/Hazarajat (66%) 
region were more likely to agree than those in the West (43%) region. 
Respondents also were asked if there should be special local jirgas and shuras for women only. Over-
all, 68% of respondents say there should be such jirgas and shuras, including 72% of female respon-
dents and 66% of male respondents. A majority of both urban respondents (71%) and rural respon-
dents (67%) say they endorse the idea. 
9.2  Political participation
Key Questions:
Afghans’ support for equal representation of men and women in elected government positions is at 
44% in 2013. Looking at the longitudinal trend for this question (see Fig. 9.3 below), over time there 
has been a slight but noticeable decline in support for equality in leadership positions, down from a 
high of 50-51% in the 2006-2008 period. The trendline for the view that elected government positions 
should be mostly for men has undergone a corresponding slight increase. In 2013, 42% of Afghans say 
that such positions should only be for men. Notably, women (60%) are more likely to support equal 
representation than their male (35%) counterparts.
Q-34. How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local (district/provin-
cial) government decisions – a lot, some, very little, or none at all?
Q-58. Does security, by this we mean participating and traveling to polling stations, play a part in 
deciding whether you will vote in an election? 
Q-59. In 2014, there is going to be an election for a new president in Afghanistan. Do you think 
the result of the presidential election in 2014 is likely to make your life better, make your life 
worse, or have no impact on your life? 
Q-83. Do you think that elected government positions should be mostly for men, mostly for 
women, or do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the politi-
cal leadership?
Q-84. If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves or 
should men decide for women who they should vote for?
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Fig.9.3: Q-83. Do you think that elected government positions should be mostly for men, mostly for 
women, or do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leader-
ship? || 2006 -2013
Interestingly but perhaps not surprisingly, of those respondents who support equal leadership posi-
tions for both men and women, the majority (83%) agree that women should be allowed to work 
outside the home.121,122 
It is also interesting to compare the data above with Afghan’s views on the level of fear they would 
have when running for public office (reported in Chapter 7, Political Participation). Women (67%) 
are more afraid of running for public office than men (56%). 
When asked how women should decide for whom to vote, over half of the respondents (53%) said 
that women should decide for themselves while just a quarter (25%) said men should advise them, 
and less than a quarter (21%) said women should decide for themselves but in consultation with men. 
This shows that close to half of the respondents (46%) believe that men should somehow be involved 
in women’s voting decision-making process. Not surprisingly, women (62%) are more likely than 
men (45%) to say that women should decide themselves for whom to vote, while men (30%) are more 
likely than women (19%) to say that men should decide for whom women should vote. However, 
men with a high level of education (56%) are more likely than men with no education (42%) to say 
that women should make their own decision when voting. Please see Chapter 7 for additional detailed 
analysis of some of the statistically significant differences in responses to this question based on re-
spondents’ region, ethnicity, and other factors. 
When asked about their perceived level of influence over local government decisions, 48% of respon-
dents say they can have some or a lot of influence. However, men (53%) are significantly more likely123 
than women (42%) to think that they can have influence. 
121 Pearson chi2 (18,n=9260) =4.2e+03 Pr <.000
122 r=.44 ,P<.00
123  Pearson Chi2 (1, n=9,151) =  48.8091, p = < 0.000
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In response to a question about whether security conditions will play a part in their decision to travel 
to a polling station to vote in 2014, male and female respondents were equally likely (each 81%) to say 
that security will play a part in their decision.
As reported in Chapter 7, 56% of respondents think the results of the 2014 presidential election will 
make their lives better, 24% said it will make no difference, and 15% say the results will make their 
lives worse. A slightly higher proportion of men (58%) than women (54%) said the 2014 election will 
make their lives better.
9.3  Education 
Key Questions:
Education and illiteracy were most frequently cited as the main problems facing women in Afghani-
stan. Access to education for girls is currently constrained by many factors including the security 
situation, costs, the lack of qualified female teachers, and cultural norms. 
The survey explored the issue of gender equality in education by asking respondents whether they 
agree or disagree with the following statement: “Women should have the same opportunities as men 
in education.” The vast majority of respondents (83%) agreed with the statement (either strongly or 
somewhat), while only 16% disagreed. Fig. 9.4 below shows a steady decrease in the level of strong 
support for gender equality in education between 2006 (58%) and 2013 (43%). However, the overall 
level of support (i.e., including those who either strongly or somewhat agree with equal opportunities 
for women in education) has stayed high and constant.
Fig.9.4: Q-81. Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do 
you agree or disagree with this opinion? || 2006–2013
 
 OPPORTUNITIES IN EDUCATION: EQUAL FOR MEN
AND WOMEN
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Strongly agree 58 56 57 55 50 50 48 43
Agree somewhat 33 33 32 32 37 35 39 40
Disagree somewhat 5 7 6 8 7 9 9 12
Strongly disagree 3 3 3 4 4 5 3 4
Q-81. Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do 
you agree or disagree with this opinion? Strongly or somewhat?
D-5. What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed? 
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Ninety percent of female respondents say that women should have the same opportunities in education 
as men (56% strongly agree and 34% somewhat agree). Women (90%) were significantly more likely to 
agree than men (78%)124 (see Fig. 9.5 below). 
Fig.9.5: Q-81. Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do 
you agree or disagree with this opinion?
Urban residents (91%) are significantly more likely to support equal educational opportunities for 
women compared to rural residents (81%).125 Across the country, respondents from the West (21%) 
and South West (15%) regions were most likely to disagree with gender equality in education, while 
those in the Central/Hazarajat region (3%) were least likely to disagree. While Hazaras (88%) appear 
to be slightly more likely to be supportive of equal educational opportunities for women, overall 
there were no notable differences across ethnic groups.
Despite advances in improving girls’ access to education over the last decade, the majority of women 
surveyed (76%) have received no education at all, compared to only 44% of men (see Fig. 9.6 below). 
As noted in Chapter 5 (Development and Service Delivery), Uzbek (84%) women were significantly 
less likely to have had formal education at any level126 than other ethnic groups, closely followed by 
Pashtun (83%) women. By contrast, Hazara women (28%) were significantly127 more likely to have 
had formal education at any level than women from any other ethnic group.
124  Pearson chi2(5,n=9200) = 471.2275 ,  Pr <.000
125  Pearson chi2(5,n=9260) = 194.5250   Pr <.000
126  Pearson Chi2 (1, n=9,251) = 31.5141, p = < 0.000
127  Pearson Chi2 (1, n=3,134) = 17.2541, p = < 0.000
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Fig. 9.6: D-5. What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed? 
Younger female respondents were significantly more likely to be educated than older female 
respondents,128 reflecting some progress on educational opportunities for women and girls in Afghani-
stan. Those advances notwithstanding, the proportion of women respondents who have a university-
level education is strikingly low (1%). Although the overall level of university education among 
respondents is only 2%, among those respondents with some university education, 88% are male, and 
only 12% are female, revealing a striking gender gap.
9.4  Economic opportunities
Key Questions:
Respondents were asked to give their opinion on gender equality related to employment opportu-
nities. When asked whether women should be allowed to work outside the home, the majority of 
respondents (63%) agree, while 36% say that they should not be allowed to work outside of the home.
Since 2006, a majority of respondents have supported the view that women should be allowed to 
work outside the home (see Fig. 9.7 below). Support for women working outside the home was on a 
modest decline from 2006-2010 but appears to have leveled off through 2013.  
128  r =-- 0.2102, p < 0.000
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Q-82. Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say 
that women should not be allowed to work outside of the home. What is your opinion on this?
D-3. Are you now working, a housewife (ask only women), retired, a student, or looking for work?
D-18b. Do female members of the family contribute to this household income, or not?
D-18c. How much of your household’s total income comes from female members of the household?
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Fig.9.7: Q-82. Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say 
that women should not be allowed to work outside of the home. What is your opinion on this? || 2006-2013
 WOMEN’S INDEPENDENCE TO WORK
OUTSIDE THE HOME
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 Women should be allowed to work
outside the home
71 70 69 67 64 62 66 63
 Women should not be allowed to
work outside the home
27 28 27 29 33 35 33 36
Women are significantly more likely to be of the opinion that women should have the right to work 
outside of the home (82%) than men (51%). Residents of urban areas (77%) are more likely than resi-
dents of rural areas (58%) to support women working outside of the home.129 Opinions on gender 
equality and employment opportunities also varied across regions. The highest levels of support for 
women working outside of the home were in the Central/Hazarajat (79%), North West (75%), and 
North East (69%) regions. Respondents in the South West region showed the least support (57%) for 
women working outside of the home. 
Among different ethnic groups, support for women being allowed to work outside the home is 
strongest among Hazaras (80%), followed by Uzbeks (71%) and Tajiks (69%). Pashtuns were the least 
likely to support the idea that women should be allowed to work outside their homes (50%). 
The majority (92%) of respondents who support gender equality in employment also support gen-
der equality in education.130, 131 Only a small number of respondents (7%) support equal educational 
opportunities for women and men while also thinking that women should not be allowed to work 
outside the home. Marital status does not have a significant effect on Afghans’ opinions on gender 
equality and employment opportunities. 
As reported in Chapter 4 (Economic Growth and Employment), when asked about their employ-
ment status (i.e., whether they are receiving wages for work), 5% of all women and 79% of all men 
say they are employed. Only 17% of respondents report having female members of the household 
contributing to household income. Women from households in rural areas (20%) are more likely132 
to contribute to household income than women in urban areas (13%). Chapter 4 provides additional 
analysis on ethnic and regional differences in responses to this question.
129  Pearson chi2(3,n=9260) = 175.6649 ,  Pr <.000
130  Pearson chi2(15) =  1.9e+03   Pr = 0.000 
131  r=.023,p<.000
132  Pearsons Chi2 (3) =  30.8231, p < 0.000
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Appendix 1: Target Demographics
Gender and Region
Characteristics
All Rural Urban
9260 7108 2152
Gender (%) (%) (%)
Male 62 66 50
Female 38 34 50
Region % % %
Central/Kabul 24 14 56
East 10 11 4
South East 10 13 2
South West 11 12 8
West 13 14 10
North East 14 16 9
Central/Hazarajat 3 4 *
North West 14 15 12
Employment Status And Age Group
Characteristics
All Rural Urban
9260 7108 2152
 % % %
Working 51 55 38
Retired 1 1 1
Housewife 33 31 40
Student 8 7 12
Unemployed 7 7 10
Other * * *
Refused * * 0
Don’t know * * 0
Age Group % % %
18-24 Years old 25 25 26
25-34 Years old 29 29 29
35-44 Years old 25 25 24
45-54 Years old 14 14 13
Over 55 years 8 8 8
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Main Occupation
Characteristics
All Rural Urban
4802 3962 840
Base: Working or retired 4802 % % %
Farmer (own land/tenant farmer) 36 43 6
Farm laborer (other’s land) 9 10 2
Laborer, domestic, or unskilled worker 8 8 8
Informal sales/business 9 8 13
Skilled worker/artisan 10 9 14
Government office - clerical worker 4 3 8
Private office - clerical worker 1 1 4
Government office - executive/manager 1 1 4
Private office - executive/manager 1 1 2
Self-employed professional 6 5 16
Small business owner 6 6 9
School teacher 5 4 6
University teacher * * 1
Military/Police 3 2 7
Farming Land
Characteristics
All Rural Urban
5357 4949 408
Base: Farmers 9260 % % %
Less than 1 Jerib 9 9 12
1 - 2 Jerib 29 29 31
2 - 3 Jerib 22 22 25
More than 3 Jerib 38 39 28
Don’t know 1 1 5
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Educational Status
Characteristics
All Rural Urban
9260 7108 2152
Base: All respondents 9260 % % %
Never went to a school 56 60 43
Informal schooling at home or at a literacy class 2 3 1
Islamic education at a Madrassa 3 4 2
Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5) 6 6 5
Primary School, complete (finished class 6) 4 4 4
Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8) 5 5 5
Secondary education, complete (finished class 9) 3 3 4
High School incomplete (classes 10-11) 5 5 7
High School complete (finished class 12) 9 7 14
14th grade incomplete (class 13) 2 1 3
14th grade complete (finished class 14) 3 2 5
University education incomplete (have no degree diploma) 1 * 2
University education complete (have degree diploma) 1 1 4
Refused (vol.) * * 0
Don’t know (vol.) * * 0
Spoken Languages
Characteristics 
All Rural Urban
9260 7108 2152
Base: All respondents 9260 % % %
Dari 79 75 93
Pashto 51 51 50
Uzbeki 9 11 5
Turkmeni 3 3 3
Balochi 1 1 *
Pashaye 1 1 *
Nooristani 1 1 0
Shignee * * 0
Arabic 1 1 1
English 5 3 12
Urdu 2 2 4
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Hindi * * 1
Russian * * *
German * 0 *
French * * *
Marital Status
Characteristics 
All Rural Urban
9260 7108 2152
Base: All respondents 9260 % % %
Single 19 18 23
Married 79 80 74
Widower/Widow 2 2 3
Divorced * * *
Refused * * *
Don’t know * * *
Ethnicity Status
Characteristics 
All Rural Urban
9260 7108 2152
Base: All respondents 9260 % % %
Pashtun 43 47 29
Tajik 32 27 50
Uzbek 7 9 3
Hazara 10 9 12
Turkmeni 2 2 3
Baloch 1 1 *
Kirghiz * * 0
Nooristani 1 1 *
Aimak 1 1 *
Arab 2 2 1
Pashaye * * *
Sadat 1 1 1
Qazelbash * * *
Gujar * * 0
Don’t know * 0 *
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Average Monthly Household Income
Characteristics 
All Rural Urban
9260 7108 2152
Base: All 9260 % % %
Less than 2,000 Afs 6 7 3
2,001 - 3,000 Afs 11 13 6
3,001 - 5,000 Afs 24 26 18
5,001 - 10,000 Afs 30 29 33
10,001 - 15,000 Afs 15 14 18
15,001 - 20,000 Afs 8 7 12
20,001 - 25,000 Afs 3 2 5
25,001 - 40,000 Afs 1 1 3
More then 40,000 Afs 1 * 2
Refused * * *
Don’t know 2 2 1
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1  Summary
The 2013 Survey of the Afghan People is Afghanistan’s longest-running and broadest annual nationwide 
survey of adult Afghan attitudes and opinions. With this comes significant responsibility to ensure 
data quality, which consists of five major components: validity, reliability, timeliness, precision, and 
integrity. Each of these will be addressed in this appendix. 
There are five major improvements in this year’s survey compared to last year:
1. Overall size - increased by 47%, which helps to reduce the margin of error
2.  Representation - insecure areas were targeted to boost responses from those areas
3.  Length - the average interview time decreased from 45 minutes last year to 38 minutes this year
4.  Tests - new statistics and logic tests were introduced this year to determine if figures showed 
meaningful differences
5.  Accuracy - The 2013 total margin of error with 95% confidence at p=.5 is +/- 2.25%. This  is 
a decrease of 2.85% from the 2012 +/- 5.1% margin of error
As in previous years, survey fieldwork was conducted by ACSOR-Surveys for The Asia Foundation 
in Afghanistan.  This year, the Foundation conducted additional in-house quality control and for the 
first time, independent, third-party monitoring was conducted by Sayara Media Group. 
A national sample of 9,260 Afghan citizens (see Figure 1 below) across all 34 provinces was selected 
using stratified finite sampling techniques. Each citizen was surveyed face-to-face between July 17 and 
July 25, 2013, within the same 30 calendar day period, consistent with previous surveys. A project 
timeline is provided in Figure 2 below. Respondents were all 18 years of age or older, including 14% 
from urban households and 86% from rural households. The average interview length was 38 min-
utes, with a range of 20 to 80 minutes.  
Several quality control procedures were employed throughout the project. Field interviewers were 
observed by supervisors and a third-party validator. Field supervisors and the third-party validator 
conducted back-checks of interviews. During the data entry phase, 20% of interviews underwent 
double data entry, and any resulting discrepancies were resolved. Finally, during the data cleaning 
phase, the Hunter program (see section below on quality control) was used to search for patterns or 
anomalies in the data that may indicate an interview was not properly conducted by an interviewer (e.g., 
gender “male” and occupation “housewife”). For this survey, 140 cases were deleted from the data set for 
having over 95% similarities in responses to another interview (i.e., failing the duplicates test).
To meet more aggressive margins of error, this year’s sample size represents nearly a 47% increase 
from previous years (see Figure 1 below). Additional advances were made in quality control, and will 
continue to improve in the 2014 survey. The 2013 survey includes three new substantive checks for 
quality control: 
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a. Nonresponse analysis (Don’t Know and Refused responses) over time by province, district, 
enumerator, gender, ethnicity, and number of observers present for the interview;
b. Logic tests to check for bias, as well as question reliability and validity; and
c. Scales for increased reliability and validity, including cross-analysis against key trend questions.
As in 2012, deteriorating security was a key challenge for accessing sampling points in 2013. While 
sampling points are randomly identified, opinions on key trends may differ significantly between 
safe and unsafe districts. In an effort this year to reduce the negative impact of sampling replacements 
on representativeness, this year’s survey included 840 “intercept” interviews, a technique where re-
spondents from insecure districts are intercepted while shopping or traveling in more secure ones, 
in addition to 2,079 respondents from “man-only” districts, where female enumerators cannot travel 
due to security concerns.
As a result of efforts to survey insecure areas, this year reflects an oversampling of men (64%) com-
pared to women (34%), as well as an oversampling of rural areas compared to urban areas. However, 
due to the increase in sample size, the total number of women surveyed this year is more than most 
previous years. Results were weighted for national urban/rural distributions, as well as provincial-
level population distributions.  Results were not weighted for gender. This decision was consistent 
with previous years, and arose from the concern that weighting for gender would bias 2013 results. 
Women from secure areas, whose views are overrepresented in the data, may have significantly differ-
ent views from women living in insecure areas, whose views are underrepresented in the data. 
All figures reported in this methods appendix represent unweighted figures, unless otherwise specified.
Fig.1: Survey sample size by year, 2006-2013
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How Don’t Know or Refused answers are handled in the analysis
In order to maintain consistency with reports from previous years, all data are reported by quoting 
percentages based on the inclusion of any “Don’t Know” and “Refused” answers given by the respon-
dents, except where not relevant to the analysis method used as is the case with the following types 
of statistical test: regressions, correlations and Chi2 tests.
How multiple response questions are reported
The survey questionnaire had a number of questions1 in which the respondent was allowed to give 
more than one answer (those questions that ask for a first, second and sometimes a third mentioned 
answer). This leads to a greater number of answers than respondents who gave these answers. There 
are two different ways to report the results for such questions. The results can either be expressed as 
the percentage of “cases” or as the percentage of all the different types of  “responses” given.
•	 The percentage of “cases” is the total frequency of a particular type of answer (response) given 
to the question by all respondents, expressed as a percentage of the total number of respon-
dents.  
•	 The percentage of “responses” is the total frequency of a particular type of answer (response) 
given to the question by all respondents, expressed as a percentage of the total number of all 
answers (responses) given.
For a full understanding of the results presented in this report, it is important to note that: the results 
for all multiple response questions are reported as the percentage of cases.
Fig. 2: Project timeline
Project Phases Start Date End Date Comments
Translation June 24, 2013 June 27, 2013  Backtranslation will be added forquality control in 2014
Briefings July 15, 2013 July 17, 2013
Ramadan started on July 9Fieldwork July 17, 2013 July 25, 2013
 Quality Control July 17, 2013 October 20, 2013
 Data Processing July 27, 2013 September 4, 2013 Eid holiday August 8-10; Indepen-dence Day August 19
1 Q3a/b: Reasons Right Direction; Q4a/b: Reasons Wrong Direction; Q5a/b: Reasons Some Right/Some Wrong; Q6a/b: Biggest 
Problems Facing Afghanistan as a whole; Q10/Q11: which countries have provided the most aid; Q24a/b: what kind of corrup-
tion affects you personally; Q30a/b: Safe to express opinions; Q31a/b: Freedom to express political opinions; Q56a/b: Most 
important achievements of government; Q73a/b/c: what kinds of problems (who taken to)
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2  Survey Preparation
Survey design
As an opinion trends survey, The Asia Foundation survey has maintained a core set of questions for 
longitudinal comparison. These are kept on the basis of producing reliable results, and most are cross-
checked against other questions. Each year, however, some questions inevitably do not make the cut, 
for good reason. This year a team of Asia Foundation experts, both Afghan and international, reviewed 
all questions in the 2012 survey against the raw data from 2006-2012 to determine whether the questions 
were valid, reliable, and useful. Pre-determined evaluation criteria were used to select candidate ques-
tions for elimination or modification. These criteria consist of two general principles and three tests.
Principles for question evaluation
Respondents must be able to answer the question meaningfully. A meaningful answer is character-
ized as informed and credible. Informed means the respondent has enough awareness or knowledge 
to answer, and is not guessing. Credible means the question does not introduce fear, confusion, or a 
strong desire to please the interviewer. 
Questions must be useful for analysis. The addition of unnecessary questions burdens respondents 
and increases the risk of respondent fatigue. 
Tests
Is the question original? Conceptually duplicative questions are eliminated unless used in a scale or 
logic test.
Is the question valid? Questions that do not clearly measure an intentional concept are eliminated 
or modified.
Is the question reliable? Does it produce consistent answers across diverse contexts and years, for 
comparison? Questions that produced large (30+ point) fluctuations from year to year were elimi-
nated or revised.
Validity and reliability are informed by a combination of qualitative and quantitative evaluations. 
Qualitative evaluation by Asia Foundation staff compared Dari, Pashto, and English translations of 
the 2012 questionnaire to identify questions that may have been confusing, poorly worded, or other-
wise conducive to biased responses. Problematic questions were categorized by four types, outlined 
below. Quantitative evaluation was then conducted by one statistical consultant and one cultural 
psychologist using a combination of correlation analysis, logic tests, and nonresponse analysis. 
Question types that increase non-sampling bias
Double-barrel question. This refers to any question that asks multiple questions in a single question, 
when we have discovered that respondents may have different opinions about each component. For 
example, Q-58/b in 2012 asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the following 
statement: “Everyone should have equal rights under the law, regardless of their gender, ethnicity, or 
religion.” The question was broken into three separate questions for 2013. More than 600 respondents 
in 2013 agreed with one question, but disagreed with the other two.
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 Memory test. This refers to any question that we found may test a respondent’s memory, rather than 
their opinions, attitudes, or behaviors of interest. For example, questions with long lists of options 
(e.g. 7+ options, such as W-3 in 2012) are both hard for participants to keep in mind at once. Ques-
tions with long lists tend to show primacy bias, which is the tendency for respondents to choose an 
option presented at the beginning or end of a list, simply because those are easier to remember.
 Leading questions. Leading questions have assumptions built into them that can bias respondent 
answers. For example, “Do you think the government is doing enough to stop the increase in violent 
crime?” is a leading question because it assumes violent crime is increasing, the government is already 
doing something about it, and that the respondent already accepts that it is the government’s respon-
sibility to stop violent crime. 
 Questions with unreliable options. Reliability requires the use of standardized instruments that are 
evenly and precisely applied. In theory, different enumerators should be able to use the same ques-
tionnaire for the same respondents and obtain the same answers. However, certain kinds of question 
designs leave more discretion to enumerator coding than others. 
 Whenever a category is required to be read aloud to a respondent, the respondent can speak for him 
or herself. When a category is not read aloud to the respondent, however, the enumerator must use 
his or her individual discretion to represent the respondent. This discretion introduces additional dan-
gers to reliability, such as inconsistent interpretations of ambiguous responses, or inconsistent appli-
cations of unspoken or “hidden” categories. In both questions mentioned above, the third “neutral” 
option (“some in right, some in wrong”; “no difference”) is hidden from the respondent. To eliminate 
categories that may be unevenly or inconsistently applied by different enumerators, enumerators are 
sometimes required to verbalize all key options, including Don’t Knows. 
 Questions with social desirability bias (SDB). This refers to any question that invite respondents 
to answer in a way that they think is socially or politically correct, rather than true to their private 
attitudes and opinions. This is particularly a concern for sensitive questions. Any tabulated result for 
a question with SDB, when reported as a raw percentage, should be taken with this understanding in 
mind.  However, a question with SDB may nonetheless be useful for analysis. For example, whether 
or not someone has confidence in the ANP may be less useful for decision-makers than the question 
of why some agree more than others. For regression analysis, questions with SDB are useful as long 
as they contain a wide distribution of responses.2
 Social desirability bias depends upon the respondent’s awareness of, and response to, the social con-
text. In most cases, at least one additional person is watching or observing the respondent, beyond the 
enumerator. There are methods of identifying high-risk questions in face-to-face opinion surveys.
 Two quantitative indicators were used to identify high-risk candidates for SDB in the 2013 survey. 
These included (1) a series of logic tests, explained later in this section, and (2) significant correlations 
between answers and the number of observers witnessing the interview. For example, between 2007-
2 In comparable surveys conducted by ACSOR, such as the USAID-funded MISTI survey, similar questions use expanded scales. 
MISTI’s first question asks, “Generally speaking, are things in [name the district] going in the right direction or the wrong direc-
tion?” Then the respondent is asked, “Is that a lot or a little?” which creates a 1-4 scale, rather than a 1-2 scale (right/wrong). This 
variance becomes important for correlation and regression analyses, for instance.
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2011, respondents were asked if they could read various languages, as an indicator of literacy. When 
respondents were asked if they could read Pashtu, significantly more participants said “yes” in the 
presence of outside observers compared to when sitting alone with the enumerator. This remained 
true even after controlling for other variables, such as region and gender, for example.3  The question 
was eliminated in 2012, and in 2013, two new measures for literacy have been introduced. However, 
even the new literacy questions appear to be sensitive to SDB. 
A third indicator might be an unusually high number or an absence of Don’t Know (DK) and Re-
fused responses to a question. However, these are unreliable indicators, as fluctuation in DKs appears 
linked to a wide variety of other factors besides SDB, to be explained later. Finally, qualitative feed-
back from field supervisors points our attention to sensitive questions where SDB is more likely to 
be a problem.4
3  Sample Design
As in previous years, the survey was designed to include 50% female and 50% male respondents. 
Insecurity, transportation conditions, and local norms for female interviewers created challenges to 
access to women in certain districts. Sampling points that were planned for interviews with women 
but could not be covered by female interviewers were replaced with male interviews in the same vil-
lage. The sample was then stratified by province, urbanity, and district using population data released 
by the Central Statistics Office of the Afghan government (2010-2011 estimates).5  
The sample was drawn using a multi-stage systematic sampling approach. ACSOR used the 2010-2011 
updated figures provided by Afghanistan’s Central Statistics Office. Similar to the 2006 update, much 
of the 2010-2011 update is based on data drawn from the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and De-
velopment relying on results from the National Reconstruction Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA). 
The NRVA is based on a detailed cataloging of households to help inform the updates in a systematic, 
replicable way. While the proportions by provinces have changed in mostly a uniform and formulaic 
manner, the additional use of NRVA data adds to the detail of the estimates.
Sampling methods
Target Population: Afghan adults in 34 provinces
Target Sample: 9,200 Afghan adults in 34 provinces
Achieved Sample: 9,260 Afghan adults in 34 provinces
3 Beta= .036, p<.0001. When z7_1 (reading Pashto) is regressed on z14 (number of observers), z1 (gender), and m6 (region), the 
model explains 4.43% of the variance in reported Pashto reading literacy. F(3, 14248)=220.10, Pr<.0001, R squared=.044.
4 In the 2013 survey, ACSOR supervisors in Ghor, Paktika, and Nimroz reported sensitivities for questions Q1, Q2, Q19, Q20, 
Q28, Q42, Q44, Q62, Q64, Q78, Q84, and D18b. These questions address personal exposure to violence, attitudes toward wom-
en’s rights, sympathy for armed opposition groups, attitudes toward the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, and 
beliefs about the mixing of politics and religion.
5 There is no official census of Afghanistan. The Central Statistics Office (CSO) of the Afghan government has attempted to provide 
updates since 2003, but their base is influenced by figures from the 1979 census. The CSO has received support from the UN, 
the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development, and the World Food Programme to issue updates. ACSOR completed a 
review of 2010-2011 updates from the CSO and reported that these were acceptable as replacements for the 2006 estimates.
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Step 1: A minimum of 200 interviews were carried out in each province. In 11 provinces of interest, 
the number of interviews was boosted to 400: Wardak, Nangarhar, Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, 
Uruzgan, Ghor, Baghlan, Bamyan, and Samangan. Due to its size, Kabul was allocated 576 interviews.
Within each province, the sample was stratified by urban and rural population figures from the 2010-
2011 Central Statistics Office estimates. Villages are considered rural while, towns, cities, and metro 
are considered urban. 
Step 2: The sample was then further distributed across the available districts in each province using 
the population estimates for each district, also from the CSO. Districts were selected via probability 
proportional to size systematic sampling. This maintains both elements of random selection of sam-
pling points, as well as probability proportional to size.  
In order to obtain some information on the perceptions of those living in insecure areas that are not 
accessible to the enumerators, “intercept” interviews were held with people coming out of these areas 
to towns/bazaars in more secure areas. For the 2013 survey, approximately 9% of the interviews 
(n=840) were intercept interviews. Intercept interviews were done in 45 districts across 22 provinces. 
These intercept interviews are identified by the variable “Method 2” in the data set. 
Step 3: The settlements within districts were selected by simple random sampling. Within urban stra-
ta we use neighborhoods (called “nahias” from cities and metros) and towns, while in rural strata we 
use villages. As population data for settlement sizes does not exist, a simple random selection among 
all known settlements was used to select locations. In this survey, six interviews were conducted per 
sampling point.
a. The instability and frequent fighting in some provinces can cause a sampling point to be adjusted 
or replaced to keep interviewers out of areas with active violence. A complete listing of replaced 
sampling points can be found in Figure 18. 
b. ACSOR interviewing was gender-specific, with female interviewers interviewing only females 
and males interviewing only males. Some provinces with significant insurgent activity or mili-
tary operations had male-only samples depending on conditions. In the case that a sampling 
point designated for female interviews was only accessible to male interviewing, it was fielded 
as a male sampling point at the originally selected location.  
Step 4: Field managers then used maps generated from several sources to select starting points within 
each settlement. In rural areas, ACSOR implemented a new system that requires interviewers to start 
in one of five locations (Northern, Southern, Eastern, or Western edges) of the rural settlement and 
perform a random walk heading in toward the center, using a different edge for each village. For 
every fifth village, the interviewer started from the center of the settlement and worked in a pre-
determined direction (North, South, East, or West) outward toward the edge of the settlement. 
Step 5: A random walk method with a fixed sampling interval was performed from the starting point. 
For example, selecting every third house on the right in rural areas and every fifth house on the right 
in urban areas.
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Step 6: After selecting a household, interviewers were instructed to utilize a Kish grid for random-
izing the target respondent6 within the household. Members of the household are listed with their 
names and their age in descending order and then the respondent is selected according the rules of 
the Kish grid.
Figure 3 below provides population percentages for each province as supplied by the Central Statistics 
Office, the unweighted sample, and the weighted sample.
Fig. 3: Sampling targets by province
Percentage in 
Population 
Percentage in 
Unweighted Sample 
Percentage in Weighted 
Sample (wgt1)1
Kabul 15.08% 6.20% 15.08%
Kapisa 1.66% 2.20% 1.66%
Parwan 2.49% 2.00% 2.49%
Panjshir 0.58% 2.20% 0.58%
Nangarhar 5.65% 4.40% 5.65%
Kunar 1.69% 2.20% 1.69%
Laghman 1.68% 2.20% 1.68%
Nooristan 0.56% 2.20% 0.56%
Wardak 2.24% 4.50% 2.24%
Logar 1.47% 2.20% 1.47%
Ghazni 4.62% 4.40% 4.62%
Paktika 1.64% 2.20% 1.64%
Paktia 2.07% 2.20% 2.07%
Khost 2.16% 2.20% 2.16%
Helmand 3.47% 4.40% 3.47%
Kandahar 4.51% 4.40% 4.51%
Zabul 1.14% 2.20% 1.14%
Badghis 1.86% 2.10% 1.86%
Herat 6.98% 2.20% 6.98%
Farah 1.90% 2.20% 1.90%
Nimroz 0.62% 2.10% 0.62%
Badakhshan 3.57% 2.20% 3.57%
Takhar 3.68% 2.20% 3.68%
Baghlan 3.40% 4.40% 3.40%
Kunduz 3.75% 2.20% 3.75%
Samangan 1.46% 4.40% 1.46%
Balkh 4.88% 2.20% 4.88%
6 Interviewers are not allowed to substitute an alternate member of a household for the respondent selected by the Kish grid. If the 
respondent refused to participate or was not available after callbacks, then the interviewer must move on to the next household 
according to the random route.
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Jawzjan 2.02% 2.20% 2.02%
Sar-i-Pul 2.10% 2.20% 2.10%
Faryab 3.74% 2.10% 3.74%
Uruzghan 1.32% 4.30% 1.32%
Ghor 2.60% 4.00% 2.60%
Bamyan 1.68% 4.40% 1.68%
Daikundi 1.73% 2.20% 1.73%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Weighting
Three weights were created for the 2013 Survey of the Afghan People. They are “wgt1,” “wgt2,”and 
Final weight_scaled. “wgt1” is recommended to be used for analysis of the data.
1. The “wgt1” variable is a weight by province and urban/rural status to account for the booster 
samples by simple inverse cell weighting.
2. The “wgt2” variable is a weight by province and urban/rural status and gender by simple 
inverse cell weighting.
3. In Final weight_scaled, the sample was post-stratified by raking the baseweight to match de-
mographic targets. The raking variables were Strata (Province by Urbanity) and d1 (Gender). 
As there are no official estimates for gender in Afghanistan, a 50/50 split of males and females 
was assumed. Urbanity was coded as Rural for villages and Urban for all other geographies. 
The base weight and final weight were then scaled back to the sample size by multiplying the 
total weight by the sample size over the sum of the weights.
4  Contact Procedures 
As noted above, after selecting a household, interviewers were instructed to utilize a Kish grid for 
randomizing the target respondent within the household. Members of the household were listed with 
their names and age in descending order. The Kish grid provides a random selection criteria based on 
which visit the household represents in his or her random walk and the number of inhabitants living 
in the household.
Under no circumstances were interviewers allowed to substitute an alternate member of a household 
for the selected respondent. If the respondent refused to participate or was not available after three 
call-backs, the interviewer then moved on to the next household according to the random walk. 
Typically interviewers were required to make two call-backs before replacing the household. These 
call-backs are made at different times of the same day or on different days of the field period, in order 
to provide a broader schedule in which to engage the respondent. Due to security-related concerns, 
the field force has had difficulty meeting the requirement of two call-backs prior to substitution in 
many rural areas.  
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In this survey, while interviewers were able to complete some call-backs, the majority of the inter-
views were completed on the first attempt: first contact 99.3%, second contact .6%, third contact .1%. 
Due to the high rate of unemployment, and choosing the appropriate time of day for interviewing, 
completion on the first attempt is common in Afghanistan. 
Sample disposition
The American Association of Public Opinion Researchers (AAPOR) publishes four different types 
of rate calculations used in AAPOR reporting (response rates, contact rates, cooperation rates, and 
refusal rates). ACSOR uses AAPOR’s Response Rate 3, Cooperation Rate 3, Refusal Rate 2, and 
Contact Rate 2 as their standards.  
Acronyms used in the formulas; 
I   = Complete Interview 
P  = Partial Interview 
R = Refusal and break-off 
NC = Non-contact 
O = Other 
UH = Unknown if household/occupied household unit 
UO = Unknown, other 
e  = Estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible
Response Rate 3= ________________I__________________
                              (I + P) + (R + NC + O) + e(UH + UO)
Cooperation Rate 3= _______I_______
                                         (I + P) + R
Refusal Rate 2= ________________R_________________
             (I + P) + (R + NC + O) + e(UH + UO)
Contact Rate 2=  (I + P) + R + O_______________
                      (I + P) + R + O + NC + e(UH + UO)
For this sample, the response rate 3 is 79.1%, the cooperation rate 3 is 95.2%, the refusal rate 2 is .04%, 
and the contact rate 2 is 83.4%.
Figures 4 and 5 below show the disposition rates and the breakdown of non-response rates by region.
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Fig. 4: Disposition rates
Survey Management  Section
ACSOR 
Code
AAPOR 
Code Description  
 1.0/1.10 Completed Interviews 9260
  Average Survey Length (minutes) 38.05
UKNOWN HOUSEHOLD ELIGIBILITY
 3.170
Unable to Reach/Unsafe Area (This comes from the 
replaced sampling points and inaccessible district list) 840
2 3.130 No one at home after three visits 373
3 4.100 No adults (18+) after three visits 346
4 4.500 Non-Residential or empty house 151
  Total Unknown Household 1710
NON-CONTACTS
1 2.230 Door or gate locked and no one came to open it 24
6 2.200 Respondent long-term absence/for the field work period 135
13  Selected respondent not available for interview 156
  Total Non-Contacts 315
REFUSAL
7 2.111 Outright refusal at the door 179
8 2.112 Not feeling informed to answer the questions 81
9 2.112
Respondent got angry because of question and aborted 
interview 15
10 2.112 Prefers head of the house to be interviewed 116
11 2.112 In a hurry/No time 79
 2.112
Selected respondent initial refusal Cumulative (sums all 
‘2.112’ codes) 291
  Total Refusal 470
OTHER
12 2.32 Physically or mentally unable 19
5 2.332
Respondent unable to complete interview in languages 
available 8
  Total Other 27
DISPOSITION RATES
RATES FORMULA/CALCULATION PERCENT
Value for e
Estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that 
are eligible 0.952
Response Rate 3 I / (I)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO) 0.791
Cooperation Rate 3 I / (I+R) 0.952
Refusal Rate 2 R / (I)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO) 0.04
Contact Rate2 (I+R+O) / (I)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO) 0.834
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Fig. 5: Breakdown of non-response rate by region
1. Central/Kabul =  55 refusals, 47 non-contacts
2. East =  43 refusals, 41 non-contacts
3. South East =  135 refusals, 93 non-contacts
4. South West =  99 refusals, 22 non-contacts
5. West =  16 refusals, 8 non-contacts  
6. North =  69 refusals, 51 non-contacts
7. Central/Hazarajat =   53 refusals, 53 non-contacts
5  Field Reports
ACSOR supervisors were asked to note any political, social, or other newsworthy events that oc-
curred during the fieldwork period that may have affected the survey. Problem questions, history 
effects, and other concerns are listed below in Figure 6.  
Fig. 6: Supervisor original, unedited written reports by province
No Province Important event/issue in the field Action taken
1 Helmand 
There were fighting and existence of 
Taliban insurgents and mines and bombs 
in Torma (Sp#686), Chardara (Sp#728) and 
Panizai (Sp#729).
Supervisor changed the Sampling points to 
Aabazan (Sp#686), Sangin Lora (Sp#728) 
and Koz Mullah Zai (Sp#729). 
2 Nooristan 
There were threats and problems created by 
Taliban and other insurgents in Awyak village. 
In Mandol district the Pashkel village was 
inaccessible due to the far distance and the 
problems created by Taliban. 
The security conditions were not good in 
Waygal and Bargi Matal of Kamdesh, there 
were Pakistani Taliban and Arabs in the area 
and made the situation worse for people.
Questions were very interesting for the 
respondents and they felt very good during 
the interviews.
Changed Awyak village to Sheren. 
Changed the village to WerGado. 
3 Panjshir No problems have been reported. 
4 Paktia No problems have been reported. 
5 Laghman No problems have been reported. 
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6 Ghor 
There were no security issues in the field, 
but the problem was with some of the 
questions in the questionnaire, interviewers 
mentioned possible sensitivities regarding 
questions Q19, Q20, Q42, Q44, Q62 and 
Q64. 
We recommend revisiting these questions 
for possible modification or omission in 
future waves. 
7 Farah No problems have been reported. 
8 Khost No problems have been reported.
9 Uruzgan 
An explosion occurred in injured 2 police 
and some local people; one interviewer was 
also among the injured people. 
We were still able to conduct the inter-
views. 
10 Paktika
When I was traveling to Kabul, the security 
along the road was very bad. Insurgents 
were asking for people who are working 
with the government or other offices, but I 
still made it for Kabul to participate in the 
training.  
Respondents displayed discomfort with 
Q30, Q41 and Q42. 
12 Ghazni No problems have been reported.
13 Jawzjan No problems have been reported.
14 Sar-i-Pul 
There were security problems in some of 
the villages. 
Respondents had difficulty giving answers 
to Q1, Q2, Q63 and Q64 questions. 
We have discussed this issue with the Kabul 
office and they gave us replacements for 
those villages. 
15 Kapisa 
A girl was killed in Koh Band district by 
unknown gunmen, that’s why all people 
were worried and scared and they were 
answering the questions with fear. 
Tagab district is completely under the con-
trol of Taliban. In Nijrab district there were 
also some insecure villages. 
We have discussed this issue with the Kabul 
office and they gave us replacements as 
needed.
16 Faryab No problems have been reported.
17 Kunar 
Interviewers told the supervisor that people 
were answering the questions about the 
Taliban and security with fear. 
18 Herat No problems have been reported.
19 Nangar-har
One village initially appeared to be acces-
sible to interviewers but residents were un-
willing to participate once fieldwork began. 
The village was replaced. 
20 Kandahar No problems have been reported.
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21 Balkh 
We faced a problem in Sp#1371. The head 
of the village told us that you do not have 
the right to conduct interviews in this vil-
lage. 
But then I went to the area and took a letter 
that we got from the provincial office and 
convinced the head of village that we have a 
permit and it is our right to do the inter-
views. 
22 Bamyan
There was fighting between Taliban and 
government troops in Do Aab and Yakh 
zarin areas, in which many were killed and 
injured from both sides. Most of the villages 
were located near these areas. That’s why 
we weren’t able to conduct interviews in 
these areas. 
We also changed some villages in Yakaw-
lang district as well due to insecurity and 
existence of insurgents. 
Beside this, there were security problems 
in another village as well. Employees of the 
government and other organizations have 
not able to visit this village for 2 to 3 years. 
We change and selected other villages as per 
ACSOR field team instructions. 
23 Takhar
There were some transportation and road 
blocks problem in some of the villages dur-
ing the field work. 
We changed the villages that we did not 
have access to.   
24 Badakh-shan
There were problems with transportation in 
some villages. We selected other villages for those. 
25 Baghlan
A road side bomb exploded on by the head 
of the police of Baghlan province. He sur-
vived from the incident, but the explosion 
killed and injured some people. 
The number of kidnapping cases has been 
increased in Baghlan, which made people 
worried. 
26 Kunduz There were security problems in some of the villages in Kunduz province.
We changed the sampling points and con-
ducted the interviews there. 
27 Badghis No problems have been reported.
28 Samangan No problems have been reported.
29 Logar No problems have been reported.
30 Wardak No problems have been reported.
31 Zabul 
There are still security problems in Zabul 
because of US military activities. This made 
things worse and difficult for us to conduct 
interviews in the field. 
32 Daikundi No problems have been reported.
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33 Nimroz
There were no security problems in the 
area, but respondents were uncomfortable 
with some questions, such as (Q28, Q78, 
Q84, Q62, Q64 and D18b). 
Interviewers used responses taught in stan-
dard interviewer training to make respon-
dents feel comfortable, including reminding 
respondents of anonymity.
34 Parwan
16 people, including women and children, 
have been killed and injured due to the clash 
between irresponsible gunmen in Jabel Saraj 
district of Parwan province. In another inci-
dent, a person killed in 6th district of the city. 
No change to field plan was needed.
6  Enumerators
Figures 7 and 8 below provide information about the gender, experience, and provincial deployment 
of the survey enumerators.
Fig. 7: Enumerators by gender and experience
 Female  Male Total
Number of female/male interviewers 366 596 962
Number of interviewers previously used in D3 project 361 579 940
Number of interviewers new to a D3 project 5 17 22
Fig 8: Enumerators by gender and province
 Number of 
Supervisors
Number of Female 
Interviewers
Number of Male 
Interviewers
Total Number of 
Interviewers
Kabul 1 34 31 65
Kapisa 1 9 18 27
Parwan 1 13 14 27
Wardak 1 17 21 38
Logar 1 4 14 18
Ghazni 1 15 24 39
Paktia 1 6 13 19
Paktika 1 0 21 21
Khost 1 7 12 19
Nangarhar 1 20 25 45
Laghman 1 13 11 24
Kunar 1 6 15 21
Nooristan 2 3 13 16
Badakhshan 1 6 14 20
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Takhar 1 12 12 24
Baghlan 1 17 29 46
Kunduz 1 17 17 34
Balkh 1 14 12 26
Samangan 1 13 20 33
Jawzjan 1 13 14 27
Sar-i-Pul 1 8 14 22
Faryab 1 12 15 27
Badghis 1 8 15 23
Herat 1 8 9 17
Farah 1 5 18 23
Nimroz 1 10 13 23
Helmand 1 10 18 28
Kandahar 1 18 24 42
Zabul 1 2 25 27
Uruzghan 1 8 33 41
Ghor 1 6 21 27
Bamyan 1 17 17 34
Panjshir 1 7 9 16
Daikundi 1 8 13 21
Total 35 366 595 960
Enumerator training
The central training for provincial supervisors was held in Kabul on July 15, 2013, and was led by 
ACSOR project manager Nazir Ekhlass. Thirty-four ACSOR supervisors were in attendance. Sha-
mim Sarabi, Ahmad Shahim Kabuli, and Samuel Schueth of The Asia Foundation were also present. 
Topics that were covered during the training include:
1. Proper household and respondent selection.
2. Review of the questionnaire content.
3. Proper recording of questions.
4. Appropriate interviewing techniques.
5. Mock interviews were conducted to get a better understanding of the logic and concept of the 
questions. 
Following the Kabul training, ACSOR project managers who had participated in the Kabul training 
traveled to Nangarhar, Balkh, Herat, and Kandahar to lead the provincial training sessions for these 
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large provincial teams. The other provincial trainings were led by the provincial supervisors in their 
respective provinces.
7  Quality Control
Quality control consists of five major components: validity, reliability, timeliness, precision, and 
integrity (see Figure 9 below). Timeliness has been addressed in earlier sections, so we now turn to 
steps taken to ensure precision, integrity, validity, and reliability. 
Fig. 9: Components of quality control
Precision: margin of error and design effect
The expansion of the sample size in 2013 was a great success, as 2013 sampling error margins reflect 
clear improvement over the 2012 margins. Among provinces that had a sample size of around 400, 
the largest sampling error was 5.16% (Ghor Province). In total, only three out of 22 sampling er-
rors were out of the targeted +/- 5% bounds. Among provinces that had a sample size of around 
200, the largest sampling error was -7.66% (Faryab Province). In total, only one of 46 sampling 
error estimates were out of the targeted +/- 7.5% bounds. Over 80% of these sampling errors were 
within +/ 7.0% bounds. 
 
Data Quality 
Components
Validity
Does the data clearly 
and directly measure 
what we intend?
Reliability
Can the same results be 
obtained repeatedly 
using the same 
measures?
Timeliness
Is data collection 
frequent enough to be 
useful?
Precision What margin of error is unacceptable?
Integrity
What mechanisms are 
in place to reduce the 
possibility that data is 
manipulated?
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A bootstrap re-sampling method was used to derive the actual sampling errors in the 2013 survey data. 
Specifically, to estimate the sampling errors of the overall sample, 2000 random samples were drawn 
with replacement from the overall sample. For the survey question Q-3 (whether the country is going 
in the right/wrong direction), the percentages of option endorsement from the 2000 random samples 
created an empirical distribution of the sample percentage of option endorsement after applying for 
the recommended weight (i.e., the “wgt1” variable, which is a weight by province and urban/rural 
status) to each sample. This provided the actual 95% confidence intervals of the sample percentage for 
the survey option endorsement. The sampling errors for each response category were then calculated 
as the percentage errors following the formulas below:
•	 Lower-bound percentage error = Lower confidence margin – point estimate 
•	 Upper-bound percentage error = Upper confidence margin – point estimate
Following the statistical methods described above, The Asia Foundation derived sampling errors of 
the overall sample (N = 9260) for the responses to Q-3 (right/wrong direction).  Both the sampling 
error margins and design effects for percentage estimates of response options are presented in Figure 
10 below. Specifically, all the sampling error margins are within +/- 1.10%. In addition, the weighted 
average design effect was 2.29 for lower error margin and 2.37 for upper error margin, respectively. 
These findings suggest that the overall sample size and sampling strategy used in 2013 survey was ap-
propriate in achieving small sampling errors at the country level after sampling weight was applied 
in the analyses.  
Fig. 10: Error margins and design effects for Q-3 (right/wrong direction)
Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today
 are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?
 Fre-quency Percent
Vaild 
Percent
Cumu-
lative 
percent
Lower Upper 
Relative 
Lower 
Margin 
Error(%)
Relative 
Upper 
Margin 
Error(%)
Theoretical 
Margin of 
Error_Ran-
dom Sam-
pling_Weight 
Applied(%)
Design 
Effect 
(Lower 
Margin 
Error)
Design 
Effect 
(Upper 
Margin 
Error)
valid
Right 
direction 5293 57.2 57.2 57.2 56.2 58.2 -0.98 1.09 0.432 2.28 2.52
Wrong 
direction 3507 37.9 37.9 95 36.8 38.9 -1.07 1 0.432 2.49 2.32
Refused 
(vol.) 10 0.1 0.1 95.1 0 0.2 -0.07 0.07 0.432 0.16 0.17
Don’t 
know 
(vol.)
450 4.9 4.9 100 4.4 5.3 -0.41 0.45 0.432 0.95 1.04
Total 9260 100 100      Weighed Average 2.29 2.37
Integrity
Thirty-five supervisors observed interviewers’ work during fieldwork. Approximately 40% of the 
interviews were subject to some form of back-check. The back-checks consisted of:
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•	 Direct observation during the interview (260 interviews, 3%),
•	 A return visit to the residence where an interview took place by the supervisor (2,559 inter-
views, 28%),
•	 A return visit to the interview location by a central office field manager (281 interviews, 3%), or
•	 Back-check by an external validator (570 interviews, 6%). 
The 2013 Survey of the Afghan People included a new component: validation by a third-party called 
Sayara Media Group. ACSOR supervisors provided the fieldwork schedule to Sayara following the 
training briefings. Sayara validators met with ACSOR interviewers during the field period and veri-
fied the correct administration of the starting point, the random walk, and the implementation of the 
Kish grid in 95 sampling points. They also conducted back-checks of selected interviews. Interviewers 
did not report any difficulties coordinating meetings with the validators, and Sayara did not raise any 
concerns about field procedures during or following fieldwork.
Validity and reliability tests
Five tests for validity and reliability (see Fig. 11 below) are used to check whether key questions are 
consistent and measure what they intend to measure. Surveys and questions that fail initial tests by 
ACSOR (the duplicates test, the equality test, and the nonresponse tests) are flagged and sometimes 
removed. Questions that fail secondary logic and nonresponse tests, conducted in-house at The Asia 
Foundation, are flagged for revision in 2014.  Finally, the addition of scales and statistical tests for 
significance are used to test whether observed differences in frequencies or between groups are statisti-
cally real. 
Fig. 11: Validity and reliability tests
Coding, data entry, and initial logic tests
When the questionnaires are returned to the ACSOR central office in Kabul they are sorted, and 
open-ended questions are coded by a team of coders familiar with international standards for creating 
typologies for codes.  
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The questionnaires are then sent for data entry. ACSOR key-punches all questionnaires on-site to 
protect the data and closely control the quality of the data entry process. During this process, the key-
punching team utilizes logic checks and verifies any errors inadvertently committed by interviewers.
ACSOR randomly selected 1,934 questionnaires of the total 9,400 for double entry. The results of 
the double entry showed that 371 questionnaires were found to have minor differences with the 
originally punched questionnaires. The average was five variables out of 378 with discrepancies. After 
reviewing the original questionnaires, it was found that in some cases the discrepancies were in the 
double punching and the original was correct. Any differences were rectified in the final data files 
based only on a review of the original questionnaire by a data manager.
Following the data cleaning process and logic checks of the dataset, ACSOR used a program called 
Hunter that searches for additional patterns and duplicates that may indicate that an interview was 
not properly conducted by an interviewer. 
The Hunter program includes three tests:
1. Equality test – compares interviews for similarities, grouped by interviewer, within sampling 
point, province, or any other variable. Typically, interviews with an interviewer average of 
90% or higher are flagged for further investigation. 
2. “Don’t Know” (i.e., non-response) test – determines the percentage of Don’t Knows for each 
interviewer’s cases. Typically, if an interviews with 40% or higher DK responses are flagged 
for further investigation. 
3. Duplicates test – compares cases across all interviewers and respondents to check for similarity 
rates. This test will flag any pair of interviews that are similar to each other. Typically, any 
cases that have a similarity of 95% or higher are flagged for further investigation. 
 
Any interview that does not pass Hunter is pulled out for additional screening. If the interview does 
not pass screening, it is removed from the final database before delivery. 
For the 2013 survey, 140 cases were deleted for being over 95% similar in substantive responses to 
another interview (i.e., failing the duplicates test). No cases failed the equality test, and zero cases 
failed the non-response test.
Problem questions identified 
Response patterns with several questions related to self-reported respondent characteristics were not-
ed during data processing.  Responses that were flagged during logic checks were verified against the 
completed questionnaires.
•	 D-7: Some respondents did not list the language in which the interview was conducted as a 
language they can speak or read.
•	 D-8 and D-9: Some respondents did not reply that they can read any language in D-9 but said 
that they can read a letter in D-6.
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•	 D-19c: Some respondents gave inconsistent replies to questions regarding their ability to pur-
chase basic items and luxuries.
•	 Questions for literacy (D-6a, D-6b) and household standard of living (D-19) will be revised for 
2014.
Addition of statistical tests and scales
To test whether reported differences between groups of interest are real rather than simply perceived, 
this year included in-house tests for statistical significance on key questions in the 2013 report. T-
Tests, correlation tests, Chi Square tests, and regression/probit tests were used. A statistical cutoff of 
p<.01 was selected for reporting results from all tests. Regression models that explained less than 1% 
of the variance in the dependent variable were also excluded from the report.
Scales are required to have Cronbach alphas >.7 and EVs>1, preferably with no other competing 
factors. Scales provide what single-question measures do not:  robust reliability, as well as the ability 
to cross-check questions of interest, for validity testing.
Secondary logic tests 
Questions suspected of bias are subjected to logic tests using other available questions.
An illustration follows:
Target Question
Q-52: How satisfied are you with the job your Community Development Council is doing? Are you very 
satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied? (similar to X34J)
X34J: Do you have a great deal of confidence, a fair amount of confidence, not very much confidence, or no 
confidence at all in Community Development Councils?
Unweighted Result
6,265 respondents (67.66%) reported feeling “somewhat” or “very satisfied” with the job their CDC 
is doing. An additional 467 (5.04%) report that they don’t know.  
Logic Test 
100% of respondents who express satisfaction with the CDC in their community should answer “yes” 
to Q-40: “Tell me, do you know if there is a CDCs in your community?”
Outcome
Over 2,000 respondents very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the CDC in their community later 
reported that they were unaware of a CDC in their community (see Figure 12 below). While this 
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question reveals significant social desirability/satisficing bias, it remains useful as a comparison trend: 
respondents with knowledge of the CDC are significantly more likely to report satisfaction than 
those without knowledge of the CDC.  A trend in the opposite direction would also be useful.  There-
fore the information remains useful and valid, so long as it is combined with logic tests, and as long 
as variance, rather than raw percentages, are used for analysis. 
Fig. 12: Logic test for Q-52 (2013)
Questions that fail logic tests are considered on a case-by-case basis. In some cases, they are merely 
flagged for caution when reporting. Others are flagged for revision in 2014. Still others are main-
tained, for use in scales that add needed reliability and validity.
Secondary nonresponse analysis: don’t knows 
Don’t Know (DK) responses were tallied for all years (2006-2013) and analyzed using Stata software 
for statistical analysis. The average number of DK responses per participant is significantly explained 
by gender (women report consistently higher DKs than men; see Figure 16 below), by year of survey 
implementation (2009-2013 reflects a steady decrease across questions; see Figures 13 and 14 below), 
and by the number of observers present (as the number of observers increases, the number of DK 
responses also tends to increase; see Figure 17 below).7
A province-by-province analysis (see Figure 15 below) reveals fluctuations by supervisor territories. 
Wide ranges and wide standard deviations in the number of DK responses, province-by-province, sug-
gests that supervisors administer and code these questions with different frequencies. Overall, between 
2006-2013, provinces with the highest average number of DK responses were Paktia (M=5.81), Khost 
7 r=+.05, p<.0001
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(M=5.76), and Sar-i-Pul (M=5.40), while the lowest were Helmand (M=1.42), Laghman (M=1.13), 
and Balkh (M=1.51). 
This evidence suggests that some DKs may have nothing to do with Afghan opinion at all. As indi-
cated above and as shown in Figure 15 below, a study of ACSOR data over time reveals a significant 
and consistent decrease in the average number of DK and Refusal responses per participant in recent 
years. This change is unlikely to mean that Afghans are less opinionated in 2012 than 2009. Instead, 
the trend likely reflects improved capacity by ACSOR supervisors and enumerators to manage DKs 
and standardize supervisor training, as well as improvements in survey design. 
Fig. 13: Decrease in the % of Don’t Know responses for Q-3 (right/wrong direction)
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Fig. 14: Average number of Don’t Know responses per interview, (2006-2013*) 
Fig. 15: Average number of Don’t Know responses per respondent (2013) 
 
0.70
1.9
4.4
5.1
3.5 3.6
2.8
1.9
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
AVERAGE NUMBER OF DONT KNOW RESPONSES
 
Appendix 2: Methodology 145
Fig. 16: Average number of Don’t Know responses by gender || 2006-2013*
*All differences are statistically significant at the p<.01 level, except for 2009, which is marginally 
significant (p=.03) 
Fig. 17: Average number of Don’t Know responses by number of observers
Types of don’t knows
There are many reasons for which a respondent may say “don’t know,” and there are at least three 
different types of DK responses. For the survey, DKs are classified according to three different types: 
Illogical DKs, Avoidant DKs, and Satisficing DKs. In terms of reasons, respondents may genuinely 
have no opinion or attitude to report for a particular question. Alternatively, however, research sug-
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gests that many respondents report “don’t know” as a strategy for providing acceptable or satisfactory 
answers to survey questions. Research also suggests that this tendency, called “satisficing,” may even 
be linked to personality traits.8 On the other hand, DKs can be avoidant, rather than satisficing.  A 
busy farmer may answer “don’t know” if he thinks it will end the survey sooner, even if the response 
is illogical. Such responses can enable respondents to answer a question without having to engage 
cognitively. This tendency is likely to be increased in surveys where respondent fatigue may take 
place. The 2013 questionnaire included 123 substantive questions and lasted, on average, roughly 
three quarters of an hour. 
Satisficing behavior in particular is expected to be strong in Afghanistan, where “saving face” and 
hospitality are important cultural dimensions.  In general, satisficing behavior tends to result in pref-
erences for:
•	 Explicitly offered no-opinion response options
•	 Socially desirable responses
•	 Non-differentiation when a list of questions asks for ratings of multiple objects using the same 
rating scale (e.g., Q-41 in the 2013 survey); and
•	 “Acquiescence response bias,” which is the tendency to agree with any assertion, regardless of 
its content.
8  List of Replaced Sampling Points
Fig. 18: Replaced sampling points (original, unedited written reports provided)
Province SP Projected District/Village Replaced with Reason
1.
Kabul
81 TAJEKAN KHOWAJA HA. Village KhanjarKhail. Village No village with this name was found
84 GOSFAND DARA. Village Kando Sang. Village No transportation way for vehicles
85 DAWOOD SHAH KA-LAY. Village Bakhtyaran. Village No transportation way for vehicles
86 QALA NAWA. Village Mullah Nader. Village No transportation way for vehicles
90 QALA NAHIM. Village Khair Abad. Village No village with this name was found
91 PACHE. Village Shaghasi. Village The village is under control of Taliban
92 GULDARA. Village Rahmat Abad. Village The village is under control of Taliban
93 SAYIDAN GULESTAN. Village 
PoshtaBadamBagh. 
Village No village with this name was found
95 DALAK HA. Village SayaBagh. Village Sayabagh is the real name of this village
8 Simonson, I. & Sela, A. (2001) On the heritability of consumer decision making: An exploratory approach for 
studying genetic effects on judgment and choice. Journal of Consumer Research. 37(6): 951-966.  
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2.
Kapisa
122 SHAIGHARI. Village DehQazi. Village The village is under control of Taliban
123 NAKHSH CHA. Village RozaKhail. Village The village is under control of Taliban
125 HARARA YA LAYSA. Village HesmatKhail. Village The village is under control of Taliban
126 NAL KHA. Village Reza Khail. Village There was fighting between tribes
127 PUSHTA. Village DehNawAskini. Village The village is under control of Taliban
3. 
Parwan
131 NemGuzarKhal Mohammad. Village Parchai 8. Village People of area didn’t allow to interview
133 KhwajaRoh. Village Tapa Shohada. Village People weren’t willing to be interviewed
135 ZARD ALOW GAK. Village ChaharDeh. Village The village is under control of Taliban
151 BALAQ. Village MiskenKhak. Village There was armed thieve on the way
153 GUL GHOUNDI - DAHI ZARGRAN. Village Do Lana. Village People weren’t willing to be interviewed
157 SAHDULLAH HULYA. Village 
QalaWazir Khan. Vil-
lage There was a funeral ceremony
158 SONDAR KHAIL. Village Matak. Village No village with this name was found
4. 
Wardak
178 SHAIR JAN. Village Deh Muslim. Village There was fighting between Taliban and HezbIslami
180 BALOCH KHAIL. Village KaNasrat. Village There was fighting between Taliban and HezbIslami
182 RAQOUL. Village Zeyolat. Village Due to Operation of ISAF
184 KOTA QAZI. Village QoulTazaGul. Village Due to Operation of ISAF
194 BALA QALA KOHNA KHUMAR. Village Kotagi. Village
There was fighting between Taliban and 
ISAF
196 KOTA ASHRO. Village LatoKhail. Village There was fighting between Taliban and ISAF
230 KOZ KHAIL. Village AmanKhail. Village There was fighting between Taliban and ISAF
232 MOSHK KHAIL. Village PayendaKhail. Village There was fighting between Taliban and ISAF
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33. 
Panjshir
268 DAHI YAOW JAWA. Village Pitab Jaw. Village There was funeral ceremony 
270 PAZGARAN. Village Pamir. Village People of village weren’t willing to be interviewed
272 PEYAWASHT BALAQ. Village Shast. Village
Malik of the village didn’t allow the inter-
view
273 RAHMATULLAH KHAIL SHAST. Village JahfarKhail. Village There was surveyed before
276 BAKHSHI KHAIL SHAKHA. Village 
BakhshiKhailPayen. 
Village
Malik of the village didn’t allow the inter-
view
277 DAHI SHAH WALI. Village DehShadi. Village No village with this name was found
278 BARAK. Village Malsapa. Village People of village weren’t willing to be interviewed
280 QOUL TARI. Village RahmanKhail. Village There was surveyed before
281 ABCHAKAN. Village BazarakKhas. Village There was surveyed before
286 PARYAN CHAMAR. Village ChamarBala. Village
There is two village named Chamar, so we 
interviewed in ChamarBala
290 BAD KHAM. Village DehKalan. Village This village is related to Unaba district
291 BAYGARA. Village LalaMirzaKhail. Village This village is related to Unaba district
292 WARKHI. Village ShaheedanBala. Village There was surveyed before
296 SAFID CHAHIR MAJ-LOM. Village Zaria. Village
Malik of the village didn’t allow the inter-
view
297 SAFID CHAHIR YA DAHI MUSKEN. Village Dal Zor. Village
People of village weren’t willing to be 
interviewed
298 KHAR PAYA. Village Pawat. Village People of village weren’t willing to be interviewed
10. 
Nangarhar
318 PER SAHIB KALAY. Village QalaJanan. Village No transportation way for vehicles
331 HOTAKE. Village Takia. Village The village is under control of Taliban
338 SHAHBAZ KHAIL. Village Sultan Khail. Village No village with this name was found
356 SHATOUR. Village Sera Meran. Village The village is under control of Taliban
367 KAR WANDA. Village Bar Bayar. Village The village is under control of Taliban
369 PATOK SHAIKH ABAD. Village PeraKhail. Village The village is under control of Taliban
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11. 
Laghman
372 SHADI BAGH. Village MansoorKalai. Village The village is under control of Taliban
373 HAZARA BANDA. Village SayedanoKalai. Village The village is under control of Taliban
374 SEEN ZAI. Village Dehandar. Village No transportation way for vehicles
375 GAR KASH. Village Karim Abad. Village No transportation way for vehicles
376 RAGI TAHNA. Village QalaSader. Village There was operation of army forces
378 SALO HULYA. Village Shaikhan. Village There was operation of army forces
383 DAK MALY. Village DakKalai. Village The village is under control of Taliban
384 KUNDA GAL. Village Bar Kott. Village The village is under control of Taliban
385 MANJELAM. Village QalaNajel. Village No transportation way for vehicles
386 PALAK WATO. Village AchakZai. Village No transportation way for vehicles
389 BANDA. Village Ghazi Abad. Village There was operation of foreign forces
390 DUM LAM. Village QalaBaya. Village There was operation of foreign forces
395 BARAN GUL. Village Shah Guzar Baba. Village No transportation way for vehicles
396 MANO. Village DehSharana. Village The village is under control of Taliban
398 ARSALLAH KALAY. Village Misken Abad. Village The village is under control of Taliban
12. 
Kunar
407 DEWARA. Village Kalmani. Village The village is under control of Taliban
408 SPAIDADO. Village Dar WarakTangi. Vil-lage The village is under control of Taliban
411 ROSHAN KANDAK. Village Hazar Mir Kalai. Village The village is under control of Taliban
412 ARAT GAR POZ. Village KozNoorgal. Village The village is under control of Taliban
415 SHARBAT KALAY. Village PachahBagh. Village The village is under control of Taliban
416 JABGE. Village Bar Narang. Village There was fighting
417 ZARKANDA. Village SpeenKar. Village The village is under control of Taliban
418 KHOSHAL BANDA. Village KozNarang. Village The village is under control of Taliban
419 GODLE. Village ShekarTangiPulGhundi. Village The village is under control of Taliban
420 SAMLAM. Village ZardAlo. Village The village is under control of Taliban
421 PASHANGAR. Village NariManzKalai. Village The village is under control of Taliban
422 BATASH. Village Jaba. Village The village is under control of Taliban
423 DOHZ JADED. Village Shingam. Village There was fighting
424 DAHZ BADNAKHAIL. Village Shar Got. Village The village is under control of Taliban
426 BAROTE. Village Tango Kamp. Village The village is under control of Taliban
427 GHASHTO KACH. Village JejiKalai. Village The village is under control of Taliban
428 TARI GULI. Village ZorAsmarKalai. Village The village is under control of Taliban
429 SHABAZI. Village Kara Mar. Village The village is under control of Taliban
431 AZORI. Village Neshgam. Village The village is under control of Taliban
432 JEGAL. Village NawiKalai. Village The village is under control of Taliban
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13. 
Nooristan
440 AWYAK. Village Sheren. Village The village is under control of Taliban
453 PASHKEL. Village WerGado. Village The village is under control of Taliban
455 SHALA DOR. Village BalaMandol. Village The village is under control of Taliban
8. 
Paktika
582 HANIF WAL. Village Mullahyan. Village There was fighting of Taliban
584 ATTA GUL. Village AkhtoKalai. Village The way was blocked by Taliban
26. 
Nimroz
650 MULLAH ABDUL AZIZ. Village Sadiq Abad. Village
Due to lack of water people shifted from 
this village
652 MAH WALI. Village Abdul Ghafar. Village Due to lack of water people shifted from this village
27. 
Helmand
686 TOORMA. Village AabBazan. Village The village is under control of Taliban
728 CHAR DIH. Village Sangin Lora. Village There was landmine to the way of this village
729 PANI ZAI. Village Koz Mullah ZaiYaNaso-Zai. Village The village is under control of Taliban
28. 
Kandahar
801 DAMAN. Village NawiKalai. Village No village with this name was found
802 Agha Shin. Village SpenaGhundi. Village The village is under control of Taliban
803 AjiKhudaydad. Village Markaz Shah WaliKott. Village There was operation of army forces
29. 
Zabul
817 MUQAM. Village Hassan Kariz. Village There was landmine on the way to this village
840 PATAW. Village Sado Khan Qala. Village There was court of Taliban so we couldn’t go there
847 TUGHRAT. Village Takbar. Village There was landmine on the way to this village
23. Badghis
926 SHAH MIRA. Village BolMisna. Village The village is under control of Taliban
927 DARA BOOM PAYEN. Village Qarchaghi. Village There was operation of army forces
929 KHAIR KHANA SUFLA. Village BuzBai Ha. Village There was operation of army forces
939 SAYID AZIM HOTAK. Village Waremat. Village There are no houses here
941 SANG ZOR. Village Payal. Village There are no houses here
943 BALOCH HA LODEN. Village Haqak. Village The village is under control of Taliban
24. 
Herat
969 CHASHMA BAZ ALI. Village ChaharBurjak. Village The village is under control of Taliban
970 AFARD. Village Pahlawanan. Village The village is under control of Taliban
971 SHALME ABAD. Village GulBaf Ha. Village No village with this name was found
984 ZANG SABAH. Village GandumMana. Village The village is under control of Taliban
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25. 
Farah
989 KARAIZ KHUDAY RAHM. Village Kohna Kan. Village The village is under control of Taliban
993 ARTOOGHNAK. Village Shewan. Village The village is under control of Taliban
994 KHARAK. Village Ganj Abad. Village The village is under control of Taliban
995 HUSSAIN ABAD. Village KalQala. Village The village is under control of Taliban
996 ASSLE ZER KOH. Village Seya Jangal. Village The village is under control of Taliban
997 KHAR SAKI. Village ShaikhLala. Village The village is under control of Taliban
998 GAD SANGAR. Village Sai Joi. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1001 WENG. Village Ghuzni. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1002 REZA GARZANAK. Vil-lage Khum Rashid. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1003 SHAH WOLLAYAT. Village Larti. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1004 GARZANAK MIR KHUSH. Village Shah Toot. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1005 NAR MAKI. Village Kariz Mohammad Saheed. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1006 QALA LAHL MOHAM-MAD. Village  Masaw. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1011 RABAT. Village Joi Chashma. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1012 KHAIR ABAD. Village Musa Qala. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1013 KARAIZ GOW. Village KorGhundi. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1014 JOWZARA. Village Deno. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1018 KARAIZ AGHA BENAN. Village 
MarkazWoloswali. 
Village No transportation way for vehicles
1019 KARAIZ NAGHAK. Vil-lage Bajera. Village There was landmine on the way
1020 KARAIZ MALIK. Village Hawzak Abdul Qader. Village There was landmine on the way
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31.
Ghor
1022 SHAI TAKHT. Village Tapa Khair Abad. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1023 VINI. Village AkhtaKhanaPayen. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1024 DAH KHALIL. Village Jar Zard. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1025 SHALAKHTAN. Village Meyanji. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1027 SOPAR MAN. Village KhwajaGhar. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1028 SHAH MAK. Village DehSabz. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1029 SHOR KAN. Village Sofak. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1031 KANDAYAK. Village WajGuna. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1032 KASHKAK. Village Tapa Shohada. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1033 ZAMIN JAI. Village Kasi. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1035 KARAI ZAK. Village Shaikh Ha. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1039 QAZAGHAK. Village Ali Baik. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1043 SEYA DASHT. Village KhumShor. Village No village with this name was found
1068 SEYA DARA. Village KarizKhoshk. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1085 KHAIRS BAIDANK. Vil-lage Shanya. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1086 KHOSHKAK. Village Gundab. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1087 JOWINASER. Village KajAbro. Village The village is under control of Taliban
14. 
Badakhshan
1096 NOW ABAD DOGHAL-TA. Village Haqelan. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1097 MADRASA. Village Qalah. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1098 YOJAYKEL. Village Murghabi Dan. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1099 PAHAN DARA PAYEN. Village SokhtaKohBala. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1100 PAYAN MOR. Village Hassan Baigi. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1101 MAMYALIK. Village KapaDara. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1107 KHAJOW. Village DehSangan. Village No village with this name was found
1121 SENI MAYET. Village Azan. Village No transportation way for vehicles
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15. 
Takhar
1128 BOLTI. Village SarElenak. Village This village is related to Kulangan district
1136 GOZAR-BALA-GARGAN. Village Tolki Bain. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1140 GUL SAI. Village Ali Qatan. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1141 OLGAR NOW ABAD. Village Aqpara. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1143 NOOR ABA. Village Seya Jar. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1145 KAJ DARAH. Village Naw Abad. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1146 ERPAN. Village Khanqa. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1153 PAMIR QESHLAQ. Village ChaparQeshlaq. Village No transportation way for vehicles
16. 
Baghlan
1181 NASIRY. Village HodKhail. Village No village with this name was found
1183 HABIBULLAH WA MATA KHAIL. Village DauodZai. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1186 KAJ NOW HAJI SAYYID TIMORY. Village 
Naw Abad SarShakh. 
Village The village is under control of Taliban
1187 MIRZA QAQ. Village SarGhalat. Village No village with this name was found
1190 PAITAWAK. Village Guzar. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1195 TALE. Village Barqi. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1196 WALI KHAIL. Village Sadat AraKash. Village This village completely has been shifted to Sarak 12
1200 DAHI MULLAH ZIYA. Village QariaChaman. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1201 HAJI SAFAR MOHAM-MAD. Village Do Aabi. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1205 HAZAR LAR KHABI. Village Naw Abad. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1208 SHUSH KAM. Village Qara Cha. Village The village is under control of Taliban
17. 
Kunduz
1237 SHERKHAN BANDAR. Village QariaKozma. Village
Sherkhan Bandar is a big area and Qaria-
Kozma is a part of it
1238 SHEER MAHAI. Village QaraKotarma. Village No village with this name was found
1247 DAWLAT-YAR. Village KhwajaPesta. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1248 LAR KHABI. Village JanatBagh. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1253 BAZ QUM. Village Mang Tapa. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1254 ALMAN TODA. Village Basos. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1255 AQ SHAKH. Village SajaniUlya. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1257 BAGHRAIKOL. Village Dana Jee. Village The village is under control of Taliban
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32. 
Bamyan
1266 NOOR QOUR BO. Village Ajka. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1268 ACHANI. Village QoulMiran. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1269 ISPI DAK. Village QalaWakil. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1270 SHAH BAIDAK. Village QalaSokhta. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1272 DAHAN PALAN. Village Mandigak. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1273 AMROD HULYA. Village DehGero. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1274 ISPA SANG. Village Borgho Sang. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1277 SEYA KHARAK. Village SarDasht. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1280 HAZAR CHASHMA PAITOW. Village  Gazak. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1281 DAHAN GHASHAR. Village QalaShagat. Village Security problem
1282 ISPI DARK. Village Pas Naw. Village Security problem
1284 BOGHRI. Village DashtUlya. Village Security problem
1285 BAYARAK. Village MeyanaDeh. Village Security problem
1286 KHOWJA KAFSHA. Village Tezab. Village Security problem
1287 KHALAF SHAIR. Village Sar Bom Sabz Dara. Village Security problem
1288 ZEAR GHAR. Village ChaharDewal. Village Security problem
1289 SOKHTAGI DAM DASHT. Village DashtSechak. Village Security problem
1291 KHAR BAIDAK. Village RashibSabzDara. Village No village with this name was found
1292 DARA UOD. Village SarlarNetaq. Village Security problem
1293 SAFID SANG BALENA. Village Degah. Village Security problem
1294 GUMBAD. Village Langar. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1295 SPEN HOW. Village Jamah Ali. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1304 SORKHAK TANGI . Vil-lage Bust. Village No village with this name was found
1306 KEJAK. Village Toyak. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1307 SORKH NAW. Village GhojNaw. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1312 GHAR GHARA SALIH. Village Deh Barat. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1313 KACH QOUL. Village Qala. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1315 GUL SAI. Village Dew Khana. Village No village with this name was found
1317 LOWRANJ. Village Sang Chel. Village Security problem
1318 BANI KABOT DOWRO. Village Qaghor. Village Security problem
1319 MADAR. Village Ahangaran. Village Security problem
1320 YAKHAK HULYA. Village Naw Abad. Village Security problem
1321 KARIMAK. Village Nabaq. Village Security problem
1322 BAYKOI. Village Gumbad. Village No village with this name was found
1323 BALDAR GHAN. Village Bor Sang. Village No village with this name was found
1324 DO WAREED. Village Qalai Mullah. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1325 GUM AB. Village KohnaQala. Village Security problem
1326 HADIRA. Village Shanya. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1327 LAGHARAK. Village DashtKamPari. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1328 MOSSA DARA. Village QaraKhwal. Village No transportation way for vehicles
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34. 
Daikundi
1330 ZANQAFA. Village QoghZar. Village No village with this name was found
1332 ALAK. Village Walrag. Village There was mistake in name of village
1335 AWGIR. Village Jawz. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1341 DAHAN RAMU. Village Sewak. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1342 BOR KUSHTA. Village ShorAab. Village No village with this name was found
1343 DAHANA-I-UOR. Village SorkhBaid. Village There was few houses in this village
1345 SHAH NOOR. Village Kaja. Village No village with this name was found
1348 DAHAN-I-NAJAK. Village DarwanaGak. Village No village with this name was found
1349 GHARAK. Village Seya Deh. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1355 TAQARNAKAK. Village Safed Sang. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1363 NIK. Village Dona Lagak. Village No transportation way for vehicles
18. 
Balkh
1380 QAFAN. Village Qarshigek. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1385 NAQELIN NOW SHAR. Village Jar Qala. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1386 LOCHAK ARAQ. Village Ahmad Abad. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1390 SHAHRAK KOHNA. Village Langar Abad. Village There was landmine on the way
1397 SHADEYAN. Village MarkazWoloswali. Village No transportation way for vehicles
19. 
Samangan
1403 AKA KHAIL. Village Omar Khail. Village This village was uninhabited 
1408 KHOWJA KHAKI-HA. Village Karta Sabz. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1412 MULLAH TASH. Village GuzarMirza Barat Ali. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1414 YATI KHONAK. Village Beni Malang. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1418 DOWLATA. Village Saheed Ha. Village No village with this name was found
1427 KHAN MOHAMMAD KAMAR. Village LarSokhta. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1433 NOW AMAD QOUDYA. Village Takaw. Village No village with this name was found
1445 QASHQA. Village Seya Qotan. Village No transportation way for vehicles
1447 HAZEEM. Village DaraShamsuddin. Vil-lage No transportation way for vehicles
1451 DAHAN TANGLI. Village Dawlat Abad. Village This village is related to FerozNakhcher district
20. 
Jawzjan
1475 BAKAWOL TURKMAN-YA. Village 
BakawolKhurasan. 
Village No respondent was found there
1484 ALAM LAIK. Village Khatab. Village No village with this name was found
1489 CHOOB BASH. Village AylekRubat. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1493 MULLAH BURHANUD-DIN. Village Fateh Abad. Village No village with this name was found
1496 QEMARAQ PAYAN. Village Koliqal. Village Malik of village didn’t allow to interview
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21. 
Sar-i-Pul
1504 TURKMANYA. Village AngotUzbikia. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1509 ARMANI MULKI. Village ShahrakBalkhabi. Vil-lage The village is under control of Taliban
1511 RAJAB ABAD. Village Achabar. Village No village with this name was found
1513 MOHAMMAD AYUB. Village QeshlaqBeland. Village No village with this name was found
1514 SHEEN. Village KhwajaQalha. Village No village with this name was found
1523 CHAGHDAN PAYEN. Village Tatar. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1524 AQ GEER AFGHANIYA. Village Koran. Village No village with this name was found
1525 SAYAD TOYE. Village Khurasan. Village The village is under control of Taliban
1526 MASJED SAFID. Village Karan. Village No village with this name was found
1533 HAJI AZIZ. Village Kamarak. Village No village with this name was found
22. 
Faryab
1544 KHOWJA SAHADUL-LAH. Village KhwajaQoul. Village No village with this name was found
1556 AQCHER. Village Tejam. Village No village with this name was found
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 Region 
 
Base: All Respondents 9260
Central/Kabul 24%
East 10%
South East 10%
South West 11%
West 13%
North East 14%
Central/Hazarajat 3%
North West 14%
 
 Geographic Code   
Base: All Respondents 9260
Villages 77%
Towns 5%
City 6%
Metro (Kabul) 13%
 Province 
Base: All Respondents 9260
Kabul 15%
Kapisa 2%
Parwan 2%
Wardak 2%
Logar 1%
Ghazni 5%
Paktia 2%
Paktika 2%
Khost 2%
Nangarhar 6%
Laghman 2%
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Kunar 2%
Nooristan 1%
Badakhshan 4%
Takhar 4%
Baghlan 3%
Kunduz 4%
Balkh 5%
Samangan 1%
Jawzjan 2%
Sar-i-Pul 2%
Faryab 4%
Badghis 2%
Herat 7%
Farah 2%
Nimroz 1%
Helmand 3%
Kandahar 5%
Zabul 1%
Uruzghan 1%
Ghor 3%
Bamyan 2%
Panjshir 1%
Daikundi 2%
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NOTE TO INTERVIEWERS:  
REMEMBER THAT THIS IS A CONVERSATION. MAKE THE PERSON COMFORTABLE. 
MAKE EYE CONTACT.
BE RESPECTFUL. DO NOT TRY TO LEAD THE RESPONDENT DURING THE INTER-
VIEW OR GET THE “DESIRED” ANSWERS FROM THEM. MAKE SURE YOU TELL THEM 
THAT THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS, YOU JUST WANT THEIR OPIN-
IONS. 
DURING THE INTERVIEW, BE POLITE BUT INQUISITIVE. DO NOT ACCEPT ONE-
WORD ANSWERS. DRAW OUT RESPONDENTS TO GIVE DETAILED RESPONSES BY 
FURTHER PROBING – SAY:  “WHY DO YOU SAY THAT?”  “ANYTHING ELSE?” “TELL 
ME MORE.”
Asalaam Valeikum, I am from ACSOR-Surveys, an independent research organization. We regularly 
conduct surveys among people like you to find out what you feel about issues of public interest. I 
just want to ask you some questions about “matters of interest to Afghans.” I am interested in your 
opinion. Your name will not be given to anyone and your views will be analyzed along with those 
of thousands of others. 
If I come to a question that is sensitive and you feel uncomfortable answering it, please let me know. 
We can either decide to ignore that particular question or else I will explain what the question is about 
in more detail so that you can decide whether to answer it or not.
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 MAIN SURVEY QUESTIONS
Q-1. Generally speaking, based on your own experience, what are two reasons to think that Afghani-
stan is going in the right direction? 
Q1a. First Mention   _____________________________
Q1b. Second Mention ____________________________
 1st mention 1st & 2nd mention
 Base: All Respondents 9260 18520
Reconstruction/rebuilding 20% 32%
Good security 14% 24%
Don’t know 4% 18%
Improvement in education system 7% 13%
Schools for girls have opened 7% 13%
Having active ANA and ANP 7% 13%
Peace/end of the war 4% 7%
Economic revival 3% 6%
Democracy/elections 3% 6%
Good government 2% 5%
Road reconstruction 2% 5%
Freedom/free speech 2% 4%
International assistance 2% 3%
More job opportunities available 1% 3%
Nothing is going in the right direction 1% 3%
Reduction in level of administrative corruption 1% 3%
More electricity supply than before 1% 3%
Reduction in poppy cultivation 1% 2%
Removing Taliban 1% 2%
National unity 1% 2%
Foreign forces leaving Afghanistan 1% 2%
Good communication system 1% 2%
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Having a parliament 1% 2%
Having a legal constitution 1% 2%
Presidential elections 1% 2%
Clinics have been built 1% 2%
Development of agriculture 1% 2%
Disarmament 1% 2%
Existence of foreigners 1% 1%
Women can now work * 1%
More attention to human rights 1% 1%
Development of healthcare system in general * 1%
Better justice * 1%
Women have more freedom * 1%
Clean drinking water * 1%
Respecting women rights * 1%
Refugees return * 1%
Refused * 1%
Prevention/Elimination of crimes * 1%
Establishing High Peace Jirga/Shura * 1%
Better relations with foreign countries * *
Free movement/travel possible * *
Decrease in crimes * *
Low prices * *
Better and more media * *
New technology is available * *
Removing terrorism * *
Having a legitmate president * *
Detecting and defusing mines * *
Establishment of factories * *
Transfer of security responsibilities * *
Respecting Islam * *
Preventing the intervention of foreign countries * *
Mining of natural resources * *
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Prevention/Elimination of suicide attacks * *
Creation of Arbakais * *
Better transportation * *
Decrease in number of accidents * *
Better treatment of addicts * *
Decrease in kidnapping * *
Abandonment of assistance with Pakistan * *
Having active governors * *
Access to products * *
Having active aiports * *
Hezb-e-Islami is getting weaker * *
Industrial programs * *
Decrease in US arbitrary attacks * *
Endorsement of strategic agreement * *
Increase in salary of government employees * *
Banking services * *
Total 100% 200%
Q-2. Generally speaking, based on your own experience, what are two reasons to think that Afghanistan 
is going in the wrong direction?
Q2a. First Mention _____________________________
Q2b. Second Mention ____________________________
 1st mention 1st & 2nd mention
Base: All Respondents 9260 18520
Insecurity 16% 24%
Corruption 14% 23%
There is unemployment 9% 20%
Don’t know 4% 18%
Suicide attacks 6% 11%
Presence of Taliban 5% 9%
Bad economy 4% 8%
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Bad government 3% 6%
Administrative corruption 4% 6%
Poor education system 3% 6%
High prices 3% 6%
Ethnic problems 2% 4%
Increase in drug trade 2% 4%
Injustice in the country 2% 4%
No reconstruction has happened 2% 4%
Neighboring countries cause problems 2% 4%
Too many foreigners are getting involved 2% 4%
Interfere of foreigners in Afghanistan’s military affairs 1% 3%
Increase in crimes 1% 3%
Innocent people being killed 1% 2%
Existence and interference of foreigners 1% 2%
Kidnapping of children 1% 2%
Lack of unity 1% 2%
Water & power supply problems 1% 2%
Poor leadership 1% 2%
Presence of Warlords 1% 2%
Lack of coordination between ISA/Coalition forces and ANP/
ANA during fights against AOGs
1% 2%
Lack of implementation of the law 1% 1%
Pakistan’s rocket attacks on Afghanistan 1% 1%
Placing bombs on the roads 1% 1%
Weak ANA and ANP 1% 1%
Women’s rights * 1%
Healthcare problems 1% 1%
Lack of aid/no development assistance * 1%
Terrorism * 1%
Unfair elections * 1%
Weak parliament * 1%
Western influence is too great * 1%
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Nothing * 1%
Foreign aid causes problems * 1%
Disarmament hasn’t taken place * 1%
Lack of shelter * *
There is no progress * *
Lack of food for people * *
Refused * *
People disillusioned with the government * *
There is danger to Islam * *
Lack of attention to agriculture * *
US arbitrary attacks * *
The government is supporting Taliban and Al-Qaeda * *
Lack of factories for manufacturing * *
Don’t have trust in the peace process * *
Lack of freedom of speech * *
Theft * *
Transportation problems * *
Too much luxury * *
Disrespecting Islamic values * *
Lack of investment * *
Too much freedom * *
Exit of foreigners * *
Creation of Arbakais * *
Political resistance * *
High levels of pollution * *
Lack of military equipment * *
Existence of Hizb-e-Islami * *
Rape/sexual harassment * *
Lack of communications system * *
Existence of Northern allies * *
Lack of specialized cadres * *
Poisoning the school children * *
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Misuse of power * *
Endorsement of strategic agreement * *
Bonn agreement * *
Americans blocking roads * *
Lack of firewood * *
Total 100% 200%
 
Q-3. Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the 
right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?
Base: All Respondents 9260
Right direction 57%
Wrong direction 38%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 5%
Q-4. (ASK ALL) In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing Afghanistan as a whole? (Write 
down answer) 
Q4a. First Mention   _____________________________
Q4b. Second Mention ____________________________
 1st mention 1st & 2nd mention
 Base: All Respondents 9260 18520
Insecurity/attacks/violence/terrorism 17% 30%
Corruption 15% 26%
Unemployment 13% 25%
Poor economy 5% 10%
Poverty 4% 9%
Education/schools/literacy 4% 9%
Suicide attacks 5% 9%
Presence of Taliban 4% 7%
Interference of Pakistan 4% 7%
High prices 2% 6%
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Don’t know 1% 6%
Government/weak government/central 
authority 2% 5%
Tribal issues/Partisanship 2% 5%
Interference of foreign countries 3% 5%
Presence of foreign troops 2% 4%
Drug smuggling 2% 4%
Scarcity of electricity 2% 4%
Injustice 1% 3%
Innocent people being killed 1% 2%
Presence of warlords 1% 2%
Crime 1% 2%
Lack of national unity 1% 2%
Reconstruction/rebuilding 1% 2%
Roads 1% 1%
Health care/clinics/hospitals 1% 1%
Lack of efficient ANA and ANP 1% 1%
Drinking water 1% 1%
Kidnapping of children * 1%
Lack of (proper) shelter 1% 1%
No attention to women’s rights * 1%
Roadside bombings * 1%
Disrespect for Islamic Laws * 1%
Water for irrigation * 1%
Weak parliament * 1%
Unfair elections * 1%
Interference of Iran * *
Irresponsible armed people * *
Agricultural problems * *
Lack of factories * *
Establishment of political parties * *
Lack of foreign assistance * *
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Lack of mines/Lack of mining for natural 
resources * *
Foreign forces’ air strikes * *
Lack of food * *
Transportation problems * *
No freedom * *
Rape * *
Low salaries for government employees * *
Misusing power * *
Refused * *
Lack of production companies * *
Exit of foreign forces * *
Lack of military equipment * *
Peace has been maintained * *
Foreigners’ arbitrary operations * *
Existence of private prisons * *
Too much luxury * *
Disrespect to our culture * *
Returnees’ problems * *
Lack of respect for elders * *
Population levels are too high * *
No problems * *
Discrimination * *
Pollution * *
Lack of natural gas * *
Existence of armed groups or militias * *
Business problems/struggles * *
Family problems * *
Weak judiciary system * *
Lack of fuel * *
Establishment of peace council * *
Infidels’ government * *
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Poisoning of school children * *
Improvement in communications * *
Development of private banks * *
Lack of barricades * *
 Total 100% 200%
Q-5. (ASK ALL) What are the biggest problems in your local area? (Write down answer) 
Q5a. First Mention   _____________________________
Q5b. Second Mention ____________________________
 1st mention 1st & 2nd mention
 Base: All Respondents 9260 18520
Unemployment 14% 27%
Electricity 14% 24%
Roads 10% 19%
Drinking Water 11% 19%
Insecurity/attacks/violence 9% 14%
Healthcare/clinics/hospitals 6% 13%
Education/schools/literacy 5% 11%
Don’t know 1% 10%
Poverty 3% 7%
High prices 3% 6%
Poor Economy 2% 5%
Reconstruction/rebuilding 1% 4%
Corruption 2% 3%
No problems 2% 3%
Pollution 2% 3%
Crime 1% 3%
Water for irrigation 1% 3%
Ethnic problems 1% 2%
Taliban 1% 2%
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Lack of (proper) shelter 1% 2%
Drug smuggling 1% 2%
Presence of warlords 1% 2%
Government/weak government/central 
authority 1% 1%
Lack of unity 1% 1%
Lack of agricultural tools /equipment 1% 1%
Transportation problems 1% 1%
Roadside bombs 1% 1%
Injustice * 1%
Innocent people being killed * 1%
Addiction to drugs * 1%
Presence of foreign forces/searching 
houses * 1%
Kidnapping of children * 1%
Lack of food * 1%
Municipalities not doing their job well * 1%
Women’s rights * 1%
Suicide attacks * 1%
Lack of ANA and ANP * *
Lack of law implementation * *
Presence of foreigners * *
Interference of Pakistan * *
Gas * *
Dikes and drains to protect against floods * *
Lack of industrial projects * *
Night raids * *
Arbakais (Armed groups supported by the 
government) * *
Lack of communication system * *
Family problems * *
Existence of terrorism and Al-Qaeda * *
Lack of fuel * *
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Lack of foreign assistance * *
Natural disasters * *
Lack of entertainment opportunities * *
Lack of factories * *
Lack of mosques * *
AOGs take money from people * *
Governor grabbing lands * *
Lack of bakeries * *
Elections * *
Moral corruption * *
People not feeling responsible * *
Refused * *
Returnees’ problems * *
Too much freedom * *
Less access to technology * *
Mine extraction * *
Lack of cold storage houses (for fruit) * *
Bad/corrupt governor * *
Lack of Shuras * *
Setting schools on fire * *
Iranian interference * *
Disrespecting Islamic values * *
Existence of Hizb-e-Islami * *
Population levels are too high * *
The people’s representatives cannot solve 
the problems * *
Negative effects of western tradition * *
Total 100% 200%
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Q-6. Overall, for you and your family, which of these periods was the best economically?
Base: All Respondents 9260
Most recent period after the Taliban 76%
Taliban period 10%
No difference (vol.) 13%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) *
Q-7. Do you or do you not use any of the following for obtaining information? 
Yes No Refused Don’t know
a) Radio 80% 20% * *
b) TV set 54% 46% * *
c) Mobile phone 57% 43% * *
d) Computer 2% 98% * *
e) Fixed phone line 1% 99% * *
f) The internet 3% 97% * *
Q-8.  Which one of the following sources do you use most often for obtaining information (Interviewer: 
Read out the options below; circle the ONE used most often)
Base: All Respondents 9260
Mosque 16%
Community shuras 12%
Friends and family 46%
Bazaars 5%
Other sources 20%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) *
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Q-9. I would like to ask you about today’s conditions in the village/neighborhood where you live. Would 
you rate (insert item) as very good, quite good, quite bad, or very bad in your area?
Very 
Good
Quite 
Good
Quite 
Bad
 Very 
Bad Refused
Don’t 
know
a) The availability of clean drinking 
water 33% 41% 17% 9% * *
b) The availability of water for 
irrigation 19% 34% 26% 17% 1% 3%
c) The supply of electricity 18% 23% 22% 37% * 1%
d) The availability of clinics and 
hospitals 13% 39% 31% 16% * *
e) The availability of medicine 13% 37% 33% 15% * *
f) The availability of education for 
children 27% 45% 20% 8% * *
g) The condition of roads in your area 11% 32% 32% 25% * *
Q-10. In the last 12 months, do you know of, or have you heard of any project or program in this area/
district covering any of the following?
Yes No Refused Don’t know
a) Reconstruction/building of roads, bridges 36% 64% * *
b) Water supply for drinking 31% 69% * *
c) Water supply for irrigation 19% 79% * 1%
d) Electricity supply 20% 79% * 1%
e) Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.) 29% 71% * 1%
f) Education (reconstruction/opening of school, more teachers etc.) 37% 62% * 1%
g) De-mining 15% 84% * 1%
h) Demilitarization/disarmament 12% 87% * 1%
i) Reconstruction/programs in agriculture 19% 80% * 1%
j) Reconstruction/programs in industry 10% 89% * 1%
k) Building new mosques 22% 77% * 1%
l) Humanitarian programs – help in food, medicines, shelter, 
production materials etc. 13% 85% * 1%
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Q-11. (Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” to any items in Q-10a-l) Which countries do you think have provided 
the most funding for these types of projects in your area/district?  
Q11a. First Mention (country):      _________________________ 
Q11b. Second Mention (country):  _________________________
Q11c. Third Mention (country):     _________________________\
Q11a Q11b Q11c Q11a+Q11b+Q11c
Column percents  Base: AllRespondents
 Base: All
Respondents
 Base: All
Respondents
 Base: All
Respondents
Base: Aware of projects 6439 6439 6439 6439
USA 27% 13% 6% 46%
Japan 10% 9% 5% 24%
Germany 7% 7% 3% 16%
India 5% 6% 5% 16%
Afghan Government 7% 3% 2% 12%
China 2% 3% 2% 7%
United Kingdom (Britain) 2% 2% 2% 6%
Turkey 2% 2% 2% 6%
Iran 2% 2% 1% 5%
Saudi Arabia 2% 2% 2% 5%
France 1% 2% 2% 5%
Sweden 2% 2% 1% 5%
Canada 1% 2% 1% 4%
Italy 2% 1% * 3%
Pakistan 1% 1% 1% 2%
Norway 1% 1% * 2%
Denmark 1% 1% * 2%
Russia 1% 1% 1% 2%
National Solidarity 
Program 1% * * 2%
Poland 1% 1% * 2%
Korea * * * 1%
Spain * * * 1%
Australia * * * 1%
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Holland * * * 1%
Tajikistan 1% * * 1%
Foreign countries * * * 1%
World Bank * * * 1%
UN agencies * * * 1%
Foreign NGOs * * * 1%
European countries in 
general * * * 1%
Jordan * * * 1%
No country 1% 1% 1% 1%
Thailand 1% * * 1%
Bangladesh * * * *
Hungary * * * *
Uzbekistan * * * *
Belgium * * * *
Turkmenistan * * * *
Switzerland * * * *
Finland * * * *
PRT * * * *
Lithuania * * * *
WFP * * * *
Indonesia * * * *
Kuwait * * * *
Egypt * * * *
DAKAR agency * * * *
Red Cross * * * *
South Africa * * * *
Greece * * * *
Kazakhstan * * * *
UNICEF * * * *
Agha Khan foundation * * * *
HABITAT *  * *
Nepal * * * *
Malaysia * * * *
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UNOPS * * * *
Czech Republic * * * *
Care Organization * * * *
Brazil   * *
Albania   * *
IOM * * * *
New Zealand * * * *
Dubai * * * *
Romania *  * *
Qatar * * * *
NATO * * * *
Libya * * * *
Sudan * * * *
Argentina * * * *
Singapore * * * *
Iraq * * * *
Bulgaria * * * *
Iceland * * * *
GTZ * * * *
Refused * * * *
Don’t know 15% 35% 58% 15%
Q-12. (ASK ALL) Now I would like to ask you some questions about your water supply Where do you 
usually get drinking water for your family? 
Base: All Respondents 9260
Piped water inside the compound (garden/plot) 12%
Personal well (in home) 34%
Well or piped water at a neighbor’s house 9%
Public, community well 20%
Public, community tap 5%
River/stream/spring 18%
Water seller 1%
Water supplied by NGO 1%
Ganda (water stored on ground in dug holes) *
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Q-13.  (ASK ALL) Do you use water for irrigation? 
Base: All Respondents 9260
Yes 52%
No 48%
Q-14. (Ask if answered Code 1 “Yes” to Q-13) How would you evaluate the amount of water available for 
irrigation in your area last year?
Column percents Base: All Respondents
Base: Water for irrigation users 4825
[1] Very good 22%
[2] Good 58%
[3] Bad 15%
[4] Very bad 5%
Don’t know (vol.) *
Q-15. (Ask if 3 or 4, Bad or Very bad, to Q-14) Please list the main reasons why the amount of water for 
irrigation is bad or very bad:
Q15a. Write First Mention: _____________________________
Q15b. Write Second Mention: ___________________________
Base: Bad 
or Very bad 
amount of 
water 
available for 
irrigation
Less 
water in 
springs
Lack of 
attention and 
care from 
municipality
Lack of 
attention 
from 
government
Not 
having 
proper 
canals
Lack of 
development 
councils
Refused Don’t know
Q15a 1000 76% 3% 6% 8% * * 6%
Q15b 1000 10% 6% 10% 13% 1% * 60%
Q15a+Q15b 1000 86% 9% 16% 21% 1% * 6%
Q-16. (ASK ALL) Over the last 5 years, has your household generally had enough water?
Base: All Respondents 9260
Yes 42%
Sometimes 45%
No 13%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 1%
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Q-17a. What is the main source of energy that you use for cooking at home? (Code in the first column 
below)
Q-17b. And what is the main source of energy that you use for heating your home? (Code in the second 
column)
Q17a Q17b
Column percents Base: All Respondents Base: All Respondents
Base: All Respondents 9260 9260
Electricity 4% 3%
Firewood 48% 26%
Coal 3% 11%
Animal dung/manure 14% 20%
Grass or other plant biomass 7% 19%
Charcoal 2% 8%
Kerosene * 1%
Bottled gas/LPG 21% 12%
Diesel * *
Don’t know (vol.) * 14%
Q-18. How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? 
Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family’s safety?
Base: All Respondents 9260
[1] Always 13%
[2] Rarely 23%
[3] Sometimes 32%
[4] Often 14%
[5] Never 18%
Q-19.  Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or of some criminal act in the past 
year? (please note that in the text this question has undergone regression analysis for correlation pur-
poses. As a result the percentages in the text  are not the same as the respondents’ answer percentages)
Base: All Respondents 9260
Yes 19%
No 81%
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Q-20. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” in Q-19) What kind of violence or crime did you or someone 
in your family experience in the past year?  (READ OUT LIST. Multiple Response) 
Base: Victims 2223
Physical attack or beating   21
Racketeering /extortion 12
Theft of livestock 10
Burglary/looting 10
Pick-pocketing 8
Foreign forces actions 6
Suicide attacks 6
Militant/Insurgent actions 6
Motor vehicle theft/Property stolen from vehicle or theft 5
Murder 5
Physical attack or beating   21
Racketeering /extortion 12
Theft of livestock 10
Burglary/looting 10
Pick-pocketing 8
Q-21. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” in Q-19) Still thinking about any violent or criminal act you 
or your family may have experienced in the past year, was it reported to anybody outside your family 
or not? 
Base: Victims 1791
Yes 64%
No 34%
Refused *
Don’t know 2%
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Q-22. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” in Q-21) Who did you report the crime to? (Multiple Re-
sponse. Do Not Read Codes)
Number of cases 1756
Afghan National Police 26%
Shura/ Elders 18%
Tribal leader/Malik 12%
District governor/ woleswal 11%
Afghan National Army 10%
Mullah Sahib 5%
Provincial authority 3%
Public prosecutor 3%
Courts 2%
Taliban 2%
Local militia (Arbakai) 2%
Local commander or warlord 2%
Just my family 1%
Central government 1%
Office of UN organization(s) 1%
Local PRT 1%
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights 
Commission *
Press or other media *
Don’t know (vol.) *
Q-23. (ASK ALL) If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you 
have that the guilty party would be punished? Would you have:
Base: All Respondents 9260
[1] A great deal 13%
[2] A fair amount 38%
[3] Not very much 29%
[4] No confidence at all 18%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 1%
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Q-24. In your view, what is the biggest cause of crime in Afghanistan? (Do NOT Read codes. Write down 
answer) 
Write Response: __________________________________________ 
Base: All Respondents 9260
Unemployment 23%
Corruption 14%
Illiteracy 9%
Poverty/weak economy 8%
Insecurity 8%
Lack of government attention/Weak government 5%
Taliban 4%
Drugs 3%
Existence of irresponsible armed groups 3%
Lack of law implementation 3%
Discrimination 3%
Presence of international forces 3%
Pakistan’s interference 2%
Injustice 2%
Terrorism 1%
Murders 1%
Robberies 1%
Criminals released without punishment 1%
Family problems 1%
Suicide attacks 1%
Lack of reconstruction *
Having weak/low-paid police *
Returnees *
Western countries *
Rapes *
Kidnapping of children *
Powerful people misusing their power *
Poorly protected borders *
Arbakais *
Business disputes *
Iranian interference *
Disrespecting culture *
Human trafficking *
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High prices *
Not collecting weapons from people *
Violence *
Too much freedom for women *
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 4%
Q-25.  (ASK ALL) Please tell me whether you think that corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, 
or no problem at all in the following areas. 
Base: All 
Respondents
Major 
problems
Minor 
problems
Not a 
problem
Refused 
(vol.)
Don’t know 
(vol.)
a) In your daily life 9260 56% 28% 16% * *
b) In your 
neighborhood 9260 49% 35% 15% * 1%
c) In your local 
authorities 9260 58% 32% 9% * 1%
d) In your provincial 
government 9260 68% 25% 5% * 2%
e) In Afghanistan as a 
whole 9260 77% 18% 4% * 1%
Q-26. Next I am going to list several different organizations or situations in which people have said they 
have experienced corruption in the past. Please tell me how often in the past year have you had to 
give money, a gift, or perform a favor for these organizations or in these situations?  Please answer 
“In all cases,” “In Most Cases,” “In some cases,” “In No Cases” if you have not had any experience 
of this sort of corruption, or “Had no contact” if you have not had contact with the organization or 
experienced the situation in the past year.
 (Rotate items on the list) 
Base: All 
Respondents
In all 
cases
Most 
cases
In some 
cases
No 
cases
Had no 
contacts Refused
Don’t 
know
a) Officials in the 
municipality/district 
office
9260 6% 11% 12% 23% 45% * 1%
b) Customs office 9260 4% 9% 12% 21% 54% * 1%
c) Afghan National Police 9260 4% 10% 17% 28% 40% * 1%
d) Afghan National Army 9260 3% 7% 11% 32% 46% * 1%
e) Judiciary/courts 9260 6% 12% 15% 21% 45% * 1%
Afghanistan in 2013182
f) State electricity supply 9260 3% 10% 14% 26% 46% * 1%
g) Public healthcare 
service 9260 4% 13% 21% 33% 29% * 1%
h) When applying for a 
job 9260 5% 11% 15% 25% 43% * 1%
i)  Admissions to schools/
university 9260 3% 10% 13% 31% 43% * 1%
j)  To receive official 
documents 9260 4% 10% 14% 25% 45% * 1%
Q-27. Do you think that your local District or Provincial Government is doing too much, about right, or 
not enough to fight corruption?
Base: All Respondents 9260
Too much 12%
About right 47%
Not enough 37%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 4%
Q-28. Some people say that politics and religion should be mixed (i.e. local religious leaders should be regu-
larly consulted on the problems facing an area), while others think that politics and religion should 
not mix. Which is closer to your view?
Base: All Respondents 9260
Politics and religion should be mixed 58%
Politics and religion should not mix 38%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 4%
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Q-29. If your household were to have one of the following four problems, from whom would you ask for 
help to resolve it? (Interviewer: Ask about each type of problem listed at the top of the chart; circle 
only ONE response in each column)
Q29a Q29b Q29c Q29d
Column percents Base: All Respondents
Base: All 
Respondents
Base: All 
Respondents
Base: All 
Respondents
Base: All Respondents 9260 9260 9260 9260
Line departments 11% 17% 7% 29%
District authorities 8% 7% 5% 11%
Elders of the local shura/jirga 48% 25% 15% 9%
Provincial governor/ 
authorities 4% 3% 4% 7%
Friends and family 1% 3% 29% 6%
Malik/Khan 9% 17% 12% 5%
Provincial Council 2% 3% 3% 5%
Community development 
council 1% 3% 2% 4%
A member of parliament 3% 4% 1% 3%
Mullah 2% 3% 6% 3%
Afghan National Army 2% 4% 3% 2%
Afghan National Police 6% 7% 5% 2%
PRT * 1% 1% 2%
NGO * * 1% 2%
Human Rights Commission * * 4% 2%
National Solidarity Program * 1% * 2%
Don’t know (vol.) 1% 1% 1% 2%
Foreign forces * * * 1%
Municipality 1% 1% * 1%
Taliban * * * 1%
Doctors * * * 1%
No one * * * *
Courts * * * *
Other * * * *
Refused (vol.) * * * *
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Q-30. Now I will read you a list of different activities that you could participate in. Please, tell me, whether 
you would participate in the following activities with “no fear,” “some fear,” or a “lot of fear”?
Base: All 
Respondents
No 
fear
Some 
fear
A lot of 
fear Refused
Don’t 
know
a) When participating in resolving 
problems in your community 9260 57% 34% 8% * 1%
b) Voting in a national/provincial 
election 9260 41% 40% 19% * 1%
c) Participating in a peaceful 
demonstration 9260 28% 40% 28% * 3%
d) To run for public office 9260 37% 39% 19% 1% 4%
e) When encountering ANP 9260 46% 37% 15% * 2%
f) When encountering ANA 9260 49% 34% 15% * 2%
g) When traveling from one part of 
Afghanistan to another part of the 
country
9260 24% 46% 29% * 1%
h) When encountering international 
forces 9260 20% 43% 34% * 2%
Q-31a. In some countries, people do not feel able to publicly criticize their government while in other coun-
tries they feel quite free to do so in public. How strongly do you agree or disagree that in Afghanistan 
it is generally acceptable to criticize the government in public?
Base: All Respondents 9260
[1] Strongly agree 27%
[2] Agree somewhat 49%
[3] Disagree somewhat 18%
[4] Strongly disagree 5%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 1%
Q-31b. In comparison to one year ago, do people in your community feel more safe, as safe as before, or less 
safe to express their opinions?
Base: All Respondents 9260
More safe to express their opinions 23%
As safe as before to express their opinions 56%
Less safe to express their opinions 17%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 2%
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Q-32. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 ‘More safe’ in Q-31b) What changes compared with the past do you 
think have made most people to feel more safe to express their opinions in the area where you live? 
(Write down answer)
Q32a. Write First Mention: ___________________________________________
Q32b. Write Second Mention: _________________________________________
Q32a Q32b Q32a+b
Base: More safe 2107 2107 2107
The security conditions are good (in our area) 34% 14% 48%
Freedom of speech is guaranteed 17% 10% 26%
Peace and democracy 10% 9% 19%
Having ANP and ANA 6% 4% 10%
Good government 2% 4% 6%
Better education 2% 3% 6%
(Respect for) Human rights 2% 2% 4%
People’s cooperation with the government 2% 2% 4%
Increase in the level of people’s awareness 1% 2% 4%
Unity among people 2% 2% 4%
Freedom of press is guaranteed 2% 1% 3%
Having a legal constitution 2% 2% 3%
Taliban removal 2% 1% 3%
Bad security 2% 1% 3%
Presence of CDC 1% 1% 2%
The removal of local militias 1% * 1%
Having (working) parliament and local shuras 1% 1% 1%
Presence of ISAF/Coalition forces 1% 1% 1%
Presence of PC 1% * 1%
Disarmament * * 1%
Reconstruction 1% 1% 1%
Corruption has decreased * * 1%
More attention to women’s rights * 1% 1%
Better justice system * * 1%
Afghanistan in 2013186
Better economic situation * * 1%
Threats by Taliban * * 1%
Injustice * * 1%
Illiteracy * * 1%
Unemployment * 1% 1%
Bias and disunity * 1% 1%
Annihilation of narcotics * * 1%
Weak government * * 1%
Lack of democracy and freedom of speech * * 1%
Creation of Arbakais 1% 1% 1%
Islamic party led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has been removed * * *
No one * * *
Night raids * * *
Threats by warlords * * *
Don’t have permission * * *
Threat by elders * * *
More corruption * * *
Increase in crimes * * *
Existence of international terrorism * * *
Fear of the government * * *
US arbitrary attacks * * *
Killing of people * * *
Crimes have decreased * * *
Fear of spies * * *
They are the residents of our village * * *
Kidnapping * * *
Suicide attacks * * *
Non-implementation of laws * * *
Interference of neighboring countries * * *
Transfer of power from foreigners to Afghans * * *
Refused 1% 1% 1%
Don’t know 3% 30% 3%
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Q-33. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 3 ‘Less safe’ in Q-31b) Why don’t people in your area have the free-
dom to express their opinions? (Write down answer)
Q33a. Write First Mention: ___________________________________________
Q33b. Write Second Mention: _________________________________________
Q33a Q33b Q33a+b
Column percents Base: All Respondents
Base: All 
Respondents
Base: All 
Respondents
Base: Less safe 1582 1582 1582
Security conditions are bad in this area 25% 9% 35%
Presence of Taliban 12% 6% 18%
Fear for personal safety 9% 5% 14%
The government doesn’t allow freedom of political 
opinion 7% 5% 12%
Threats by AOGs 5% 4% 9%
Presence of warlords 3% 2% 6%
Fear of police 4% 3% 6%
No real democracy 2% 2% 5%
The government doesn’t care about people’s 
opinions 3% 2% 5%
Ethnic discrimination 1% 2% 4%
Lack of justice 2% 3% 4%
Fear of revenge 2% 2% 4%
Lack of education 2% 1% 3%
Fear of people 2% 1% 3%
Women are under the control of men 1% 1% 2%
Fear of coalition/foreign forces 2% 1% 2%
Elders/Mullahs don’t allow freedom of opinion 1% * 2%
Lack of awareness of legal rights 1% 1% 2%
Fear of Malik 1% 1% 2%
Corruption 1% 1% 2%
Unemployment * 1% 2%
Fear of spies 1% 1% 2%
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Threats by district governor 1% 1% 2%
Don’t trust anyone 1% 1% 2%
No disarmament * 1% 1%
Not interested in/Lack of information about 
politics 1% 1% 1%
Afraid of family members 1% * 1%
Suicide attacks * * 1%
Existence of terrorism * 1% 1%
Animosity between government employees * 1% 1%
Kidnapping * * 1%
Interference of neighboring countries * * 1%
Killing of innocent people 1% * 1%
Political parties/partisanship 1% * 1%
Fear of militias 1% * 1%
Poverty/Weak economy * 1% 1%
Existence of smugglers * *  
Refused * * *
Don’t know 6% 36% 6%
Q-34. (ASK ALL) How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local (District/Pro-
vincial) government decisions – a lot, some, very little, or none at all?
Base: All Respondents 9260
[1] A lot 10%
[2] Some 38%
[3] Very little 28%
[4] None at all 23%
Refused *
Don’t know 1%
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Q-35. On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the process of decision-making in your com-
munity (not your opinion on how good the decisions made were for you personally). Are you very 
satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the process?
Base: All Respondents 9260
[1] Very satisfied 20%
[2] Somewhat satisfied 50%
[3] Some what dissatisfied 21%
[4] Very dissatisfied 7%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 2%
Q-36. In your opinion, which of the following does your member of parliament care about most? Is it about 
... (Interviewer: Read out options)
Base: All Respondents 9260
National issues 16%
Provincial issues 20%
District or municipality issues 11%
Ethnic issues 19%
Personal interests 31%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 2%
Q-37. Members of parliament have various responsibilities. How would you rate their performance on each 
of the following duties? Would you say they are doing a bad job, an okay job, a good job, or a great 
job?
Base: All 
Respondents
Bad 
job
OK 
job
Good 
job
Great 
job Refused
Don’t 
know
a) Listening to constituents and 
representing their needs 9260 36% 43% 17% 4% * 1%
b) Delivering jobs and 
development 9260 37% 33% 23% 5% * 1%
c) Making laws for the good of 
the country 9260 30% 35% 24% 9% * 1%
d) Monitoring the president and 
his staff 9260 29% 36% 24% 9% * 2%
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Q-38. Provincial council members have various responsibilities. How would you rate their performance on 
each of the following duties? Would you say they are doing a bad job, an okay job, a good job, or a 
great job?
Base: All 
Respondents
Bad 
job
OK 
job
Good 
job
Great 
job Refused
Don’t 
know
a) Listening to constituents and 
representing their needs 9260 32% 46% 17% 4% * 1%
b) Delivering jobs and development 9260 33% 35% 25% 6% * 1%
c) Improving delivery of basic 
services 9260 30% 37% 25% 6% * 1%
d) Helping resolve disputes 9260 28% 39% 25% 8% * 2%
Q-39. Please tell me which statement you agree with more (Read statements).
Base: All Respondents 9260
Statement A 33%
Statement B 66%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 1%
Q-40. Community development councils (CDC) have been established as part of the National Solidarity 
Program and members of the Council are representatives of various groups in your community. Tell 
me, do you know if there is a CDC in your community? 
Base: All Respondents 9260
Yes, aware of CDC in your community 58%
No, not aware of CDC in your community 40%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 2%
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Q-41. I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please 
tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, 
or no confidence at all? If you don’t know, it’s ok, just say you have no opinion. (Interviewer code: 
99 “Don’t Know” if they have no opinion)
Base: All 
Respondents
A lot of 
confidence
Some 
confidence
Not much 
confidence
No 
confidence 
at all
Refused Don’t know
a) Afghanistan 
Land Authority 9260 32% 39% 15% 11% * 3%
b) Community 
development 
councils
9260 21% 41% 23% 10% * 5%
c) Community 
shuras/jirgas 9260 24% 41% 22% 10% * 4%
d) District 
government 9260 20% 41% 25% 12% * 2%
e) Government 
ministers 9260 12% 33% 32% 20% * 2%
f) International 
NGOs 9260 14% 37% 29% 17% * 3%
g) Local militias 9260 9% 23% 28% 35% * 5%
h) Media such as 
newspapers, radio, 
TV
9260 30% 38% 20% 10% * 1%
i) People who take 
bribes 9260 5% 13% 18% 61% * 3%
j) National NGOs 9260 12% 39% 29% 16% * 3%
k) Parliament as a 
whole 9260 12% 35% 30% 18% * 5%
l) Provincial 
councils 9260 16% 41% 26% 15% * 1%
m) Provincial 
government 9260 19% 40% 26% 13% * 2%
n) Religious leaders 9260 31% 35% 21% 12% * 1%
o) The court 
system 9260 10% 33% 33% 22% * 2%
p) Your member of 
parliament 9260 10% 39% 28% 21% * 2%
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Q-42. I’m going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Army (ANA).  ANA soldiers 
are the ones who wear dark green and brown camouflage uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or 
disagree with each statement. (Read out statement, wait for response and then ask): Would you say 
strongly or somewhat? 
Q42a Q42b
Base: All Respondents 9260 9260
[1] Strongly agree 58% 57%
[2] Agree somewhat 35% 34%
[3] Disagree somewhat 5% 6%
[4] Strongly disagree 2% 3%
Refused (vol.) * *
Don’t know (vol.) 1% 1%
Q-43a. (Ask if answered 3 “Somewhat disagree” or 4 “Strongly disagree” to Q-42a) Can you tell me why you 
disagree with the statement “ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people”?
Column percents Base: All Respondents
Base: Somewhat disagree or Strongly disagree with “ANA is honest and fair with 
the Afghan people” 617
Unprofessional behavior with people 20%
They take bribes 12%
Nationalism 9%
They don’t respect elders 8%
Firing on civilians 7%
They are addicts 5%
They don’t punish the AOGs 5%
They are very brutal 5%
They are illiterate 5%
They kill innocent people 3%
They misuse their power 3%
They have Taliban members among them 1%
Their monthly pay is low 1%
They work on foreigners’ orders 1%
They can’t maintain security *
Refused (vol.) 1%
Don’t know (vol.) 14%
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Q-43b. (Ask if answered 3 “Somewhat disagree” or 4 “Strongly disagree” to Q-42b) Can you tell me why you 
disagree with the statement “ANA helps improve the security”?
Q-43b.   __________________
Base: Somewhat disagree or Strongly disagree with “ANA helps improve the security” 823
Insecurity 20%
Not well-trained 11%
They take bribes 10%
Not well-equipped 7%
Nationalism 5%
Never act on time 5%
The law is not implemented equally 5%
Killing innocent people 5%
They support Taliban 4%
Disrespecting people 3%
They are drug addicts 2%
They are being paid less 2%
Misuse their power 2%
They destroy the country 2%
ANA is not present in our area 2%
Misusing their vehicles 1%
They support foreigners 1%
Taliban have spies among them 1%
Refused (vol.) 1%
Don’t know (vol.) 12%
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Q-44. I’m going to read some statements to you about Afghan National Police (ANP).  ANP officers are 
the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each 
statement. (Read out statement, wait for response and then ask): Would you say strongly or some-
what? 
Q44a Q44b Q44c
Column percents  Base: AllRespondents
 Base: All
Respondents
 Base: All
Respondents
Base: All Respondents 9260 9260 9260
[1] Strongly agree 44% 43% 38%
[2] Agree somewhat 41% 43% 42%
[3] Disagree somewhat 10% 9% 11%
[4] Strongly disagree 4% 5% 7%
Refused (vol.) * * *
Don’t know (vol.) 1% 1% 1%
Q-45a. (Ask if answered 3 “Somewhat disagree” or 4 “Strongly disagree” to Q-44a) Can you tell me 
why you disagree with the statement “ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people”?
 Q-45a.  ____________________
Column percents Base: All Respondents
Base: Somewhat disagree or Strongly disagree with “ANP is honest and fair 
with the Afghan people” 1400
They are corrupt 29%
They are not well-educated 13%
They don’t respect elders/people 13%
They are bad people 10%
They are nationalist 6%
Misuse their power 6%
Insecurity 5%
They are drug addicts 3%
Driving fast/misuse their vehicles 2%
We don’t have ANA in our area 1%
Their salaries are low 1%
They are not well-equipped 1%
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They harass women 1%
They are Afghan *
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 7%
Q-45b (Ask if answered 3 “Somewhat disagree” or 4 “Strongly disagree” to Q-44b) Can you tell me why 
you disagree with the statement “ANP helps improve the security”?
 Q-45b.  ____________________
Column percents Base: All Respondents
Base: Somewhat disagree or Strongly disagree with “ANP helps 
improve the security” 1298
They don’t perform their jobs 17%
Bad security 16%
They don’t have the skills of war 9%
The are not bound by law 6%
They are illiterate 6%
They respect people 5%
They are hired by references 4%
They support terrorists 4%
They are drug addicts 2%
Misuse their power 1%
No ANP in our area 1%
They take bribes * 
They kill innocent people * 
They are nationalist *
They are being paid less * 
Refused (vol.) 1%
Don’t know (vol.) 7%
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Q-45c (Ask if answered 3 “Somewhat disagree” or 4 “Strongly disagree” to Q-44c) Can you tell me why you 
disagree with the statement “ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes”?
 Q-45c.  ____________________
Column percents Base: All Respondents
Base: Somewhat disagree or Strongly disagree with “ANP is efficient at 
arresting those who have committed crimes” 1780
They are corrupt 33%
Existence of AOGs 10%
Courts will free the criminals 10%
The don’t know the law 10%
They don’t have war skills 9%
They are illiterate 6%
They are nationalists 4%
They support terrorists/criminals 4%
Misuse their power 2%
They are drug addicts 1%
There is no ANP in our area 1%
They are low-paid *
Refused (vol.) 1%
Don’t know (vol.) 10%
Q-46. Now, please tell me if you think that the following need foreign support to do their job properly at 
the moment? Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly? 
Q46a Q46b
Column percents Base: All Respondents Base: All Respondents
Base: All Respondents 9260 9260
[1] Strongly agree 42% 38%
[2] Agree somewhat 35% 37%
[3] Disagree somewhat 13% 14%
[4] Strongly disagree 8% 9%
Refused (vol.) * *
Don’t know (vol.) 1% 1%
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Q-47. Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall the [insert 
item], is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job?
Base: All 
Respondents
A very 
good job
Somewhat 
good job
Somewhat 
bad job
Very 
bad job Refused
Don’t 
know
a) National 
government 9260 26% 49% 17% 7% * 1%
b) Provincial 
government 9260 20% 48% 23% 8% * 1%
c) Municipal 
authorities 
(Ask urban residents 
only)
2152 13% 46% 27% 13% * 1%
d) District 
government (Ask 
rural residents only)
7108 18% 48% 26% 8% * 1%
Q-48. Has the member of parliament (MP) for your province ever been involved in helping to resolve a 
problem or issue (masala/masael) that affects you in the last 2 years?  
Base: All Respondents 9260
Yes 24%
No 74%
Refused *
Don’t know 2%
Q-49. Has the Provincial Governor ever been involved in helping to resolve a problem or issue (masala/
masael) that affects you in the last 2 years?  
Base: All Respondents 9260
Yes 27%
No 71%
Refused *
Don’t know 2%
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Q-50.  Have you ever personally tried to contact a representative on the provincial council for help in solv-
ing any of your personal or community problems in the last 2 years? 
Base: All Respondents 9260
Yes 24%
No 75%
Refused *
Don’t know 1%
Q-51. (Filtered. Ask if answered “Yes” in Q-50) How satisfied were you with the outcome?
Column percents Base: All Respondents
Base: Contacted a representative on the provincial council 2287
[1] Very satisfied 23%
[2] Somewhat satisfied 50%
[3] Some what dissatisfied 18%
[4] Very dissatisfied 9%
Don’t know (vol.) 1%
Q-52.  (ASK ALL) How satisfied are you with the job your community development council (CDC) is do-
ing? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied? Or if you 
don’t know what they’re doing, or are not aware that you have a CDC, just say “I don’t know.”
Base: All Respondents 9260
Very satisfied 16%
Somewhat satisfied 47%
Some what dissatisfied 22%
Very dissatisfied 8%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 6%
Q-53.  Lets focus on elections. Please tell me if there was an opportunity to vote for each of the following 
types of elections in your area. 
Base: All Respondents Yes No Refused Don’t know
a. District shura 9260 43% 55% * 2%
b. Community development 
council 9260 47% 51% * 2%
c. Provincial council 9260 64% 35% * 1%
d. Parliamentary 9260 70% 29% * 1%
e. Presidential 9260 78% 22% * 1%
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Q-54. When people talk about elections, they often describe them as free and fair. By “free” they generally 
mean that all people have the chance to vote as they wish. By “fair” they generally mean that all can-
didates/parties follow the rules, are given equal access to the public and votes were counted correctly 
and not manipulated. Thinking about what is meant by “free” and “fair”:
In general, do you think elections in Afghanistan are free and fair, or not? 
Base: All Respondents 9260
Yes, free and fair 61%
Not free and fair 35%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 4%
“Please note the text in chapter 7 indicates 61% think elections are free and fair. This is because the 4% 
“don’t know” has been excluded”
Q-55. (Filtered. Ask if answered “No” to Q-54, not free and fair) Tell me the reasons why you think they 
were not free and fair starting with the most important reason and then the next most important 
reason and so on. (Interviewer: Allow up to 4 responses)
Q55a Q55b Q55c Q55d Q55a+b+c+d
Column percents Base: All Respondents
Base: All 
Respondents
Base: All 
Respondents
Base: All 
Respondents
Base: All 
Respondents
Base: Was free and fair 3425 3425 3425 3425 3425
Corruption in the 
election 16% 15% 10% 5% 46%
Corruption in counting 
the votes 33% 20% 10% 3% 66%
Buying votes 14% 16% 10% 3% 42%
Not everyone 
participated in election 2% 3% 3% 1% 9%
People hired for election 
process where illiterate 1% 2% 2% 1% 5%
Nationalism/Bias 2% 2% 2% 1% 7%
Lack of security 11% 9% 8% 4% 32%
One individual voting 
multiple times 2% 3% 2% 2% 9%
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Interference of 
foreigners 5% 4% 4% 2% 15%
Warlords played a big 
role 4% 6% 6% 3% 19%
Political parties were 
involved 1% 1% 2% 1% 5%
Women were not 
allowed to vote 1% 2% 2% 1% 7%
There was no control/
monitoring 1% 3% 2% 1% 8%
Interference of ANA 
and ISAF * * * * 1%
President is a puppet 
installed by foreign 
countries
* * * 1% 2%
Existence of Taliban 1% 1% 1% 1% 3%
Too many candidates * * 1% * 2%
Delay in declaration of 
election results 1% 1% 1% 1% 4%
Weak government 1% 1% 1% 1% 4%
Finger ink was 
removable * * * * 1%
Use of fake cards * 1% 1% * 2%
Taliban were not elected 1% * * * 2%
Local militia 
interference * * * * *
Lack of voting stations * * * * 1%
Under aged people were 
voting * * * * *
Refused * * * * *
Don’t know 2% 8% 31% 67% 67%
Q-56. (ASK ALL) Please tell me which statement you agree with more (Interviewer: Read each statement).
Base: All Respondents 9260
Statement A 81%
Statement B 19%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) *
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Q-57.  From the following four sources – mosque, community shuras, friends/family, and bazaars –  which 
one do you use most often for obtaining information about elections and who to vote for? (Inter-
viewer: Read out the options below; circle the ONE used most often) 
Base: All Respondents 9260
Mosque 13%
Community shuras 18%
Friends and family 48%
Bazaars 5%
Other source (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 16%
Q-58. Does security, by this we mean participating and traveling to polling stations, play a part in deciding 
whether you will vote in an election?
Base: All Respondents 9260
Yes 81%
No 17%
Refused *
Don’t know 2%
Q-59. In 2014, there is going to be an election for a new president in Afghanistan. Do you think the result 
of the presidential election in 2014 is likely to make your life better, make your life worse, or have 
no impact on your life? 
Base: All Respondents 9260
Better 56%
Worse 15%
No difference 24%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know 5%
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Q-60. (“Reconciliation” is a process that takes place when opposing parties overcome a grievance and start 
to rebuild their relationships) Are you aware of any efforts being taken by the Afghan Government 
to reconcile with armed opposition groups? 
Base: All Respondents 9260
Yes 74%
No 25%
Refused *
Don’t know 1%
Q-61. Do you think reconciliation efforts between the Afghan Government and armed opposition 
groups can help to stabilize the country, or not?
Base: All Respondents 9260
Yes 63%
No 32%
Refused *
Don’t know 4%
Q-62. In your opinion, what is the reason that the armed opposition groups are fighting against the Afghan 
government? (Interviewer: Open-ended; write down first answer) 
Write First Mention: ____________________________________________________  
Column percents Base: All Respondents
Base: All Respondents 9260
Presence of foreign troops/international community 22%
To gain power 20%
They are supported by Pakistan 10%
Too much corruption in the government 5%
They are dissatisfied with the government 5%
To support Islam 4%
For money 3%
Unemployment/poverty 3%
They are against democracy 2%
To create insecurity 2%
To establish security 2%
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Illiteracy 2%
Fighting is their way of life 1%
Lack of attention to their desires 1%
Injustice 1%
Ethnic problems 1%
To defend the country 1%
To destroy our country 1%
Creating fear/terror 1%
They implement law 1%
They are brutal/cruel 1%
They are supported/motivated by foreign countries 1%
They are against police forces  *
There is not reason * 
To support drug trafficking  *
Robbery  *
Moral corruption  *
Violence against women  *
Killing innocent people  *
Freedom  *
They are not Afghan  *
Destroying schools  *
Availability of weapons * 
They are corrupt  *
They are Afghans  *
Suffering losses by international forces  *
They are against Islam  *
Refused (vol.)  *
Don’t know (vol.) 7%
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Q-63. What is one reason that an Afghan citizen might support the goals of armed opposition groups?
Write Reason: __________________________________________
Base: All Respondents 9260
Nationalism 6%
Corruption 9%
AOGs work for Pakistan 4%
Their supporters are against peace 3%
Their supporters have been deceived 3%
There is no reason 3%
Lack of jobs 7%
For better security 6%
Their supporters are backed by foreign countries 3%
For their own profit 7%
They are against the USA 3%
AOGs are Muslims 8%
AOGs solve problems faster 1%
They are illiterate 2%
AOGs are Afghan 4%
AOGs are performing Jihad 6%
AOGs serve the people 1%
They are afraid of AOGs 6%
Injustice in Afghanistan 4%
AOGs prevent civilian casualties *
Their supporters are against development *
Their supporters hate democracy *
Weak government 1%
Take revenge on the government *
Lack of shelter *
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 13%
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Q-64. What is one reason that an Afghan citizen might disagree with the goals of armed opposition groups? 
Write Reason: __________________________________________
Base: All Respondents 9260
To finish the war 14%
AOGs are not trustworthy 4%
AOGs have bad intentions 4%
They kill innocent people 24%
They love their country 3%
AOGs are non-Muslims 1%
They work for Pakistan/foreigners 8%
AOGs are corrupt 2%
AOGs are nationalist 1%
They harass people and take bribes 2%
AOGs are not Afghans 1%
They perform suicide bombings 8%
They are fighting against the government 2%
They are against women’s rights 2%
People hate them 2%
AOGs are drug addicts *
AOGs are illiterate 1%
To support the Afghan government 1%
Planting bombs along the roads 1%
They are against development 2%
They are against education 1%
AOGs are kidnappers *
They don’t maintain justice *
People who hate them support Islam 1%
AOGs are against freedom and peace 3%
They don’t want AOGs to gain power *
Refused (vol.) 1%
Don’t know (vol.) 11%
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Q-65.  Thinking about the reasons you have given for why armed opposition groups have been fighting 
during the past year, in general, would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy or 
no sympathy at all for these groups?
Base: All Respondents 9260
A lot of sympathy 9%
A little sympathy 26%
No sympathy at all 63%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 2%
Q-66. I’m going to read some statements. Please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat 
disagree, or strongly disagree with each statement. (Read out statement, wait for response and then ask): 
Base: All 
Respondents
Strongly 
agree
Agree 
somewhat
Disagree 
somewhat
Strongly 
disagree
Refused 
(vol.)
Don’t 
know 
(vol.)
a) Everyone should 
have equal rights under 
the law, regardless of 
their gender
9260 59% 31% 7% 3% * *
b) Everybody should 
have equal rights under 
the law regardless of 
their ethnicity
9260 56% 31% 10% 2% * *
c) Everybody should 
have equal rights under 
the law regardless of 
their religion
9260 54% 32% 10% 3% * 1%
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Q-67.  Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the 
following statements?
Base: All 
Respondents
Strongly 
agree
Agree 
somewhat
Disagree 
somewhat
Strongly 
disagree
Refused 
(vol.)
Don’t 
know 
(vol.)
a) If I had a dispute, I 
am familiar with how 
to bring the case to the 
formal justice system 
(Huquq Department at 
district/provincial level)
9260 32% 45% 16% 6% * 1%
b) If I had a dispute, I 
am familiar with how 
to bring the case to the 
local jirgas, shuras
9260 34% 42% 17% 5% * 1%
Q-68. In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn’t settle with the other 
party and had to go to the Huquq Department or village/neighborhood based shura/jirga to resolve 
it, or not?
Base: All Respondents 9260
Yes 19%
No 80%
Refused *
Don’t know *
Q-69.  (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” in Q-68) What kind of a case or dispute was it? (Single Re-
sponse. If more than one case or dispute, ask for the most recent one) (please note that in the text this 
question had undergone regression analysis for correlations purpose. As a result the percentages in the 
text do not match the respondents’ answers percentages)
Base: Contacted Huquq Department or shura/jirga 1771
Dispute over land 41%
Other property dispute, not land 12%
Commercial dispute 12%
Divorce 5%
Family problems 18%
Traffic accident 9%
Drug smuggling *
Robbery *
Dispute over inheritance *
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 2%
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Q-70. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” in Q-68) Were you satisfied with the outcome of the proceed-
ings, or not?
Base: Contacted Huquq Department or shura/jirga 1771
Fully 24%
Somewhat 47%
No/Dissatisfied 21%
Not finished yet/still in proceedings (vol.) 7%
Don’t know (vol.) 2%
Q-71. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” in Q-68) Where have you taken this case or dispute?
Base: Contacted Huquq Department or shura/jirga 1771
Huquq Department/State court 36%
Village, neighborhood-based shura/jirga 36%
Both (vol.) 25%
Other (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 3%
Q-72.  (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 ‘Huquq Department/State court’ or code 3 ‘Both’ in Q-71) When 
taking a case to the Huquq Department/State Court or being a party in settling a case in a state court, 
have you used any professional legal services (from a lawyer), or have you pleaded your case alone/
with help by friends/relatives?
Base: Huquq Department/State court or both 1073
Professional legal services 25%
Alone/helped by friends, relatives 49%
Both (vol.) 25%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 1%
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Q-73.  (ASK ALL) And now let’s turn to the local Huquq Department. Tell me do you strongly agree, some-
what agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the Huquq 
Department
Base: All 
Respondents
Strongly 
agree
Agree 
somewhat
Disagree 
somewhat
Strongly 
disagree
Refused 
(vol.)
Don’t 
know 
(vol.)
a) Local Huquq 
are fair and 
trusted
9260 21% 49% 20% 8% * 2%
b) Local Huquq 
follow the local 
norms and values 
of our people
9260 17% 41% 29% 10% * 2%
c) Local Huquq 
are effective at 
delivering justice
9260 19% 40% 27% 11% * 2%
d) Local Huquq 
resolve cases 
quickly and 
efficiently
9260 15% 38% 30% 14% * 3%
e) Local Huquq 
effectively sent 
my case to the 
courts
9260 15% 37% 30% 14% 1% 3%
f) Local Huquq 
effectively sent 
my case to the 
local jirgas or 
shuras
9260 13% 39% 30% 14% 1% 4%
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Q-74. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the 
following statements about state courts?
Base: All 
Respondents
Strongly 
agree
Agree 
somewhat
Disagree 
somewhat
Strongly 
disagree
Refused 
(vol.)
Don’t 
know 
(vol.)
a) State courts are 
fair and trusted 9260 21% 41% 25% 13% * 1%
b) State courts 
follow the local 
norms and values 
of our people
9260 14% 37% 32% 16% * 1%
c) State courts 
are effective at 
delivering justice
9260 18% 36% 30% 16% * 1%
d) State courts 
resolve cases 
timely and 
promptly
9260 13% 33% 33% 20% * 1%
e) State courts 
treat men and 
women equally 
9260 16% 38% 28% 16% * 2%
Q-75.  And now let’s turn to village/neighborhood-based jirgas/shuras. Tell me do you strongly agree, 
somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the 
village/neighborhood-based jirgas/shuras?
Base: All 
Respondents
Strongly 
agree
Agree 
somewhat
Disagree 
somewhat
Strongly 
disagree
Refused 
(vol.)
Don’t 
know 
(vol.)
a) Local jirgas, 
shuras are fair 
and trusted
9260 34% 47% 14% 4% * 2%
b) Local jirgas, 
shuras follow 
the local norms 
and values of our 
people
9260 27% 43% 21% 7% * 2%
c) Local jirgas, 
shuras are 
effective at 
delivering justice
9260 27% 43% 21% 7% * 2%
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d) Local jirgas, 
shuras resolve 
cases timely and 
promptly
9260 24% 43% 23% 7% * 1%
e) There should 
be local women’s 
jirgas and shuras 
9260 26% 42% 21% 9% * 2%
Q-76.  And now let’s turn to informal justice. Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat 
disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements?
Base: All 
Respondents
Strongly 
agree
Agree 
somewhat
Disagree 
somewhat
Strongly 
disagree
Refused 
(vol.)
Don’t 
know 
(vol.)
a) The practices of 
baad and badal in 
Afghanistan
9260 13% 24% 24% 38% * 1%
b) The guardian of a 
female should wait 
until she is of adult 
age and should always 
consult her first before 
arranging her marriage
9260 37% 37% 16% 8% * 1%
c) If a husband dies 
without children, his 
wife is entitled to part 
of mahr
9260 36% 35% 17% 9% * 3%
Q-77. How satisfied are you with the available dispute resolution mechanisms/services in your area? Are 
you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, very dissatisfied?
“ Please note the text in chapter 6 indicates 71% are very or somewhat satisfied”. This is because the 3% 
Don’t know responses have been excluded”
Base: All Respondents 9260
Very satisfied 17%
Somewhat satisfied 54%
Some what dissatisfied 21%
Very dissatisfied 6%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 2%
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Q-78. Now let’s talk specifically about women’s issues. What are the biggest problems facing women in this 
area today? [Interviewer: Write down top two answers]  
Q-78a. First mention: _______________________________________
Q-78b. Second mention: _____________________________________
Q78a Q78b Q78a+b
Column percents Base: All Respondents
Base: All 
Respondents
Base: All 
Respondents
Base: All Respondents 9260 9260 9260
Education/illiteracy 27% 17% 44%
Lack of job opportunities for women 12% 13% 25%
Lack of rights/women’s rights 10% 8% 19%
Forced marriages/dowry 9% 7% 16%
Domestic violence 8% 7% 16%
Poverty 3% 4% 7%
General healthcare 4% 2% 6%
Nothing 6% 6% 6%
Pregnancy-related healthcare 3% 3% 5%
Lack of professional courses 3% 2% 5%
Under the control of men/men have power 2% 2% 4%
Security 2% 2% 4%
Can’t leave homes 1% 1% 3%
Freedom and democracy 1% 1% 2%
Lack of electricity and water * * 1%
Murder of literate women * * 1%
Government not paying attention to women 1% 1% 1%
Rapes * * 1%
Representation in shura/jirga * * *
Suicide * * *
Transportation problems * * *
Lack of bakeries for women * * *
Lack of shelter * * *
Drug addiction * * *
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Presence of Taliban * * *
High prices * * *
Cultural problems * * *
Lack of public baths * * *
Corruption * * *
No availability to religious education * * *
Lack of markets for crafts * * *
Injustice * * *
Ethnic problems * * *
Lack of parks for women * * *
Kidnaping of women * * *
Bias * * *
Lack of opportunities for women * * *
Lack of courts for women * * *
Divorcing women * * *
Checkups * * *
Lack of construction * * *
Roadside bombs * * *
Refused * * *
Don’t know 4% 20% 4%
Q-79. In your area is there an organization, institution, or authority, where women can go to have their 
problem(s) resolved?
Base: All Respondents 9260
Yes 18%
No 80%
Refused *
Don’t know 2%
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Q-80. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” in Q-79) What organization, institution, or authority is that?
 Write response: ___________________________________________  
Column percents Base: All Respondents
Base: Has such organization, institution, or authority 1654
Directorate of Women’s Affairs 46%
Human Rights Council 13%
District office 9%
Police 4%
Women’s shura 4%
Human rights office 3%
Provincial office 2%
Qawm elders 2%
Local council 2%
Village shura/Elders shura 2%
The court 1%
National Solidarity Program 1%
Chief of police 1%
Local jirgas 1%
Safe house 1%
Neda-e-Zan organization 1%
Government organizations in general *
Attorney general *
Municipality *
MRRD *
Directorate of Social Works *
WASA organization *
Women capacity-building literacy organization *
Agha Khan foundation *
Red Crescent Society *
Swedish organization *
Relief International *
Religious Ulema *
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Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 4%
Q-81. (ASK ALL) Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. 
Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? (Wait for response and then ask):  Strongly or somewhat?
Base: All Respondents 9260
[1] Strongly agree 43%
[2] Agree somewhat 40%
[3] Disagree somewhat 12%
[4] Strongly disagree 4%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 1%
Q-82. Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that 
women should not be allowed to work outside of the home. What is your opinion on this?
Base: All Respondents 9260
Women should be allowed to work outside the home 63%
Women should not be allowed to work outside the home 36%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 1%
Q-83. Do you think that elected government positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, or do 
you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership? 
Base: All Respondents 9260
Mostly for men 42%
Mostly for women 12%
Equal for both men and women 44%
Leadership should be given to them according to their capability *
Women should do house work *
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 1%
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Q-84. If women vote, do you think that women should decide whom to vote for themselves or should men 
decide for women who they should vote for? 
Base: All Respondents 9260
Women should decide for themselves 53%
Men should decide for women 25%
Women should decide for themselves but in consultation with men 
(vol.) 21%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 1%
Q-85. Do you or other members of your household own any farm land, regardless of whether you person-
ally work on or farm the land yourself or not?
Base: All Respondents 9260
Yes 51%
No 49%
Don’t know *
Q-86. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” in Q-85) How many jeribs of land do you or other members 
of your household own?
_____ jeribs
Column percents Base: All Respondents
Base: Farm land owners 4743
2 17%
3 16%
1 10%
4 10%
5 9%
6 6%
10 6%
8 4%
7 3%
9 2%
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 217
12 2%
15 2%
20 2%
11 1%
13 1%
14 1%
16 1%
25 1%
30 1%
40 1%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 3%
Mean value 6.98
Q-87. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” in Q-85) How much of your land do you or other members 
of your household farm? 
Base: Farm land owners 4743
Less than 1 Jerib 9%
1 - 2 Jerib 29%
2 - 3 Jerib 22%
More than 3 Jerib 38%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 1%
Q-88.  (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” in Q-85) Have you or other members of your household lost 
any land in the past year?
Base: Farm land owners 4743
Yes 14%
No 84%
Don’t know 2%
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Q-89. (Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” in Q-88) What is the reason you or other members of your household 
lost land this past year?
Write reason for loss: ____________________
Base: Lost any land 649
Sale of land 27%
Land-grabbing 8%
Lack of anti-flood walls 20%
I lost it in a dispute 5%
Lost land because of debt 26%
Lost land due to a murder case 4%
Refused (vol.) 1%
Don’t know (vol.) 10%
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DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS
D-1. Gender 
Base: All Respondents 9260
Male 62%
Female 38%
D-2. (ASK ALL) How old are you?  (Record actual age; if respondent doesn’t know or refuses, please estimate) 
Base: All Respondents 9260
 Years  Percentage of respondent
30 6%
40 6%
18 5%
20 5%
25 4%
28 4%
35 4%
19 3%
21 3%
22 3%
23 3%
32 3%
38 3%
45 3%
50 3%
24 2%
26 2%
27 2%
29 2%
31 2%
33 2%
36 2%
37 2%
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41 2%
42 2%
60 2%
34 1%
39 1%
43 1%
44 1%
46 1%
47 1%
48 1%
49 1%
51 1%
52 1%
54 1%
55 1%
56 1%
65 1%
70 1%
D-3. Are you now working, a housewife (ask only women), retired, a student, or looking for work?
Base: All Respondents 9260
Working 51%
Retired 1%
Housewife 33%
Student 8%
Unemployed 7%
Refused *
Don’t know *
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D-4. (Ask if codes 1 or 2, ‘Working’ or ‘Retired’ in D-3):  What is your main occupation? (Write down and 
then code. If retired, ask for previous occupation and then code)
Occupation: _____________________________________
Base: Working or retired 4802
Farmer (own land/tenant farmer) 36%
Skilled worker/artisan 10%
Farm laborer (other’s land) 9%
Informal sales/business 9%
Laborer, domestic, or unskilled worker 8%
Self-employed professional 7%
Small business owner 6%
School teacher 5%
Government office - clerical worker 4%
Military/Police 3%
Private office - clerical worker 1%
Government office - executive/manager 1%
Private office - executive/manager 1%
University teacher *
D-5. (ASK ALL) What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed?  (Write down one code 
for just the highest level selected from the list below)
       Education level:_________________________
Base: All Respondents 9260
Never went to a school 60%
Informal schooling at home or at a literacy class 2%
Islamic education at a Madrassa 3%
Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5) 6%
Primary School, complete (finished class 6) 4%
Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8) 5%
Secondary education, complete (finished class 9) 3%
High School incomplete (classes 10-11) 5%
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High School complete (finished class 12) 9%
14th grade incomplete (class 13) 2%
14th grade complete (finished class 14) 3%
University education incomplete (have no degree diploma) 1%
University education complete (have degree diploma) 1%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) *
D-6.  Please tell me if you can:
Base: All 
Respondents Yes No
Don’t know 
(vol.)
a. Write a letter to someone without any 
assistance 9260 40% 60% *
b. Read a letter from somebody without 
any assistance 9260 41% 59% *
c. ‘If a piece of nan cost 20 Afghani 
at a bakery, do you know how 
much change you will get if you 
want to buy 4 pieces and you have 
100 Afghani in your pocket? (Do 
not read responses)’
Base: All 
Respondents
Yes, 20 
Afs
Yes, other 
amount No
Don’t know 
(vol.)
9260 79% 12% 8% 1%
D-7.  Which languages do you speak? (Multiple Response)
Base: All Respondents 9260
Dari 79%
Pashto 51%
Uzbeki 9%
English 5%
Turkmeni 3%
Urdu 2%
Balochi 1%
Pashayee 1%
Nooristani 1%
Arabic 1%
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D-8. What languages can you read? (Multiple Response)
Base: All Respondents 9260
Dari 30%
Pashto 26%
English 6%
Arabic 2%
Uzbeki 1%
Urdu 1%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 61%
D-9.  What languages can you write? (Multiple Response)
Base: All Respondents 9260
Dari 28%
Pashto 23%
Uzbeki 1%
Arabic 2%
English 6%
Urdu 1%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) 63%
D-10. Are you married or single?
Base: All Respondents 9260
Single 19%
Married 79%
Widower/Widow 2%
D-11. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 2 or 3 in D-10 [Men only]) How many times have you been married? 
(Record Number Below)
Total: 4497
1 91%
2 8%
3 1%
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D-11a. (Filtered, Ask if aanswered code 2 or 3 in D-10 [Men only]) Of these, how many are still living? 
(Record Number Below)
Column percents Base: All Respondents
Total: 4497
0 1%
1 96%
2 4%
D-12. (ASK ALL) How often do you eat meat in a typical week (excluding weddings or special events)?
Base: All Respondents 9260
Never 10%
Once 52%
More than once 34%
Every day 3%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know *
D-13. How often do you eat vegetables in a typical week (excluding weddings or special events)?
Base: All Respondents 9260
Never 6%
Once 23%
More than once 44%
Every day 26%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know *
D-14. Which ethnic group do you belong to? (SINGLE RESPONSE ONLY)
Base: All Respondents 9260
Pashtun 43%
Tajik 32%
Hazara 10%
Uzbek 7%
Turkmeni 2%
Arab 2%
Baloch 1%
Nooristani 1%
Aimak 1%
Sadat 1%
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D-15.  Which of the following three options do you identify with most at the moment – choose one?  
Base: All 
Respondents
Being a 
citizen of 
your country
Being a 
member of 
your ethnic 
group
Being a 
follower of 
your religion
Refused 
(vol.)
Don’t 
know 
(vol.)
D15a First 
Mention 9260 66% 17% 17% * *
D15b  Second 
Mention 9260 15% 30% 47% * 8%
D15a,b,c, 
Mention 9260 81% 46% 64% * *
D-16. (Ask All) How many people live here in this household?  (Record Number Below)
Base: All Respondents 9260
8 13%
7 12%
9 12%
10 11%
6 10%
5 7%
11 7%
12 7%
13 4%
4 3%
3 2%
14 2%
15 2%
16 2%
2 1%
17 1%
18 1%
19 1%
20 1%
Mean value 9.22
Afghanistan in 2013226
D-18a. For statistical purposes only, we need to know your average monthly household income. Will you 
please tell me which of the following categories best represents your average total family monthly in-
come? [Interviewer: if the respondent can only tell you their annual family income, divide this by 12]
Base: All Respondents 9260
Less than 2,000 Afs 6%
2,001 - 3,000 Afs 12%
3,001 - 5,000 Afs 24%
5,001 - 10,000 Afs 30%
10,001 - 15,000 Afs 15%
15,001 - 20,000 Afs 8%
20,001 - 25,000 Afs 3%
25,001 - 40,000 Afs 1%
More then 40,000 Afs 1%
Refused *
Don’t know 1%
D-18b. Do female members of the family contribute to this household income, or not?
Base: All Respondents 9260
Yes 17%
No 82%
Refused (vol.) *
Don’t know (vol.) *
D-18c. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” in D-18b) How much of your household’s total income comes 
from female members of the household?
Base: Female members of the family contribute to HHI 1614
Less than 25% 64%
Between 26% and 50% 26%
Between 51% and 75% 7%
Between 76% and 100% 2%
Refused *
Don’t know *
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D19a. Please rate the living standard of your household. Does your household have enough money for food 
every day?
Yes No Refused Don’t Know
a. Does your household have enough money for food every day? 85% 15% * *
b. Does your household always have enough money for fuel? 66% 44% * *
c. Does your household have enough money for your daily food, 
fuel and children’s education? 53% 47% * *
d. Does your household have enough money for your daily food, 
fuel, children’s education and to buy occasional luxury items? 26% 73% * *
D-20. Have you lived outside of Afghanistan in another country at any time in the past 20 years?
Base: All Respondents 9260
Yes 23%
No 77%
Refused (vol.) *
D-21a. (Ask if code 1 “Yes” in D-20) In what country or countries have you lived?
Base: Lived outside Afghanistan 2116
Pakistan 67%
Iran 35%
India 1%
Saudi Arabia 1%
Dubai 1%
Russia 1%
D-21b. (Fill in for each country listed in D-21a) How long in years did you live in this country?
Base: Lived outside Afghanistan 1409
10 13%
2 9%
3 9%
8 8%
4 7%
Afghanistan in 2013228
5 7%
12 6%
15 6%
1 5%
6 4%
7 4%
9 3%
11 3%
13 3%
14 3%
20 2%
16 1%
17 1%
18 1%
25 1%
30 1%
RECORD THE TIME (USING 24-HOUR CLOCK) INTERVIEW WAS COMPLETED AND 
LENGTH OF THE INTERVIEW (M-16 AND M-17)
Read closing statement to the respondent: 
“Thank you for participating in our survey. Do you have any questions? In the next few days my 
supervisor may contact you to evaluate the quality of my work and answer any other questions you 
may have. To help him do that, could I have your name and address?”
Respondent Information: Name:   ____________________
 Address: ____________________
Interviewer Certification: “I certify that I have completed this interview according to the instruc-
tions provided me by the Afghan Center for Socio-economic and Opinion Research.”
    ___________________ _______________
    Signed    Date 
 To be completed by the supervisor:
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D-25. Was the interview subject to quality control/back-check?
Base: All Respondents 9260
Yes 44%
No 56%
 D-26. Method of quality control/back-check
Base: All Respondents 9260
Direct supervision during interview 2%
Back-check in person by supervisor 27%
Back-check from the central office 7%
Not applicable 56%
Back-checked by Sayara personnel 8%
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